893.51/2695: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)58
227. On March 2 the Japanese Ambassador left with the Department a lengthy memorandum on the subject of the consortium, a copy of which is being sent you by pouch. It sets forth in great detail the reasons for the Japanese claim for exclusion of certain interests in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia from the scope of the consortium. It states that such claim is based on the “economic existence and national defense of Japan.” It gives as an additional reason for asking protection of its interests in these localities “the recent development of the Russian situation.” It states that the British Foreign Minister invited Viscount Chinda on the 19th of November last to propose a formula to cover the situation and “accordingly, the Japanese Government, while authorizing the Japanese bankers’ group to enter the proposed consortium on the same footing as the bankers’ groups of the other Powers concerned, venture to propose to achieve the settlement of the matter at issue by exchanging between the Members concerned a note embodying the [Page 504] sense of the formula hereto attached. [Here follows the formula contained in the memorandum of March 2 from the Japanese Embassy, printed supra.]”
It also submits the following list of concessions and options in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia which it asks be excluded from pooling as provided in consortium agreement:
[Here follows the statement of exceptions annexed to the memorandum of March 2 from the Japanese Embassy, printed supra.]
Please communicate the above to the British Foreign Office with the statement that this Government is not disposed to question the substance of the list as submitted although it is much more far reaching than was contemplated by the American proposal of October 28,59 of which a copy was forwarded to you in Despatch 435, October 30, last.60 This is particularly true of Article 3 which relates to the five Manchurian Railways. The Department wishes to go as far as possible to meet the legitimate desires of the Japanese and to remove any reason for further delay in bringing about effective cooperation.
As regards the proposal of the Japanese Government in respect to a reservation to be made on the basis of “the paramount importance of the economic existence and national security of the country, coupled with a due regard for the general peace of the Far East,” the Department desires to advise you of its views for your own information and for your guidance in discussions of this question with the British Foreign Office. This Government is heartily gratified by Japan’s apparent renunciation of the exclusive economic and political claims which it has hitherto maintained with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia. The formula proposed by the Japanese Government is, however, in the view of this Government, superfluous and potentially dangerous. This Government is not unsympathetic with the professed objects of the Proviso, but considers that by reason of the particular relationships of understanding which exist between Japan and the other three powers associated with it in the Consortium there would appear to be no reason to apprehend on the part of the Consortium any activities directed against the economic life or national defense of Japan. It is felt that Japan could with assurance rely upon the good faith of the United States and the other two powers associated in the Consortium to refuse their countenance to any operations inimical to the vital interests of Japan: and that Japan’s insistence upon the other three powers joining in the proposed formula would only create misapprehension.
[Page 505]It is felt moreover that such a formula would not only be unnecessary but would lend itself to misconstruction for the reason that it apparently differentiates between the status of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and that of other Chinese territory. The mere fact of such differentiation would, it is apprehended, give rise to questions which would tend still further to unsettle the already complex situation in China.
This Government is therefore hopeful that the Japanese Government may in view of its existing relations with the other three powers be persuaded to rely upon their good faith in this matter and forego its proposal to require explicit guarantees the mere statement of which opens the way for possible misconstruction and misapprehension in the future.
It is desired that you ask the Foreign Office for an informal expression of opinion concerning the present Japanese proposal when it shall have considered the matter in detail. Please explain that because of Mr. Lamont’s presence in Japan it is desired to reply to the memorandum at the earliest possible moment.
Repeat to Paris as number 476 for similar action.
- See last paragraph for instructions to repeat to Paris as no. 476.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. i, p. 497.↩
- Not printed.↩