033.1100/4–1050
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Robertson)
Subject: General Collins’ Visit to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
| Participants: | General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army |
| Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army | |
| Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for NEA Mr. David A. Robertson, NEA |
Discussion:
Mr. McGhee called on General Collins at the Pentagon on Monday, April 10, 1950 at 3 p. m. to discuss the General’s recent trip to Greece,1 Turkey,2 Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Mr. McGhee opened the discussion by observing that the reports we had received on General Collins’ visit to the various capitals indicated the warmth with which General Collins had been greeted and the fine impression he had made on foreign government officials he had seen.
General Collins stated that he was delighted to find, wherever he went, the friendliness and warmth with which Americans were greeted, diplomats, military men and private individuals alike. He then proceeded to review the highlights of his visits, country by country.
Turkey:
General Collins stated that in visiting the Signal Corps school in Turkey he was happy to observe that almost all of the instructors were Turks. Mr. McGhee agreed that we should train the Turks to take over the instruction of their own people as rapidly as possible.
General Collins stated that, in answer to questions put to him by officials in Turkey and Iran as to what support they might receive [Page 1249] from the U.S. in the event of hostilities, it was the U.S. plan to give the enemy a very heavy pounding by strategic bombing at an early stage in hostilities which should be of considerable aid to these countries. When fears were expressed that the enemy would move in at an early stage by use of paratroops, he pointed out that this sort of fear had been expressed to him in many countries which he had visited and it was just not possible for the enemy to organize and commit paratroops except on a limited scale. He outlined the complications and difficulties that he had experienced in connection with a small parachute combat force under his command during the last war.
General Collins said that while he had been very much impressed with the integrity of the President of Turkey,3 he felt that the Defense Minister and the Chief of the Joint Staff and his Deputy were not too strong. In going over the Turkish war plans he observed to them that they had not provided sufficient depth for the armies for carrying on guerrilla warfare after the first blow had been struck; that supply, ordnance and other depots should be moved back from the front lines so that all would not be lost at an early stage; that it would be unfortunate to commit a large force in defense of that part of Turkey lying in Europe and that too many of the naval facilities were located on the east bank of the Bosphorus where they were exposed to destruction by gun fire from the other side. He felt that it might be necessary to find a stronger man to head up the U.S. Naval Mission in Turkey. As regards the Turkish army deployed in the east he has been informed that there was no coordination of plans with the Iranian forces adjacent to that sector and such discussions would, in his opinion, be desirable. Mr. McGhee observed that the Iranians had approached the Turks on several occasions requesting joint discussions but the Turks had not as yet consented.
General Collins further observed that he found little or no coordination among the Turkish armed forces. The Secretary of Defense appeared to have been poorly informed as regards Turkish war plans and little or no time had been spent by Turkish military leaders in the Defense Ministry and Joint Staff observing conditions in the field. He made appropriate observations, particularly as regards the desirability of field visits, pointing out that he had come the long distance to Turkey for the purpose of making such observations. The Defense Minister assured him measures would be taken to correct these conditions.
General Collins stated that General McBride would return to the U.S. in August and be replaced by General Arnold4 who was also a [Page 1250] very able officer. He stated that he had agreed with Ambassador Wadsworth concerning the desirability of sending out a separate general officer to head the Army Mission. This would tend to remove any resentment of the other missions and would permit General McBride to spend more time on advising the Turks regarding their war plans.
- For the portion of this memorandum on General Collins’ trip to Greece, see p. 362.↩
- March 26–28.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation with Turkish President Ismet Inönü, at Ankara, March 26, by General Collins, p. 1241.↩
- Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, then Chief, Budget Division, U.S. Army Comptroller’s Office.↩