Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

46. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 12, 1978, 2–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• AMERICAN SIDE

  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
  • Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • William Quandt, National Security Council
  • Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
  • Denis Clift, Vice President’s Staff

• EGYPTIAN SIDE

  • Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
  • Ahmed Maher, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister
  • Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
  • Nabil el-Araby, Director of Legal Department, Foreign Ministry
  • Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry
  • Abou el Gheite, Office of the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

• Egyptian Comments on U.S. Paper

Kamel first expressed appreciation for the efforts of President Carter, the Secretary and the U.S. Delegation. He said that the Egyptian side understands the importance of positive results. He had earlier in the morning met President Carter by chance and in a brief chat explained to the President what the Egyptians have in mind.²

Prior to discussing the U.S. paper³ in detail, he wished to outline a number of points on which the U.S. and Egypt are in agreement: (a) the desire to keep and to preserve the relationship between our two countries, (b) concern that a comprehensive and just peaceful settlement be reached. The results should be such that it will attract others to join, (c) whatever settlement is reached must “fortify” Egypt and strengthen the moderate states of the (Middle East) area in order to enable them to meet the “dangerous trends” that are now spreading in that area, (d) we must prevent chaos from developing in the area and be alive to the dangers of Soviet penetration. This means that conditions should not be created which have the effect of distorting the U.S. image in the area.

The Secretary said that we agree on all four points. He called the maintenance of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship vital. There must be a comprehensive settlement. We wish the result of the Camp David meetings to fortify Egypt, to protect Sadat, and to underscore Sadat’s paramount position in the Arab world. We have great respect for President Sadat as a true leader. We agree that world chaos should be avoided as should anything that jeopardizes the moderate forces in the area.

Kamel went on to say that the Egyptian side has carefully studied our paper. He was happy that we welcome any proposals that the Egyptians might wish to put forward. The Egyptian proposals, he said, aim at creating a balance between the obligations of the parties. As he saw it, the American proposal in its present form will in no way obtain Saudi approval. He thought that we are in agreement that Saudi support is needed. Hussein will also be reluctant to join. Hussein’s participation, Kamel stressed, is essential.

The Egyptian position, Kamel recalled, is explained in the paper which the Egyptian side had earlier presented to us. It is based on (a) a balance of obligations between the parties, (b) insuring Israeli withdrawal to the ’67 lines except for minor rectifications, (c) insuring the security of all parties, (d) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, (e) the participation of all parties. Kamel then asked el-Baz to present the details of the Egyptian ideas.

El-Baz first explained what he called the “Egyptian approach” to the U.S. formula. The Egyptians had come, he stated, with the objective of reaching agreement. By this they meant agreement with the “other party.” A fortiori they wish to reach agreement with the U.S. in order to see if there is common ground between us. The Egyptians are positive on the U.S. role. They have an interest in assuring the success of the American effort. They believe that the American side wishes to be even-handed and fair. The American paper has been studied in this light. Points of agreement between us have been sought. So has the answer to the question: what is the main purpose of the United States in presenting the proposal? It is intended to be a compromise between the Israeli and Egyptian positions or is it a formulation of U.S. views on controversial issues involved in the dispute.

The Secretary said that the purpose of the U.S. proposal is to set forth a fair and even-handed method and framework which will allow a comprehensive settlement to be achieved. It also takes into account practical and other related aspects of the problem.

El-Baz said the Egyptian side has some problem with the structuring of the American paper, but that this is not overly important. He wished to make some general comments about the American paper. First, the Egyptians do not get a clear definition from our paper of corresponding obligations that the parties should have to each other pursuant to UN Resolutions, which are the basis for settlement. He specifically mentioned UN Resolution 242. The recurrent theme in the American paper, as the Egyptians see it, is that the main obligation is to negotiate. The obligation to “act” has been subordinated by this emphasis. Negotiations, he contended, are a process; they are not a basic obligation. They must also be put in the framework of how the Arab-Israeli situation has evolved. Our approach only defers dealing squarely with the problems. The U.S. paper suggests that the parties negotiate on the basis of such and such resolutions. The history of the dispute, el-Baz argued, makes it clear that the Israelis conduct their litigation without a full recognition of the mutuality of obligations. Egypt believes it is essential that there be a clear definition of the obligation of both parties. The negotiations should focus on how to implement obligations.

