88. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Summary of President’s Meeting with the Israeli Delegation, October 17, 1978, 2:00–3:15 p.m., Oval Office
1. Dayan expressed his concern with three main obstacles in the peace treaty negotiations. First is the question of “priority of obligations.” Israel wants to make clear that Egypt’s obligations under the peace treaty will supersede any other obligations, such as mutual defense pacts.
2. Dayan’s second problem was the linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the West Bank/Gaza issues. Israel wants the treaty to stand on its own without any linkage to other obligations. He will accept mention of the comprehensive framework in the preamble, and some of the Camp David understandings can be included in an exchange of letters. In addition, Israel might be prepared to consider [Page 316] some unilateral gestures to demonstrate its goodwill in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza issues.
3. The President suggested that Israel might want to let the Egyptians put in some phrases dealing with the broader peace framework so long as they did not affect the substance of the treaty. Dayan mentioned amnesty for political prisoners, and removal of military headquarters from some cities, such as in Gaza, as the type of unilateral gestures that might be possible. The President suggested that the Israelis might ease the ban on political activity in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan said that they would consider this, but that it might create problems for Sadat, since there might be demonstrations against him.
4. Dayan’s third concern was the speed of normalization. He fears that the Egyptians are weakening their commitment to the establishment of diplomatic relations at the end of the interim withdrawal. They are speaking of gradual normalization. In the economic and cultural areas, Israel can accept this, but not in the diplomatic area. Israel has already agreed to speed up the pace of the withdrawal, so that al-Arish will be returned within two months, Rash Muhammad within four months, and all of the rest of the area up to the interim withdrawal line, by the end of six months. This was done on the assumption that the Egyptians want to move quickly on the normalization of relations. The President said that he agreed with the Israelis on this point.
5. Dayan also mentioned the problem of one Israeli settlement located to the west of the interim withdrawal line. Some arrangement should be made so that this settlement is not required to withdraw before the others.
6. Dayan also raised issues in our bilateral relationship. He spoke first of the need for some form of American guarantee that the agreement will be carried out in good faith. Dayan’s second point concerned financial assistance to help carry out the withdrawal of forces. Weizman explained the difficulties that Israel would confront beyond those of building two new airfields. The President agreed that an American team could consult with the Israelis, but that they would not have authority to make any commitments.
7. Finally, Dayan turned to the question of the cost involved in relocating the settlers from Sinai. The President made clear that he would not be prepared to ask Congress for funds for this purpose in light of the well-known American position on the illegality of settlements.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 14, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/13–18/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The memorandum was found attached to an October 19 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski, upon which Brzezinski marked his approval, as well as a copy of the memorandum for the record of Carter’s conversation with the Egyptian delegation later the same afternoon, printed as Document 89. The covering memorandum also stated that copies of the summaries would be sent to Eilts, Lewis, and Vance. (Ibid.)↩