42. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State1
5335. Subject: President Assad’s Letter to President Carter. Ref: Damascus 5318.2
Summary: President Assad’s response to President Carter’s September 7 letter,3 received September 11, was forthcoming. He said inter alia that Syria would continue to seek a political solution; that fundamentally—despite provocations—Syria’s policy in Lebanon is one of self-defense and standfast; and that the objectives of Syrian policy in Lebanon remain the unity of the land and people of Lebanon, the sovereignty of the central government and the stopping of fighting. He stressed that all acts of the peacekeeping force, which is responsible for maintaining security and public order, are motivated by concern for the [Page 161] unity of Lebanon and the continued existence of the Lebanese state. He pledged that Syrian forces would practice a maximum degree of self-control while efforts are being exerted to help the Lebanese reach a solution. The remainder of the letter is a catalogue of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis, highlighting the activities of the Chamounists and Phalangists in blocking reconciliation or rebuilding the national army. Assad called attention to the Israeli role in encouraging these two groups, and urged the US to exert pressure on Israel to stop interfering in Lebanon. In delivering the text the presidency highlighted Assad’s public statements on Syria’s Lebanon policy in German interview (septel),4 including Syria’s intention to withdraw the minute they are requested to by the Lebanese Government. End summary.
1. President’s Private Secretary, Mohammed Dabboul, delivered to me September 11 President Assad’s response to President Carter’s September 7 letter on Lebanon. The response is forthcoming. Text of letter follows.
[Begin] text.
His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter
President of the United States of America
Dear Mr. President
I have received your letter dated September 7, and while I share your concern over the sad events that are taking place in the sister country of Lebanon, I would point out the following:
1. Since the very start of civil fighting in Lebanon in April 1975 and until the beginning of June 1976, we exerted great political efforts to stop acts of violence and to restore calm and stability to the sister country of Lebanon. However, those political efforts in which other parties—Arab and foreign—sometimes participated failed and the civil war continued: hundreds of people were killed daily, villages and city quarters were destroyed, the state of Lebanon collapsed, the army and the security forces disintegrated and partition became a factual thing and the talk of all parties. Indeed, some of these parties made practical arrangements for the setting up of petty sectarian states and Syria received one million Lebanese refugees.
2. Together these events produced grave results which threatened the unity and independence of Lebanon and the integrity of its territory. The sovereignty of the State was shattered into fragments that fell into the hands of various parties. In those difficult circumstances and while the fighting was favoring one party, we realized that the continuation of the fighting, the imbalance of forces and a victory by one party [Page 162] over the other—all this would mean a defeat for the unity and independence of Lebanon as well as more violence, bloodshed and destruction. Thereupon, Syria assumed its national and brotherly responsibility towards Lebanon and sent units of its armed forces to stop fighting, restore peace, foil acts aiming at partition and maintain the unity and national safety of Lebanon. In this effort, Syria clashed with parties with whom we have political and emotional ties, including the Palestinians. The Syrian units made use of some of the means available to them to stop the fighting and to maintain the national balance in Lebanon, nothwithstanding the psychological effects produced on us by this use. But we regarded the interests of Lebanon and the restoration of peace to its territories more important than the suffering, burdens and losses we endured. Thus, fighting was stopped and peace was restored to all parts of Lebanon.
3. During the period of calm which followed, we tried to make the Lebanese Government play a more effective role in achieving national reconciliation and building up a national army which enjoys the confidence of all parties, because it is nationally constituted and because it owes allegiance only to the state and not to armed factions or to leaderships produced by the civil war. We did this in the belief that a country’s army should symbolize the national aspirations of its citizens as well as their desire for peace and stability. Unfortunately, however, no part of all this could be effected because the Falangists and the Chamounites placed obstacles in the way of the endeavors of the Lebanese Government to produce national reconcilation, commence a national dialogue, form a Council of Ministers embracing all parties, restore the institutions of the State and impose its authority in all Lebanese territories. In addition to rejecting the reconstruction of the Lebanese Army whose unity had been shattered by the civil war, they tied up the majority of its officers and military personnel with the “Military Council of the Lebanese Front” and thereby prevented the President of the Republic of Lebanon and his government from taking any effective measures related to the armed forces. They furthermore resorted to all means to achieve their aim—including threats of murder and terror—and did all this so that officers of the Army would serve them and would not serve the State of Lebanon.