Second, el-Baz noted, the American paper appears to de-emphasize mutuality and reciprocity, especially in its provisions concerning security. The Egyptians realize that security is for both parties. “For certain reasons” Egypt accepted the “notion” that the Israelis are more sensitive on this point. But this should not be a general rule. Security is a right and an obligation for all.

When Egypt presented its draft proposal, el-Baz continued, it believed that the proposal contained many ideas. The Egyptians were surprised to find that the American paper did not draw much on the Egyptian paper. There were some serious omissions in the American paper, e.g., (a) any reference to the declaration of human rights, (b) a declaration to the principles of international law, (c) any reference to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. The Egyptians had thought that this last provision, in particular, should give no problem, since as early as October, 1956, Israel accepted the concept of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, (d) the concept of UN Security Council guarantee of borders. The latter, el-Baz argued, should be in the interest of every party to the dispute.

The Secretary explained that these omissions were prompted by our belief that if certain declarations are cited, the Israelis will wish to add their own list of citations. We want to achieve the objectives of the Egyptian proposal within specific reference to a series of documents. On compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, he noted that when the Israelis signed this agreement, they specifically excluded its applicability to Arab-Israeli matters. The Israelis do not believe that the ICJ is unbiased. If there were some method other than the ICJ, it might be more palatable. On borders, the Secretary pointed out that we have covered this in paragraph 7 of the American paper. Our language is simpler, but the Egyptian concept is included.

El-Baz commented that Israel appears to be seeking to force Egypt to accept only one method in resolving disputes. This method is uninterrupted negotiations, even if these lead to no progress. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which the American paper cites, speaks of other methods of resolving disputes. Israel regrettably thinks it can deal with the Arabs on the basis of the de facto situation.

The Secretary suggested that the Egyptians make their suggestion on this point. Nabil el-Araby observed that the methods of settling disputes are contained in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. The article leaves it to the parties to choose the method they wish to employ. Why should the method of direct negotiations be singled out? The Secretary responded that we have not singled out any method. The ICJ language has been taken out.

El-Baz then commented that in the Egyptian paper, there had been the proposal that all parties agree to the NPT. The Egyptians had assumed this would meet with enthusiastic American approval. The (nuclear) issue creates a special element of tension in the area. It gives psychological and physical concern to both sides. There is no need, el-Baz argued, to accommodate the Israelis on this point.

El-Baz then said he wished to make some specific comments:

A. The Palestinian problem: This, he noted, is the crux of the issue. The formulation and concept to resolve it must be clear. The sovereign rights of the (Palestinian) people must be clear. He understood that the Egyptian and American positions on this are similar. If one begins from this assumption, one must go on to say that in principle, Israel is obligated to withdraw in the West Bank/Gaza in accordance with the “inadmissibility” language.

El-Baz stated that, in recognition of the sensitivity of this problem, Egypt has accepted the concept of a transitional period. It did so in an effort to be cooperative and to ease the resolution of the problem. It also did so to accommodate the United States. Israeli withdrawal will enable the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination. The Egyptians find basic defects in the way this problem is presented in the American paper. The interim arrangement envisaged in our paper carries with it the seeds of perpetuation. It can become a permanent arrangement. There is no clearcut Israeli commitment to withdraw or how to do so. Israel is also given a prominent role in deciding the final outcome. Granted, the American paper calls for the abolition of military government, but Israel remains a major participant in running the area. All authority is derived from Israel. This, el-Baz contended, negates the concept of abolishing the Israeli military government. Egypt and Jordan, he noted, can play a role to provide additional needed security in the West Bank/Gaza.

The Secretary said that it is not correct that the American proposal envisages the interim regime will become a permanent one. We have spoken of an interim settlement and the participation of the inhabitants in the determination of their own future. He drew attention to page 7, para 2 in support of this view. The people elect the self-governing authority. That authority derives its competence from Egypt, Israel and Jordan, at such time as the latter joins. We sought to place authority in the hands of the people through an election process. Egypt, Jordan and Israel should have a role so that they can in a practical way set up the authority.

