740.0011, Pacific War/3123

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

In reply to a recent enquiry from His Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon37 about Timor, the Secretary General of the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs38 said that, as Sir R. Campbell was aware, the Japanese occupation of Portuguese Timor had been followed by interminable discussions with the Japanese Government which had led nowhere. When the new Japanese Minister had been appointed, he had been told that the usual reference to “the friendly relations uniting the two countries”, or words to that effect, would not be admitted in the customary address to the Head of the State on the presentation of his credentials. The most that would be allowed would be an expression of hope for “the improvement of relations”. Discussions relating to Japanese behaviour in the Colonies had subsequently been reopened with the new Minister but these had also led nowhere.

Dr. Sampayo said that a number of Portuguese officials had escaped from Timor to Australia but, this abandonment of their posts being quite contrary to Portuguese traditions, they had been instructed [Page 526] to return to them. The Portuguese Government had demanded that the Japanese occupation forces should put no obstacle in the way of this and in general should abstain from making it impossible, as they had been doing, for the Portuguese administration to function. In reply the Japanese Minister had demanded an undertaking that the Governor and his staff would adopt a proper neutral attitude. This naturally infuriated Dr. Salazar,39 who brought the discussions to an end.

His Majesty’s Ambassador understands that he has since been considering in consultation with his principal Ministers what action is open to him.

Sir R. Campbell reports that according to one informant Dr. Salazar was contemplating an early declaration of war but he thinks it most improbable that Dr. Salazar would proceed to that extreme. He might possibly break off relations but even that would presumably expose him to the seizure of Macao, not to mention retaliatory action of some kind by other members of the Axis. Sir R. Campbell would not be surprised therefore if Dr. Salazar contrived to keep his anger in check for the time being.

Although His Majesty’s Government agree with Sir R. Campbell’s conclusions, they think it would be desirable to encourage Dr. Salazar if he shows any further signs of taking a stronger line vis-à-vis the Japanese. They therefore propose to telegraph to Sir R. Campbell as follows:

“If Dr. Salazar should decide to break off relations with or even to declare war on Japan we should welcome such a development and you should give all possible encouragement to such a step. An anticipated seizure of Macao would not affect us but we should be unable to afford the Portuguese any assistance if they were to attempt to hold that island.

“The above is sent for your information only and guidance.”

As, however, Macao is in a United States strategic sphere, they would be glad to know whether the United States Government concur.

  1. Sir Ronald H. Campbell.
  2. Teixeira de Sampayo.
  3. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.