4. During that period we displayed a measure of tolerance and flexibility beyond belief. We did this in the hope that time would persuade the deviating parties to go back to the right path and to restore to the central Government of Lebanon and authorities usurped by them. In fact they have been exerting authority to levy taxes, control education and public services and commit incredible acts of brutality against citizens in the areas over which they have imposed their authority. The Falangists and the Chamounites who performed these acts adopted [Page 163] partition slogans such as “self-ensured security” in the areas in which they have overthrown the authority of the State of Lebanon.
5. The two parties of the Falangists and the Chamounites were encouraged by Israeli intervention in Lebanon and particularly in southern Lebanon. You recall in this regard, I am sure, the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon and the part played by Israel in preventing the effective restoration of the authority of the State of Lebanon therein and in barring the entry of a Lebanese Army unit into this area, thereby violating Security Council Resolutions nos. 425 and 426. In fact you know best the details of the Israeli intervention.
6. Since the beginning of this year, Israeli intervention has become more evident: arms and military aid are being sent to the Falangists and Chamounites, who are urged to proceed with their partition policies and practices and instigated to commit provocative acts against the peacekeeping forces, including the Syrian forces. The great provocation, however, was launched on February 8 of this year, when some military elements made an unexpected attack on a patrol of the peacekeeping forces, killing a number of its members. Successive provocations against the peacekeeping forces followed, and the forces which are the instrument of the lawful authority in Lebanon had to resort to self-defense and to sticking to their positions without moving over any territory in the hope that those who challenge the unity, safety and stability of Lebanon would ultimately return to the right path.
In fact provoking the peacekeeping forces was not the limit for them. For they went so far as to commit crimes of murder in order to rid themselves of the policies of Christian leaders opposed to their own policies and practices. Such was the case of the murder of the late Toni Franjieh, a former Lebanese Deputy and Minister and the son of President Suleiman Franjieh, a former President of Lebanon.
7. Launching attacks against the peacekeeping forces aims to put an end to all manifestations of lawful authority in Lebanon inasmuch as those forces, in addition to being the only force of the lawful authority in Lebanon acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people, constitute the only force capable of imposing law and order. This explains why the Israelis persist in instigating armed groups to clash with the peacekeeping forces.
8. By virtue of the nature of their mission, the peacekeeping forces are responsible for maintaining security and public order in Lebanon. All acts which they have carried out in Lebanon and those which they will carry out are motivated by concern for the unity of Lebanon and the continued existence of the Lebanese State. I am sure, Mr. President, you agree with me that if a armed group were to violate public order and threaten the safety and security of citizens in an American city, it would be the primary duty of the American security forces to hasten to [Page 164] defend law and public order without awaiting a specific order, the act being of the very essence of their tasks and duties.
9. In this connection, reference should be made to the campaign currently being launched by the Israeli information media on the subject of an alleged liquidation of Christians in Lebanon. I very much wish that in relation to this campaign you would recall the acts and practices of Israel against the Palestinians—Christians and Muslims alike.
When the Christians were hard pressed in the civil war in Lebanon, Syria alone assumed the responsibility for relieving pressure and restoring balance to the Lebanese arena.
I hope you are not unaware of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Christians are opposed to the policies and practices of the Phalangists and Chamounites, as has been declared by a large number of their leaders. Moreover, the Christians living in the areas controlled by the peacekeeping forces enjoy excellent conditions of life. If the whole question were sectarian in nature, why is it, it may be asked, that fighting breaks out only in a limited section of Beirut?