Abdul Rauf el-Reedy contended that this simply creates confusion. It can be used by the Israelis to claim that Israel is a partner in the interim period. This prejudices the basic principle that authority should derive from the people. The Secretary noted that the Egyptians believe this and so do we, but the Israelis do not. Our belief is that the American formulation is a practical way to handle the problem. Nabil el-Araby stated that as long as there is a provision that Israel is one of the parties from whom authority is derived, Israel will claim a favored position. On page 8 of the American draft, Israeli residual rights are cited. The Egyptians’ study of those rights suggest that the self-governing authority will be limited to maintaining internal security. Others will handle the territorial aspects.

The Secretary asked if it might be better to delete the sentence about the source of the authority for the self-governing group. The Egyptians readily agreed that this should be done. The Secretary said we will consider this.

El-Baz noted that if this concept is deleted, page 9 of the American proposal still gives the Israelis an important voice in determining the future of the West Bank/Gaza. This should be handled through self-determination of the Palestinian people. The Egyptians know the American concept. But the parties must agree at the beginning on pertinent principles to be applied. This should not be left to the end, otherwise the self-governing arrangement will simply be perpetuated. The Israelis will have a veto. Leaving the issue vague, as the American paper does, poses a problem for the final settlement.

The Secretary observed that if one tries to eliminate Israel at this point, one is prematurely forcing a decision on the sovereignty question. The Israelis are reserving their claim to sovereignty in the West Bank, but are not now asserting it. The United States and Egypt believe that the people of the area should decide. El-Reedy contended that it will be difficult to proceed with two interpretations of this issue. If a way is left for Israel to assert sovereignty, it will cause trouble. The Secretary said we cannot stop the Israelis from doing so. El-Baz argued that this is a basic issue. The Secretary agreed, but said we had agreed not to face it now. El-Reedy said that if Israel is to determine the future of the West Bank/Gaza, Israel will always believe that is its objective. El-Araby argued that the sovereignty issue should be faced squarely.

El-Araby stated that when the right of self-determination is mentioned, this means the final step. It should be decided by the Palestinians living there, either through plebiscite, referendum, etc. No one but the Palestinians should participate. Egypt accepts negotiations with the Palestinians and Jordanians on security measures, but not on deciding the final status of the West Bank/Gaza. The American paper confuses this issue. El-Baz asked what happens if Israel does not reach agreement with the Arabs? The American proposal omits any clear and unequivocal obligation on the part of Israel to withdraw from the West Bank/Gaza with the possibility of minor rectifications that do not reflect the weight of conquest. This has been the constant United States position.

El-Baz also noted that the Aswan formula⁴ has not been reproduced in full in the American paper. The term “people” had been omitted. The Secretary said that he was willing to put this back.

El-Araby next indicated Egyptian unhappiness with the “amalgamation” of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. The Israelis, he noted, are given a veto in our paper on the return of displaced persons. In the case of the refugees, El-Araby acknowledged, Israel has a say in accordance with UN resolutions. However, UN Resolution 237 of 1967,⁵ which the United States had voted for, governs the status of the displaced persons. It is different from UN Resolution 194,⁶ which covers the Palestinian refugees. These two concepts, el-Araby asserted, should not be amalgamated.

El-Araby also was unhappy with the inclusion on page 12 of a reference to Egypt and Israel reaching agreement on “Arab and Jewish refugees.” On Arab refugees, it is the Palestinians who are involved. In the case of Jewish refugees, El-Araby noted that this can only apply to Egyptian citizens of Jewish faith who left Egypt after 1967 or before. Egypt is agreeable that such individuals may return to Egypt at any time they wish.

The Secretary noted that we are aware of the refugee program. It has not been adequately dealt with. Our paper is trying to show that the entire refugee problem needs to be handled. El-Baz stated that the Egyptians object to equating the Jewish refugee issue with the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian refugees, he reiterated, are separate from the displaced persons and should be so treated. They are also separate from Jewish refugees. He saw no real problem with Jewish refugees. If an individual has a claim, it is his or her right to seek redress through the courts or through international adjudication.

The Secretary asked if the Egyptians object to the use of “Arab” and to the inclusion of Jewish refugees also to the non-reference to the UN Resolutions. Saunders pointed out that there is a separate Jewish refugee problem. He did not think it sufficient to cite UN Resolution 194. Israel must somehow be brought into the action in order to solve the refugee problem. El-Araby suggested the matter be taken piece-by-piece: displaced persons should be cited, Palestinian refugees should be cited, but in a manner where their rights are not prejudiced during the interim period. (He made no reference to Jewish refugees.)

