98. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of President’s Meeting with Egyptian Delegation
PARTICIPANTS
- President Jimmy Carter
- Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
- Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
- Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
- Mr. Hebert Hansell, Legal Adviser, Department of State
- H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Acting Foreign Minister
- H.E. Abdallah el-Erian, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry
The President began by reviewing his talks2 with the Israelis. He said that they had shown flexibility and that they would be going back to their cabinet with a number of specific recommendations. He gave the Egyptians copies3 of the revised treaty text. In the preamble, the reference to reaffirming a commitment to the framework agreement would be left in, and in addition there would be a letter4 in which the Egyptians and the Israelis would commit themselves to begin negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza within one month of the signing of the treaty. The President urged that they both sign the same text. The Israelis have no objection to what the Egyptians put in a separate letter of their own concerning their views on the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis will have a different letter on that topic. It is up to Egypt to decide what to put into a separate letter.
The President said that he would suggest the deletion of a couple of the paragraphs in the preamble and suggested one addition referring to the Egyptian-Israeli framework agreement. The President asked if the Egyptians had received any new instructions on the timing of the exchange of ambassadors and Boutros Ghali said that they had not.
The President then turned to the reference to Gaza in the treaty. He said that Israelis were prepared to accept reference to the issue of the status of Gaza. He might also propose a new sentence saying that the status of Gaza and the West Bank will be decided in accordance with the framework agreement at Camp David. The President said that he understood that Egypt does not claim Gaza as a part of Egypt, but does not want to acknowledge that it is a part of Israel. The Israelis reserve their right to claim sovereignty over this area. A map should be appended which would show the border between Egypt and Israel, as well as the boundary around Gaza.
El-Erian said the idea which would be reflected is that Egypt has some responsibility under the general armistice agreements for Gaza. Boutros Ghali said that he would accept the language proposed by the President. Egypt will mention its special responsibility for Gaza in a letter.
[Page 359]The President again said that the Egyptians could put anything they wanted in a unilateral letter, but that the Israelis would not necessarily say the same thing in their letter. But it is important that both parties reaffirm clearly their commitment to the framework. El-Erian noted that it would not be appropriate to refer to the West Bank when dealing with the Egypt-Israel border, only Gaza was at stake. The President agreed.
The President then informed the Egyptians that the Israeli delegation had agreed to recommend the deletion of the term “terrorism”. This is subject to Begin’s approval. On page 5, the section on navigation had been modified to deal with the Egyptian concern that Soviet ships might try to maneuver in the Gulf of Aqaba. El-Erian said that there were two problems. Egypt could accept for itself the status of the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway, but Egypt could not speak for the other riparian states. Egypt’s position should not appear to commit them or prejudge the question as it will be dealt with in the law of the sea conference. He said that the formulation in the revised draft was acceptable, however, the President said that the Israelis had agreed to this language.
Turning to page 6, the President discussed the question of arbitration. The Israelis want to resort to negotiations first. If there are routine difficulties, there is no need to have a fifth member for arbitration right away.
Boutros Ghali said that negotiations were already dealt with in the first paragraph of this article. Arbitration is the fallback position. It would be unusual to have an arbitration commission of only four members. El-Erian said that there is need for some umpire in arbitration. Usually someone appoints the additional member.
The President said that he would like to see disputes normally solved through negotiations. It should not be normal practice to refer to a referee. He would prefer that there be a commission of two members from each party first, then if they agree there is a deadlock they could invite a fifth member to join them. He would like to see three steps: normal diplomatic negotiations; the four-member commission; and then arbitration.
Boutros Ghali said that this was an interesting innovation, but there was no precedent for it. He would prefer not to spell out the details. El-Erian referred to Article 33 of the U.N. Charter5 and encouraged that conciliation be referred to as one step in settling disputes. The President [Page 360] again said that a quick move to binding arbitration would cause him some problems. He would like to have some in-between step. El-Erian suggested a slight change in Article VII, paragraph 2. The four-member commission should be for conciliation, not arbitration. The President said that this sounded all right to him, but they should try to work out three stages. El-Erian suggested negotiations first, then conciliation, then arbitration.
The President then showed the Egyptians the letter that he had drafted earlier in the morning. He would like Begin and Sadat both to sign this letter committing themselves to begin negotiations within one month on the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, the Egyptians could have their own letter using Camp David language on the West Bank and Gaza. Boutros Ghali asked if the letter would be part of the treaty. The President said that it would be signed on the same day. Israel has not yet seen the exact text of the letter, however, but they will reconfirm their commitment to the Camp David agreements and they will allow the full text to be annexed to this letter. It will say that within one month negotiations will begin on the West Bank and Gaza. This will establish a strong link between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. El-Erian said that if this letter were part of the treaty it would be great. The President said that it would not be in the text, but the same procedure would be used as at Camp David, with the letters being released on the same day. Boutros Ghali asked if it would be legally binding and the President confirmed that it would be. On this basis, the Egyptians agreed to the idea of the exchange of the letter.
The President then turned to page 6 concerning the priority of obligations. He said that Israel wanted to be assured that if the Jordanians or Palestinians refused to participate in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, this would not impede the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Boutros Ghali initially hesitated to react to the new language, but on reconsideration said that there would be no problem.
