File No. 811.34537/49.
The American Minister to
the Secretary of State.
American Legation,
Habana, February 11,
1911.
No. 623.]
Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in
regard to the enlargement of our naval station at Guantánamo, I have the
honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of a confidential note
dated the 8th instant, which I received from Sr. Sanguily, the Cuban
secretary of state, last night. In this note Sr. Sanguily reiterates
what he has already said to me (dispatch No. 567, of Jan. 14) on various
occasions. As will be seen, the Cuban Government understands why the
enlargement is wanted, recognizes the necessity for it, and is
practically ready to make an exchange for the land at Bahía Honda
without considering the difference in size of the two areas concerned.
For various reasons, however, and notably in order to make the exchange
popular, Sr. Sanguily hopes that the American Government will be willing
to make certain concessions which will appear to have a compensatory
character and would be of effect in influencing public opinion.
In his note the secretary calls attention to the fact that no reference
is made in our proposal to the question of the jurisdiction of the
entrance to the Bay of Guantánamo. I venture to suggest to you the
advisability of making some arrangement which would be satisfactory to
us, and at the same time agreeable to the Cubans, by which Cuban vessels
entering a Cuban port would be (theoretically at least) spared the
mortification of passing through what Sr. Sanguily called “American
waters.” The entrance to the harbor and the whole of the west shore
would appear to be entirely dominated
[Page 118]
from the heights which are to be included in the
new extension, and I think it might be possible for us to renounce the
west shore and jurisdiction of a strip of navigable water along the
western side of the channel, in the time of peace—with appropriate
regulations in regard to anchorage and the construction of any
buildings, etc., within the limits of the original leasehold—reserving
to ourselves the right to occupy the land and close the port whenever
considered necessary through the outbreak of hostilities. I make this
suggestion with a hope that the Secretary of the Navy will reconsider
his decision in the premises. * * *1
I have, etc.,
[Inclosure.]
The Cuban Secretary of
State to the American
Minister.
[Translation—Extract.]
Habana, February 8,
1911.
No. 13.]
Mr. Minister: In reference to the
conversation which we had when your excellency brought me your note
in regard to the new limits to be given to the Guantánamo naval
station, it is a real pleasure to me to advise your excellency that
the steps preliminary to the final transaction are being taken, with
the observation at the same time that, according to said note, the
suggestions that I had the honor to make to you concerning the
jurisdiction of the waters must be dropped, since the limits
proposed comprise the two mouths (the two shores of the mouth) of
the bay mentioned.
The form in which this negotiation, of such great interest to both
Republics, has been put forward and is progressing—an additional
evidence of the good disposition of the United States and of the
keen and sincere friendship with which Cuba responds—encourages me
to offer to your excellency the following points, the importance of
which in the relations of the United States will not escape the
perspicacity of your excellency.
[Here follow references to two matters that appear in this volume
under the titles “Claim for the cost of intervention in Cuba” and
“Sovereignty of the Isle of Pines”; also reference to newspaper
rumors of the possibility of a third intervention which, says the
note, “although the act of unscrupulous speculators and business
interests alarm and disconcert the nation, wound patriotic
sentiment, and nourish misgivings and distrust in the minds of all.”
The note then suggests a clearing up of these three problems by—
A denial by the United States Government of intention to press the
reported claim for cost of intervention;
An agreement with Cuba concerning the sovereignty of the Isle of
Pines;
An agreement with Cuba explicitly defining the conditions “that shall
govern the exercise of the right of intervention in the Cuban
State”; for although the Piatt amendment, the Appendix to the Cuban
Constitution, and the treaty with the United States all express the
ends, none of them define the conditions that may justly oblige the
United States to intervene or Cuba to accept intervention. The note
then proceeds:]
I take the liberty to advise your excellency that the Cuban
Government and the nation would see in all the declarations
indicated a worthy and valuable compensation for the concessions
contemplated in favor of the United States.
The Government does not take into account the remarkable
disproportion between the area of 50 caballerias at Bahía Honda,
which the United States would renounce, and the considerably greater
area at Guantánamo by which it would augment the station, because
the Government is convinced that the United States is actuated to
propose enlarging the area of the naval station not only by the
obligations imposed upon it by the Piatt amendment to protect Cuba’s
independence, but also by its own needs of self-defense and foreign
policy. But the generous spirit of this point of view which Cuba
adopts
[Page 119]
authorizes it to
hope to receive from the United States the compensation indicated,
which would so fully satisfy public sentiment.
I avail myself, etc.,