El-Baz referred to our reference to a continuing committee to handle by unanimous agreement unresolved issues. He asked what we have in mind with this provision. Saunders observed that the reference is a purely technical one. He recalled the mixed commission that was set up in the Sinai II Agreement. There are certain issues which such a group could discuss and, hopefully, resolve. El-Baz responded that putting problems into hands of the two parties might in effect result in a stalemate. He pointed out that mechanisms do exist to handle this sort of a situation and referred again to the ICJ.

El-Araby noted that day-to-day operations in the West Bank/Gaza should be within the competence of the local, self-governing authority. Saunders suggested that the Egyptians provide us with appropriate language.

The Secretary asked whether the use of the term “consensus” will solve the Egyptian problem. The Egyptians responded unanimously that it will not. Saunders pointed out that the Israelis are a party to the problem during the transitional period. El-Baz agreed to provide us with pertinent language.

El-Baz then referred to the paragraph in our paper on Jerusalem. He expressed understanding that the problem is difficult and sensitive. But, he pointed out, Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank. Neither the United States nor Egypt recognize the amalgamation of Arab Jerusalem into Israel. Jerusalem, he insisted, is included in the Israeli obligation to withdraw. Egypt agrees that the city should not be redivided. He drew a distinction between the issue of sovereignty in East Jerusalem and that of the life of the people. The Secretary pointed out that our paper says that Jerusalem should not again be divided. El-Baz noted that the United States also agrees that Jerusalem is not a part of Israel. The Secretary observed that trying to solve the Jerusalem problem now is a mistake. It will simply create problems. He suggested it be left to the Jordanians for the future. Kamel observed that we want Hussein to come in. El-Baz stated that if this is our common concern, the United States formula is harmful. The “future relationship” phrase used in the American paper, he contended is Israeli phraseology. The Secretary pointed out that it is not, it is our language. El-Baz insisted that two sovereignties in Jerusalem should not be allowed. The issue should be handled first by Israeli withdrawal, and thereafter by agreement not to redivide the city. The starting point should be non-recognition of the Israeli occupation. Unfortunately, the phraseology in the American paper leads to the conclusion that the Israelis may remain. The Secretary pointed out that we are simply saying that the ultimate arrangements for Jerusalem must be worked out some time in the future. Atherton suggested that the final sentence in the paragraph on Jerusalem should take care of the Egyptian concern. The Egyptians insisted it will not. The Secretary asked whether the Wailing Wall should be under Jordan. El-Baz said it should be so far as jurisdiction is concerned. The Jews might have the right to visit, and claimed this is already taken care of by the reference to freedom of access to religious shrines. El-Reedy pointed out that internationalization of Jerusalem is another possibility. The Secretary wondered whether anyone would support this. El-Baz did not answer the question, but urged that nothing be included to prejudge the final outcome. Doing so would mean that the status quo will be perpetuated. The Secretary observed that the more one goes into detail with respect to Jerusalem, the greater is the problem for Sadat. El-Araby again referred to UN Resolution 267 of October 1967,⁷ which the United States has approved.

El-Reedy asked if the Palestinians in East Jerusalem will or will not be included in the self-governing regime. The American paper seems to suggest that it will not be (page 8). Saunders opined that we should think of Jerusalem separately. El-Araby suggested that the reference be to the West Bank and Gaza, instead of to areas now under Israeli military government jurisdiction. Saunders suggested that our phraseology protects Sadat. It leaves the Jerusalem question separate. El-Araby responded that the West Bank/Gaza has specific geographic meaning. The Secretary suggested that the Egyptians provide us with their proposed language.

El-Baz then referred to the absence of any reference in our paper to settlements. The Secretary pointed out that this omission had already been explained to Sadat and Kamel. Before our paper is finalized, language on the settlements will be included. On the matter of the illegality of the settlements, President Carter will repeat our position in a speech to the Congress.

The Secretary then said he would like to raise a question or two.

On page 4, the fourth line from the bottom, he asked if the Egyptians would like to have the phrase “based on the principle of reciprocity” included. The Egyptians said this was agreeable to them and observed that President Carter had already agreed to the inclusion of such a phrase.

El-Araby asked what is meant by “special security forces” on page 4 of our paper. Saunders said the reference is to the collection of police forces that might be involved.