The President then turned to page 5a. This deals with the question precedence. Some of Egypt’s mutual defense agreements are in conflict with the terms of this treaty. We have tried to find words in our treaties, such as the NATO treaty, which make it clear that the most recent treaty takes precedence. El-Erian said that this was a legitimate Israeli concern. According to the Egyptian constitution, a treaty requires that domestic law be in conformity with the treaty. The treaty is self-executing in that sense. Egypt has committed itself to end the boycott. Many Egyptian laws will have to be abrogated. Everything that has been based on the state of war will end. It is hard to say that in all circumstances this treaty will prevail. Therefore, Egypt preferred the first American draft, which simply said that “there will be no conflict.” Only [Page 361] the U.N. Charter, in Article 103,6 has such status of being superior to all other commitments. The most difficult problem for Egypt are the security pacts. Some have expired, but at least one from 1950 on joint defense and economic cooperation embodies the idea of collective self-defense against aggression. This would cause great difficulties for Egypt and the Arab word if this treaty had to be renounced.
The President referred to the Israeli consultation with American experts on international law. They had agreed the American draft language was not adequate. The President suggested that el-Erian and Barak might get together with some international lawyers to work out adequate language. El-Erian said that the problem was not entirely a legal one. Egypt does not want to appear to be washing its hands of the Arab league. Mr. Aaron said the reference to the U.N. Charter was met to protect Egypt’s right to collective self-defense. El-Erian acknowledged that this was helpful. Hansell added that in the event of Israeli aggression, the reference to the U.N. Charter would allow Egypt to respect its commitment under the mutual defense pacts. El-Erian said that he recognized the validity of this point and this would make it easier for Egypt to accept. Egypt would like, however, to avoid any appearance of referring specifically to domestic law. This is covered by the Egyptian constitution. The President suggested that the reference to internal law be deleted. El-Erian said that in that case, Egypt could live with the language as drafted. El-Erian asked if the language “will prevail” could also be removed. Egypt agrees on the concept, but would like different words. The President said that he wanted to get this resolved now. He wants Barak to be able to say that these issues have been resolved. The Israeli delegation should recommend the entire text to the Cabinet. El-Erian said that this would be a major issue for them. Hansell confirmed that the United States had used similar wording in the NATO treaties, particularly that “there will be no conflict”. El-Erian said that instead of “will prevail”, language such as “shall be honored” might be used. The President urged him to try to work this out. We would agree that the reference to internal law should be deleted. The President also thought the words “shall be honored” could be used.
Boutros Ghali asked about the possibility of U.N. Security Council endorsement, and the President said that this was already in the Camp David agreements. He suggested that in the exchange of letters the Egyptians might refer to this paragraph. Boutros Ghali said that would be acceptable.
[Page 362]The President said the whole text of the Camp David agreement should be appended in any case to the exchange of letters. It would be better not to start selecting different parts of the agreement. The President said that he also suggested a letter on U.N. forces. There could be a problem if the Soviets or the Chinese refused to approve the stationing of U.N. forces in the demilitarized zones. The United States wants to insure that the treaty would not fail on this account. The President would be prepared to send the letter which he showed to the Egyptian delegation. El-Erian said that the letter was acceptable.
The President said that there could be troops from many different nations, provided they were mutually acceptable. If Begin accepts all of these suggestions, we will have resolved all of the difficulties. We will try to get the Israelis to drop any reference to Egyptian internal law. We also talked to them about the missiles, and have said that only SA–7 missiles should be allowed across the canal. The other missiles could move up the canal. This can be done as soon as the treaty is signed. This is acceptable to Israel. Boutros Ghali said this would be all right.
Atherton said that three annexes remained to be completed. The one7 dealing with diplomatic relations was most important. It needs to be worked out in detail. Boutros Ghali said that he hoped to get answers from Sadat. The question of the settlement is also unresolved. He did not want to put the reference to one month for the exchange of ambassadors in the treaty. He asked if this could be handled in a letter. Egypt agrees and will do it. He will send a letter to Dayan if necessary.
The President said that he would try to work this out. If Sadat agrees to do this within a month, perhaps he can refer to it in a letter along with the letter that says negotiations will begin within one month. The President said that he would try to get the Israelis to accept the idea of referring to this in a letter rather than in the annex to the treaty.
El-Erian said the Israelis are also asking for a guaranteed oil supply. They want an advantageous position. They will already have a de facto advantage because of their location. The President said that he agreed with Egypt on this point. Atherton said the oil experts have not yet begun meeting and the talks could be complicated. The President said that he would not support the idea that Israel has any right to preferential treatment on oil. Maybe they can negotiate a five-year supply contract, but Israel cannot demand this of Egypt. This should not hold up the signing of the treaty. Israel should not have to be given preferential treatment. Boutros Ghali said that he agreed this should not delay the treaty. The President said that Israel already had some advantage [Page 363] because of proximity, but they should not be given any other special advantage. Boutros Ghali said that the Israelis can bid for the oil and this would pose no problem.
In conclusion the President thanked the Egyptians for being very forthcoming. He said he would support their position on oil and deleting the reference to internal law He said that the Israelis had also tried to be forthcoming last night, and that he thought it was a good step to have an agreed text of the letter on negotiations beginning on the West Bank and Gaza in one month. This should help with the Saudis.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/21–25/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.↩
- See Document 96. Carter had also met with the Israelis on the afternoon of October 20. The President’s Daily Diary records that Carter met with Dayan and Weizman in the Oval Office from 2:50 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)↩
- Reference is possibly to a complete, revised text of the draft treaty—including the preamble, a draft letter on UN forces, and a suggested Egyptian draft letter on West Bank and Gaza—forwarded from Atherton to Carter under an October 20 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78)↩
- See footnote 3 above.↩
- The full text of Article 33, requiring parties in a dispute “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” to employ negotiations “or other peaceful means,” is printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47, p. 835.↩
- The full text of Article 103, stipulating the primacy of the UN Charter over obligations to any other international agreement for UN member states, is printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47, p. 842.↩
- See Annex III.↩