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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition
  4. Document 48

48. Memorandum of Conversation1

Camp David, September 13, 1978, 10:20–11:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • AMERICAN SIDE

    • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
    • Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
    • Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
    • William Quandt, National Security Council
    • Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel

  • ISRAELI SIDE

    • Prime Minister Menachem Begin
    • Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
    • Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman
    • Prof. Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court and Prime Minister’s Legal Advisor
    • Dr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to Foreign Minister
    • Major General Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch
    • Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
    • Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
    • Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
    • Mr. Dan Pattir, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Public Affairs

SUBJECT

  • Israeli Discussion of U.S. Paper on Sinai

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Lewis went to Foreign Minister Dayan’s cabin to deliver to the Israelis the draft framework agreement2 on the Sinai which had been discussed briefly earlier in the evening3 by the President with Mr. Barak. Dayan looked it over quickly, asked Defense Minister Weizman to come over to the cabin to join him, and initiated a discussion about problems he immediately saw in the document concerning the use of airfields and the provisions for stationing of UN Forces at Sharm el Shaikh. He was also concerned about the language on withdrawal of all Israeli personnel and the immediate establishment of the exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. A confused discussion with Weizman then ensued about definitions of the various zones in the paper, interrupted by a telephone call from Begin to Dayan. Dayan said that the President was sitting with Begin and Barak at the present mo[Page 192]ment and suggested that we all adjourn to Holly Cabin rather than continue the discussion in two places. The Secretary agreed.

While arrangements were being made to move to Holly, Dayan said that of the three zones mentioned in the paper, so long as Weizman agreed with the deployments described for the two westernmost zones, then he had no problem. All of the problems, as he pointed out, are in the zone from 20 to 40 kilometers west of the old international frontier between Sinai and Palestinian mandate. He did not see a way to reach agreement at Camp David on all of the complex problems in that zone, and suggested leaving negotiations on these issues for the next phase, retaining the status quo while those negotiations went on.

Secretary Vance asked Weizman whether the dispositions of forces described in paragraphs C1, C2, and C3 were generally consistent with his understandings with Sadat. Weizman said that they were, though some rewording and readjustment would be necessary.

The Dayan-Weizman-Vance meeting then adjourned to Holly, where it was joined by the remainder of the Israeli Delegation and by Saunders, Atherton, and Quandt. Begin began by asking Rosenne to read out slowly the text of the US Sinai proposal. Begin then initiated a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion, after some preliminary and rather prolonged discussion among the Israelis in Hebrew.

Begin said that according to his agreement this evening with President Carter, paragraph B would be dropped and would be replaced by language which stated in essence that the issue of the Israeli settlements “would be decided in the peace treaty.” After further discussion in which Dayan restated his view of the difficulty in resolving the complex issues in the easternmost zone at this point, Dayan suggested revising paragraph B to read, “Except as otherwise agreed in the final peace treaty, Israeli armed forces will be withdrawn from Sinai.” He said that this should be coupled with a statement that during the period of negotiations for a final peace treaty, the status quo should prevail, and that all the issues involving that zone will be discussed and decided in the negotiations for the final peace treaty.

Begin then went back to a paragraph-by-paragraph approach, saying that the first paragraph was fine, and that the second paragraph should read, “All the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in the resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.” (He stressed that the dispute was between the two countries, and did not just involve Sinai. Secretary Vance agreed.)

They then agreed that the word “full” in paragraph A would follow the first word “the”, rather than precede the word “Egyptian”. There was some objection by Begin to the use of the word “full” but he dropped it.

[Page 193]

There then ensued a lengthy debate about language which should be used to describe the concept of withdrawal of both armed forces and settlements, much of which went on among the Israeli delegation. Dayan then asked Secretary Vance if he could accept Dayan’s idea of making clear that the principle had been accepted in this document of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and establishment of the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. He said this would defuse the airfields issue and leave only the settlements question to be hammered out in subsequent negotiations. The Secretary said he understands the concept, but did not comment on it. Dayan said that Weizman should be able to work out here a timetable for the turnover of the airfields to civilian control, but that obviously the status quo would have to be maintained until final negotiations are complete for the treaty.

The Secretary then asked Weizman whether paragraphs C1, 2 and 3 of the draft and the subsequent paragraphs were satisfactory. There was a confusing discussion among the Israelis, and Weizman said that the concepts were generally satisfactory but the wording was unfamiliar and did not accord with previous concepts of buffer and demilitarized zones used in the previous agreements between Israel and Egypt. They would have to accept some alternate language.

After another long debate in Hebrew took place, Secretary Vance suggested that perhaps we leave the Israeli delegation to examine the document at a more leisurely pace and to give us their reactions the next morning. Begin agreed. The meeting then adjourned with an understanding that it would reconvene at 10 a.m. on September 14,4 at which time the Israeli reactions to this draft would be available.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis on September 14.↩
  2. The specific draft of the Sinai Framework agreement is not further identified. See footnote 55, Document 28.↩
  3. See footnote 52, Document 28.↩
  4. Carter met with Barak alone from 10:11 a.m. to 10:40 a.m. and with Dayan and the rest of the Israeli delegation from 11:05 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., September 14. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) See footnote 59, Document 28.↩