27. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
5882. Subj: Soviet Ambassador’s Views on Present Situation in Afghanistan.
1. During my initial courtesy call on Soviet Ambassador Alexander M. Puzanov July 16, he provided the following answers and observations to my questions:
A) Soviet-Afghan relations: Puzanov stated that there had never been any serious bilateral problems between Kabul and Moscow during the sixty years since diplomatic relations were established during the time of King Amanullah and V. I. Lenin. He observed that the Soviets had enjoyed friendly, productive relations with the royal and Daoudist regimes which had preceded the current Taraki government, and expected to continue this positive relationship with the new regime.
B) Soviet military advisors: Puzanov explained that the recent increase in the number of Soviet military advisors here has been necessary in order to train the Afghans to use armored, air force, and communications equipment being supplied by the USSR. He claimed that the rate of increase of advisors is not so high as that which followed Daoud’s 1973 overthrow of the monarchy.2
C) Soviet economic assistance: Puzanov explained that the forty-odd Soviet-Afghan economic assistance agreements signed since the April 27 revolution were already in the pipeline. Although most are related to the basic assistance commitment made to former President Mohammad Daoud during his 1975 State visit to the USSR, some date back to the pre-1973 monarchical era. Puzanov stated that negotiations for these proposed projects had become stalled during the Daoudist period for “a number of reasons.”
D) Projected bridge over the Amu Darya (Oxus): Puzanov predicted that the projected Hariatan Bridge should be ready to convey vehicular traffic over the river frontier between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in “four and one-half years.”
E) The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA): Puzanov did not think that Politburo-Secretariat-Central Committee organiza[Page 67]tion of the PDPA necessarily related the Afghan party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He thought that “all parties in the world” have similar organizational structures. In reply to a question, Puzanov said there are no party ties between the PDPA and the CPSU. He explained that, after its 1967 split, the Afghan party had dissolved into “political groupings” which could not be regarded as parties. Since the Khalqists and the Parchamists only recently reunited, i.e., in mid-1977, there has not been sufficient opportunity for the CPSU to react to this event. The Afghan party had never participated in any international Communist meetings.
F) Membership of the PDPA Politburo: Puzanov thought that there are “either nine or eleven members.” During a recent conversation with Chairman Noor Mohammad Taraki, he got the impression that the latter had not yet decided what to do about the Politburo positions which had been occupied by (the diplomatically exiled Parchamist leaders) Babrak Karmal and Noor Ahmad Noor. It is possible, he conjectured, that these two might retain their Politburo seats.
G) Government decision-making: Although arguing that the governmental decisions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) are being made by the Revolutionary Council, which he initially defined as the country’s “state and legislative organ,” Puzanov acknowledged that the Central Committee of the PDPA provides overall political guidance. Puzanov went on to describe the Afghan Cabinet as the “executive organ” and the Revolutionary Council as the “legislative element” of the government.
H) Regional security: Puzanov noted with satisfaction that there were no “border problems” between Iran and Afghanistan. Observing that Afghanistan requires peace in order to be able to resolve its domestic challenges, he asserted that the USSR endorsed the Afghan regime’s stated intention to negotiate peacefully Kabul’s major “political difference” with Pakistan (i.e., the “Pushtunistan” issue). Puzanov welcomed warmly India’s willingness to expand its political and economic contacts with Afghanistan. He noted benignly that Kabul’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are “normal.”3 Puzanov recalled that the PRC had offered the Daoudist regime a 60-million-dollar line-of-credit which had not yet been fully committed. He cited as Chinese accomplishments here: Irrigation projects in Parwan Province, textile-making assistance, and a hospital at Kandahar.
I) Afghanistan’s future: Puzanov noted that impoverished Afghanistan was now working on a five-year-plan which will require help [Page 68] from as many friendly foreign donors as possible. He was optimistic that the regime’s goals will be met.
2. Comment: Although Puzanov was obviously dissembling on some points, such as the influx of Soviet military advisers and the structure of the PDPA, it was clear that he was trying hard to portray post-revolutionary Afghanistan as a country in need of outside assistance, as a nation which needs peaceful relations with its neighbors, and as a non-destabilizing factor in this region.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780301–0595. Confidential. Sent for information to Ankara, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, Tehran, CINCPAC for POLAD, and CINCEUR for POLAD.↩
- On the question of the Soviet role during the 1973 revolution, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 8.↩
- China recognized the new government in Afghanistan on May 7.↩