18. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
4980. Subject: Pakistan and the U.S. Following the Kabul Coup. Ref: A. Islamabad 4727; B. Islamabad 4630; C. State 119925; D. Kabul 3836; E. Islamabad 4348; F. Kabul 4018; G. Tehran 4547.2
1. As all of our contacts tell us, from General Zia on down, the abrupt change of government and orientation in Afghanistan is an historic event, pregnant with immediate security implications for the nearby countries of the Middle East and South Asia and with important ripple effects on the strategic interests of the great powers in this area. Embassy officers travelling around Pakistan since the coup in Kabul have found a sense of gloom and trauma prevalent in most of the [Page 43] comments now being offered by Pakistanis of all walks of life, and indeed, the nation—or at least its opinion molders—appears to be in a state of shock.3
2. To fully understand the meaning for Pakistanis of the change in Afghanistan it is important to recall that for most of the history of this part of the world—at least until the Europeans came by sea some 400 years ago—Afghanistan has been both the military and cultural route into South Asia. As the British Empire in India took shape, British policy sought to seal off that route by fostering a classic buffer role for what was to become Afghanistan. The replacement of the czars by Bolsheviks and the British Raj by swaraj (self-rule) did not fundamentally change this situation, and Afghanistan remained a buffer in a cold war context.
3. This is not simply an historical digression. Rather these are fundamental facts which underly the thinking and the relationships of the peoples and the states of this region, predating the Dulles and Ayub Khan eras but incorporated, essentially intact, into our earliest security relationship with Pakistan. When opinion leaders in this country now turn to us to express their concerns and anxieties about Pakistan’s future in view of the apparent loss of that buffer against Soviet Central Asia, they have in mind these widely perceived historical realities and are reacting with gut concern for national survival. Turning to the U.S. for reassurance at this moment is also something of a reversion to earlier principles, since it was as an anti-Soviet alliance, focused on the USSR (and Afghanistan), that the post-war U.S.-Pakistan relationship was strongest.
4. If it were the uncertainties in the Afghan situation alone in their minds it would be disturbing enough for many Pakistanis. But the change in the role of Afghanistan may also have destroyed—for now at least—whatever slender prospect there was for continued warming Indo-Pakistan relations, described now by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi as “back to square one.” The quick Indian recognition of the new regime in Kabul—however warranted in Delhi’s eyes and welcome in Kabul’s—has rather quickly resurrected all the old shibboleths about the Indo-Soviet relationship (based on their 1971 agreement).4 At the official level, and even more widely in the country, there is renewed suspicion about what the wily Hindus are up to this time combined [Page 44] with a presumption that it bodes ill for Pakistan. Even those Paks who perceive their own paranoia point out that paranoids can have real enemies.
5. There is great disappointment among our Pakistani contacts that the U.S. has not said more in criticism of the bloody events in Kabul at the end of April. Officially, we have been pressed, bilaterally and in the CENTO context, for some concrete evidence of what we propose to do about the change that has come about in Afghanistan to ensure that the pox let loose there in April does not spread to Iran and Pakistan in the months and years ahead. While as a practical matter, the Pakistan Government has publicly adopted a wait-and-see attitude much like our own and Iran’s, Pakistan’s leaders feel let down that even in private conversations we have had nothing more to offer than a willingness to consult and an assessment which Ambassador Sullivan has correctly termed “thin gruel.”
6. Many Pakistanis want a close and continuing U.S.-Pak relationship of trust, cooperation, and confidence, so our reaction thus far has been doubly disappointing. Some will, of course, see it as but the latest U.S. let-down of Pakistan, going back to our support of India in 1962, our failure to aid Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and our pressure now to deny Pakistan the nuclear reprocessing plant it feels it needs. Many also see it as part of a wider lack of resolve on the part of the U.S., and outgrowth of our Watergate, Angola, and Vietnam traumas; U.S.-Pakistan differences on policy toward the Horn of Africa will also be cited as evidence of this lack of U.S. resolve. And this comes from those who are still friendly to our interests here.
7. Those Paks who actually oppose our interests here and who have long sought to cut Pakistan loose in a sea of non-alignment accommodationism may well see an opportunity in the current situation to demonstrate conclusively that the U.S. is, in fact, an unreliable partner which has lost its zest for the struggle. They will argue, as [less than 1 line not declassified] notes the Foreign Secretary already has, that Pakistan must stop looking to the U.S. (and CENTO) for reassurance, but rather must accommodate to the rise of Soviet and the decline of American influence in the world.
8. Policy implications: I do not suggest or recommend that we be streamrollered by events in Afghanistan into taking steps in Pakistan or in this region to resurrect an earlier era of U.S.-Pak relations. The world is a different place than it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, and besides, nostalgia has a way of making that earlier relationship appear better than it probably was. We have substituted for the earlier objective of containment of Communism the more realistic formula of promotion of regional stability. Events in Kabul have undermined that stability, and so far we seem unable to think of actions to shore it up.
[Page 45]9. There has been a fundamental change in the South-Asia-Middle East region, nevertheless, and whether the Soviets prompted the Kabul coup or are merely the beneficiaries of it, the perception is that the Soviet Union has scored an important gain in this part of the world. That should be a matter of concern to us.
10. Our friends, in whose territorial integrity and independence we have frequently expressed strong interest, and who rightly interpret that interest, and our previous relationship with them based on our 1958 bilateral as testimony to our concern for their security can legitimately expect a more visible sign of our concern than they have seen thus far.5 As I see it, we are now very much in danger of letting our tactical posture vis-à-vis the new Afghan regime be a substitute for policy toward the region as a whole. Our friends will not be to blame if they begin to draw the conclusion that our assurances of the past lack practical effect.
11. It seems to me that we must find a way of acting in this region which can serve to reassure our friends in Pakistan, Iran, and even India, while not unduly disturbing the new relationship we are attempting to foster with India, or challenging the Soviets frontally to our disadvantage perhaps, in other forums. And we must somehow persuade Iran, and India, and Pakistan that they now have more in common regarding the new situation in Afghanistan than they have interest in their continuing mutual suspicions of each others’ motives and activities.
12. The big hurdle for U.S. policy in this—at least the most obvious one at the outset—is our nuclear non-proliferation face-down with the GOP. I do not imply any diminution of the importance of this global goal of reducing the spread of uncontrolled nuclear technology, any more that I would suggest we abandon our human rights concerns here or in Afghanistan or in Iran (or even in India) in the interests of regional security. What I do suggest, however, is that we not hold our entire bilateral policy relationship hostage to any single or multiple strands of our global foreign policies, however important and worthy. To continue to mortgage our entire relationship with Pakistan to the non-proliferation question—despite what has happened and may happen in the wake of the Kabul coup—will be to promote the erosion of our last remaining instruments of influence and prestige here in Pakistan while the GOP—this government or the next one or two or three—decides it must trim its sails to the new wind blowing from Central Asia.
[Page 46]13. If we are going to have influence in this region, it is because we are relevant to its interests and because we are presumed to share some of its deepest concerns. Part of our problem with Pakistan, even before the Kabul coup, has been this perception of relevance. We press them hard on nuclear non-proliferation, as we must; we express concern over their human rights record; we expect them to make changes for the better in their administration of aid projects [garble—and in their] handling of the economy. At the same time, we deny them access to new and replacement military equipment in some critical areas, and we refuse to commit new assistance or to sign agreements for which funds have already been obligated. If, now, we prolong these largely self-imposed shut-downs, Pakistan (and its neighbors) will draw their own conclusions. If, on the other hand, we can be more responsive to their concerns, we may—in fact—use this period to repair some of the damage in our relationship while at the same time exercising greater influence on the GOP to set its own affairs aright.
14. We are waiting, and must no doubt continue to wait for answers and for events:
—A solution to the reprocessing plant problem;
—the settling of Bhutto’s fate;
—the formation of a civilian government;
—clarification of Afghan intentions.
But let us not postpone all action until all of these and other questions are settled to our satisfaction. To do so will further undermine, perhaps fatally, our ability to influence events and achieve our policy goals. We would like to see a stable, civilian government here, but in present circumstances there is very little we can do to promote that result, and we are losing the capability to have meaningful influence on human rights, narcotics control, and economic development. All of these are high on our list of goals and objectives, but unless we can soon find some areas of middle ground between our hopes and the realities of the situation, it is hard to see how we can make any progress toward our goals.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780210–0657. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Dacca, New Delhi, Kabul, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Kathmandu, and Colombo.↩
- Telegrams 4727 and 4630 from Islamabad, dated May 12 and May 10, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780204–0665 and D780197–1239, respectively. Telegram 119925 to Tehran is dated May 11 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780199–0650); telegram 3836 from Kabul is dated May 11 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780199–1023); telegram 4348 from Islamabad is dated May 3 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0733); and telegram 4018 from Kabul is printed as Document 17. For telegram 4547 from Tehran, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 17.↩
- In telegram 4727 from Islamabad, May 12, the Embassy reported that Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi told Hummel that recent events in Afghanistan threatened Pakistan and CENTO existentially: “While you wait to see how things develop in Afghanistan, we will be gone.” (See footnote 2, above)↩
- India recognized the new Afghan Government on May 2. For the 1971 agreement, see footnote 3, Document 16.↩
- A reference to the bilateral Agreement of Cooperation signed on March 5, 1959, pursuant to a declaration signed on July 28, 1958, by the Baghdad Pact nations. The Baghdad Pact was the precursor of CENTO.↩