Afghanistan
31. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780400–1081. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Bonn, Dacca, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Rome, Tehran, and USNATO.
32. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 11, The Afghan Revolution After Six Months (An Intelligence Assessment). Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. According to a typed statement on the cover page, “the author of this paper is [name not declassified] South Asia Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.”
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780502–0817. Confidential. This telegram repeated, for the Department’s information, the telegram of the same number sent December 5 to Moscow, and for information to Ankara, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, Peking, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD. A copy of this telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978).
34. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978. Secret. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Inderfurth to Brzezinski and Aaron, February 1, which forwarded Carlucci’s memorandum and attachments. Inderfurth asserted that the CIA paper’s call to expose Afghanistan’s problems and its status as a Soviet pawn would be “counterproductive” because it contradicted another part of the paper that noted the negative psychological impact of Soviet influence on the region. Bringing more attention to the situation, he argued, would only exacerbate the problem. In response, Henze wrote at the bottom of Inderfurth’s memorandum: “Well you have to generate some waves to make progress.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of Carlucci’s memorandum: “Let planning proceed. ZB.”
35. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject File, Box 98, Chron: 1–5/79. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Griffith.
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Communications with Soviet Union Re: Death of Dubs. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad.
37. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 2/79. Top Secret. Sent for action.
38. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Members of the Special Coordination Committee
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Attached but not printed is an undated covering memorandum from Inderfurth to Brzezinski, which characterizes the attached CIA paper as “not a set of concrete proposals,” but rather an offering of options ranging from propaganda “through sponsorship of large-scale insurgency to bring about a change in government in power in Kabul.” Inderfurth noted the paper’s “principal deficiency” was that “it gives only a vague impression of CIA’s capabilities,” which meant that the CIA was unprepared to implement some of the options laid out in the paper. Inderfurth recommended that Brzezinski “step up operational intelligence collection as an essential first-step toward planning more concrete programs.” Also attached but not printed is Brzezinski’s February 21 memorandum to Henze. See Document 37.
39. Special Analysis Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified] and [text not declassified].
40. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 97S00360R: Intelligence Document Collection (1977–1981), Box 56, (3150520079–3150678979). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
41. Article in the President’s Daily Brief
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 3/26/79–3/31/79. Top Secret; For the President’s Eyes Only. Carter initialed the cover page in the upper right corner.
42. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
43. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance
Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000019, Box 3, Afghanistan, Non-Vector 1980–1985. Secret. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page indicates that the memorandum was received in S/S–I on April 2 at 9:50 a.m.
45. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In the top right corner, an unknown hand wrote: “orig to ZB w/Eve Rept. Mini-SCC 3–30–79. SumCon not prepared.” No other record of the mini-SCC meeting was found. A memorandum from Thornton and Henze to Brzezinski, March 22, called for a mini-SCC meeting, tentatively scheduled for March 31. Thornton advocated the necessity of convening such a meeting because the intelligence situation in Afghanistan remained unclear; “the ambassadorial issue is still open” due to Dubs’s murder; the Americans in Afghanistan were at risk; and there was a need for interagency policy coordination with regard to Afghanistan. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) Thornton was responding to a March 20 memorandum from Brzezinski that relayed Mondale’s inquiry regarding what the United States could do about the growing rebellion in Afghanistan. (Ibid.)
46. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790156–0069, P850147–1923. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Baghdad, Beijing, Bonn, Colombo, Dacca, Damascus, CINCPAC for POLAD, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Kathmandu, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Tokyo, Berlin, USNATO, and USUN.
47. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was one of several papers prepared for the April 6 SCC meeting. See Document 48. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, April 4, Henze characterized this memorandum and the paper, Document 45, as “serious intelligence papers that provide a basis for realistic discussion.” Still, Henze noted, the Department of State was not enthusiastic about implementing the proposals, while CIA personnel were divided as well: “Turner wants to please everybody and avoid controversy; Carlucci is in a Hamlet-like pose; McMahon wants to straddle everybody’s position. All this is clearly sensed by the sharp minds that still exist in the DDO. Many DDO officers oppose all these actions because they do not believe the Agency has the capability to carry them out effectively in the field. Others are primarily concerned about what they consider to be inevitable leaks which will cause the Administration to back down, even if it does launch some of this activity, and leave CIA again exposed as well as embarrassed abroad.” Henze’s memorandum is attached to Document 48, but not printed.
48. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC 1979. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, April 9, which summarized the meeting. Brzezinski noted: “the Attorney General opined that a Presidential Finding and report to Congress was not required at this stage. It was understood, however, that if the Pakistanis respond positively, you will be asked to execute a Finding that would authorize CIA to implement the most feasible and otherwise desirable options.” Carter drew a line in the left margin beside the first sentence and wrote: “Better expression than SCC minutes,” and underlined “if the Pakistanis respond positively.” Also attached but not printed is Henze’s April 4 memorandum to Brzezinski; see footnote 1, Document 47.
49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London, Beijing, Jidda, New Delhi, Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran. Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.
50. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified].
51. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret. Attached but not printed is Brzezinski’s handwritten note forwarding the memorandum to Aaron: “DA, Please get on top of this through a mini-SCC. We need action. E.g, give them money. Also black ops.” At the top of Brzezinski’s note, Henze wrote: “Turner will take up formally with ZB 1 May 79.” Neither a record of the May 1 meeting nor a record of a mini-SCC on the topic was found. The next SCC meeting that took up the Afghanistan issue was held June 26. See Document 53.
52. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
[Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (May 79–Jun 79). Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. 2 pages not declassified.]
53. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting
Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 104, SCC–172, 6/26/79, Afghanistan and Grenada. Top Secret. Drafted by Gregg. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Tabs A–G are attached but not printed.
54. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 06T00412R: Intelligence Publication Files, Box 1, NESA Research Paper—Afghanistan: A Regime Besieged, July 1979. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “The author of this paper is [less than 1 line not declassified] Office of Political Analysis. The Office of Strategic Research contributed to the report.” Another statement on the cover page reads: “This report has been coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.”
55. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton and Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1979. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped “ZB has seen.”
57. Telegram From the Consulate in Lahore to the Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790378–1327. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated for information to Jidda, Moscow, and the Department of State. A copy of the telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (August 79).
58. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. The appraisal was attached at Tab E to an August 22 memorandum from Henze to Denend, not printed, that responded to Mondale’s request for information on Afghanistan. Henze did not specify when Mondale made the request.
59. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The report was attached at Tab C to an August 22 memorandum from Henze to Denend, not printed, that responded to Mondale’s request for information on Afghanistan. Henze did not specify when Mondale made the request.
60. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790388–0115. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis.