Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

759.60C27/8–248: Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Marvel) to the Secretary of State

secret

Copenhagen, August 2, 1948—6 p. m.

718. Pursuant Deptel 493, July 30,¹ efforts to contact Danish Foreign Minister² Saturday unsuccessful. In absence Foreign Minister, talked today with director of Foreign Office Dahl, and asked him whether a further delay could be made by Danish Government in answering formally Polish note regarding reciprocal air concessions at Copenhagen and Warsaw. When he asked me whether I could present the American views, I admitted I could not. He thereupon stated he would see if Danes could delay formal action but pointed out they were already orally committed and emphasized US views should be forthcoming immediately in view of passage of time of week’s grace.

Department was advised by mytels 657, July 12 and 660, July 13³ regarding Polish-Danish air agreement. While I have received today statement of policy⁴ I cannot follow reason for applying it to such Polish-Danish arrangement, particularly when EC A Hoffmann⁵ is publicly proclaiming necessity of East-West trade, when Denmark considers air agreement simply an incident to such trade, when US position at Danube Conference⁶ advocates freedom of navigation in order to increase East-West trade and particularly when proposed arrangement is in accordance with principles of ICAO. Defiance of ICAO principles with Denmark will have damaging effect on US interests in Greenland weather station agreement which must be renegotiated in 1949.

If US policy regarding aviation is to “pierce the corporate veil” and consider all satellites as only a Russian entity, then such policy should prevail in other international aspects. If Poland is not an entity regarding aviation, then it is not an entity as a member of UN. Denmark will be most reluctant to do away with these legal fictions. Consequently it appears to me ill-advised to draw on our reservoir of goodwill with Danes in this connection and press them to go back on oral commitment (particularly when I am instructed not to disclose US purposes or policy for such pressure) when this reservoir must be drawn on to effect successfully Danish concurrence with US views on problems certainly as large if not larger than the present one of mutual concessions regarding weekly air services between two capitals in order to promote international trade. If a principal aspect of US policy concerns aircraft maintenance, then it is better to approach privately-owned DDL as in case of DC–6’s (Embtel 679, July 19⁷). In any event furthest US can now go in my opinion is to suggest promptly and clearly the detailed obligations it wishes either contained in or omitted from formal Danish-Polish agreement.

Marvel

1. Not printed; it instructed that the Embassy again urge the Danish Government to delay granting formal approval of Polish air operations to Copenhagen (857.79660C/7–2748).
2. Gustav Rasmussen.
3. Neither printed.
4. The reference here is to document NSC 15/1, July 12, 1948, p. 451, copies of which were forwarded to various missions.
5. Paul G. Hoffmann, Administrator for Economic Cooperation.
6. For documentation regarding the participation by the United States in the Conference to Consider Free Navigation of the Danube, held in Belgrade, July 30–August 19, 1948, see pp. 593 ff.
7. Not printed.