The fact is that the Christians in Lebanon, like the Muslims, are opposed to the acts of violence practiced by the Phalangists and Chamounites with Israeli instigation. They are all in favour of the unity of the country and of restoring the authority of the State to all parts of Lebanon.
10. It should also be noted here that the talk now being carried on by the Israelis and Zionists concerning alleged persecution of Christians—who constitute part of our nation and cannot be subjected to persecution by anyone—is reminiscent of the European practice in the 19th century—which is now part of history—of using the pretext of the protection of minorities in order to cover intervention in some areas and to impose European colonialism.
A more important consideration is that this talk will lead the Islamic world to talk about the fate of the Muslims of Lebanon, considering that Lebanon, by its very social structure, consists of several sects and communities. Such trends, Mr. President, will surely lead to the destruction of the national unity of Lebanon, which is a matter of the utmost significance to all the citizens of Lebanon.
11. While thanking you for the letter in which you expressed concern over the present situation in Lebanon—a concern which I share with you, I believe that the United States can greatly help the sister state of Lebanon by exerting pressure to make the Israeli Government stop its intervention in Lebanon and discontinue the military, material and political support which it gives to some armed groups—a support that encourages acts which contradict what both our governments have declared concerning the security, peace, sovereignty and unity of Leb[Page 165]anon. Moreover, a declared American stand in this direction, would constitute a positive and constructive contribution.
Undoubtedly, a continuation of the Israeli attitude constitutes a factor threatening the security of the region.
12. In conclusion, would reaffirm the objectives of our policy in Lebanon, namely the unity of the land and people of Lebanon, the sovereignty of the central government and the stopping of fighting. Acting on these principles, the Syrian forces in Lebanon practice a maximum degree of self-control, while efforts are being exerted to help the Lebanese Government by attempting to reach a political solution acceptable to the various parties and by taking measures conducive to maintaining security, upholding the authority of the law and safeguarding the country’s unity and integrity.
Syria is as desirous to protect the safety of the citizens of Lebanon, regardless of their social or political adherence, as that of its own citizens. They are all our brothers for whose sake we have endured a great deal of suffering, burdens and sacrifices.
With best regards and wishes,
Hafez al-Assad
President of the Syrian Arab Republic
Damascus, September 10, 1978
End text.
2. Comment: Dabboul seemed very pleased with the contents of President al-Assad’s letter, obviously believing that they were responsive to the points made by our President in his letter. After reading the letter, I said I was glad to see that President al-Assad had alluded to “efforts being exerted by the Lebanese Government . . . to reach a political solution.” As he knew, we felt very strongly about this, believing that further military actions would only complicate the situation in Lebanon and risk escalation. The situation is very tense and unless Syria exercises caution, there is the ever present danger of Israeli intervention. Dabboul echoed the standard SARG position that the Syrian Army is merely reactive to provocations.
3. I then reminded Dabboul of our proposal that the Syrian Government reiterate publicly its ultimate intentions in Lebanon, including an eventual troop withdrawal. Dabboul enthusiastically showed me a copy of the daily newspaper Al-Ba’ath in which Assad was quoted in a German interview as not only reiterating Syria’s “honorable” intentions in Lebanon but also as saying that Syrian forces would withdraw from Lebanon the minute they were requested to do so by the Lebanese Government.
[Page 166]4. Assad’s two public interviews September 9 and 11 (septel)5 constitute further clear statements of Syrian intention to withdraw. Statements specifically counter charges that Syria seeking by its actions in Lebanon to undercut Camp David, ignore the popular will in Lebanon, or implement dream of “Greater Syria.”
5. Believe, as Dabboul implied, that these statements are a direct response to our request for public statement on intention to withdraw.
6. Suggest Department pass6 to Beirut and Tel Aviv.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–1998. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Not found.↩
- Reference is presumably to Document 29.↩
- See telegram 5334 from Damascus, September 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780369–1067)↩
- Ibid.↩
- The Department relayed Assad’s letter in telegram 231943 to multiple posts, September 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780007–0528)↩