The Secretary alluded to the phrase on page 6 of the American draft “assist in the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty.” He suggested an addition, “based on phased withdrawal, Israeli forces, etc.” He said we have some language to this effect. The Egyptians suggested that “phased” be removed, withdrawal should not be qualified. A statement could be included suggesting withdrawal in accordance with some timetable.

El-Araby suggested that on page 6 a statement be included to the effect that “security arrangements will be reciprocal,” or some other similar phase based on the principle of reciprocity.

El-Reedy returned to the issue of the basic structure of the paper. Some of the fundamental principles for Egypt, such as the inadmissibility language, is in the Preamble. The Secretary observed that this is where it is in UN Resolution 242. El-Reedy stated that it is in 242 because it is also in the UN Charter. Egypt suggested that there might be a general part of the paper to cover fundamental principles. The issue, he pointed out, would not be important if the Israelis had not come up with the idea that the “inadmissibility” language is not binding because it is in the Preamble. The Secretary said he believes it should be in the Preamble. Perhaps the matter could be treated by citing the entire Preamble. El-Reedy noted that the American paper had also added to the pertinent preambular language the phrase, “within secure and recognized borders.” This is not in the UN Resolution 242 Preamble. El-Baz noted that because the Israelis insist that because the “inadmissibility” language is in the Preamble, it is not important. For that reason the Egyptians believe it should be in the operative language. The Secretary pointed out that the Israelis “climb up the wall” with any such suggestion. El-Baz suggested that this shows their intentions.

El-Baz then referred to para 7 on page 12 having to do with the possible inability of Jordan to join in the negotiations. This, he insisted, does not help and could be offensive to Jordan. The Secretary responded that the phrase is intended to show that the negotiations would go ahead even if Jordan does not participate. Kamel observed that the Egyptian side is proceeding on the assumption that Jordan will join. The Secretary said we hope so, but cannot be sure. El-Baz thought it is not necessary to provide for such a contingency. It goes without saying, he argued, that if Jordan does not participate, Egypt will go ahead. The Secretary noted that the language is for Egyptian protection. El-Baz argued that Egypt does not need it. Boutros Ghali thought that the matter might be handled by a side letter.

El-Baz then referred to para B–2 on page 12 having to do with diplomatic, economic and cultural relations. He contended that diplomatic recognition does not require immediate diplomatic or other relations. Sadat, he claimed, is clear that diplomatic relations should not be provided for at this stage.

On page 13, El-Baz referred to para 3–E on the deployment of armed forces. He noted that the Egyptians had proposed regulating the acquisition of arms in order to stop the arms spiral. This, he noted, had been taken from the original Israeli proposal of last year. The Secretary thought the entire paragraph might be eliminated. The police issue could be taken care of on page 4. The Egyptians seemed agreeable, but El-Baz insisted that what is also needed is a reference to a general reduction of armaments. He reiterated that the Egyptian language had been taken from the September 77 Israeli draft.⁸

The Secretary agreed to study the Egyptian suggestions. The Egyptians then provided a draft paper, which in effect recasts the American paper. It was agreed that we will go over the paper and provide the Egyptians and the Israelis with a revised draft tomorrow evening. El-Baz contended that since our paper is being revised on the basis of the latest Egyptian-Israeli proposals, we should meet first tomorrow morning with the Egyptians and only afterwards with the Israelis.⁹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.
2. See footnote 40, Document 28.
3. The specific version of the draft Framework paper is not further identified. See footnote 53, Document 28.
4. See footnote 5, Document 3.
5. U.N. Security Council Resolution 237, adopted on June 14, 1967, called on the Israeli Government to ensure the safety and facilitate the return of residents who had fled the fighting during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. For the complete text of the Resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967, pp. 190–191.
6. The status of Palestinian refugees is specifically addressed in Article II of Resolution 194–(III), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 11, 1948. For the complete text of the Resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49, pp. 174–176.
7. For the text of UN Security Council Resolution 267, adopted July 3, 1969, see Quest for Peace, pp. 23–24.
8. For documentation on this draft, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.
9. Instead of separate bilateral meetings with the Egyptians and Israelis, Carter met with Barak and El-Baz from 8:10 a.m. to 4:53 p.m. and again from 8:05 p.m. to 10:15 p.m., September 13, in order to revise the overall draft Framework. See footnote 52, Document 28.