Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

772.00/5–2251: Despatch

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 442

Tunis, May 22, 1951.

Subject: A New Political Crisis Bluilds Up

The past week has produced in Tunisia the essential elements of a major political crisis similar to that which hit Morocco recently. Both sides have hardened their attitude and a test of strength between the Bey (with the Neo-Destour pushing him on) and the Resident General has already begun. This situation has developed out of:

1. The insistence of the Tunisian cabinet, controlled by the Neo-Destour, upon ever greater reforms and its utilization of whatever tactical weapons come to hand:

2. The success of the Neo-Destour in persuading the Bey to support its program;

3. The firm determination of the Resident General not to go beyond the very limited reforms he has repeatedly proclaimed as his program.

The state of affairs at this moment is that the Resident General has served notice on the Bey that he must dismiss his present Prime Minister and two other Ministers if he expects to make any more progress toward internal autonomy, and the Bey has protested to the President of France against the delivery of this ultimatum.

The Resident General’s objective is to get rid of Salah Ben Youssef, Minister of Justice and Secretary General of the Neo-Destour, whom he charges with sabotaging the French program of orderly evolution and who undoubtedly dominates the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet.

The Bey’s objective, presumably, is to maintain his support in Nationalist circles and, perhaps, provoke a change of Resident General.

Mr. Perillier told me on May 19 that he wants very much to continue the reform program, as he has laid it down, but that he cannot accept the premature demands of the Cabinet for still greater powers and the institution of a national representative legislative assembly. He has now become convinced that Ben Youssef will not, or cannot, negotiate in good faith on the only basis acceptable to France. Furthermore, he charges the cabinet with neglecting its ordinary administrative duties. Consequently, he wants a change in cabinet leadership. He is sure he can find good men who will work with him. However, he does not propose to force a change. If the Bey remains obdurate, he will merely mark time and wait for the Bey or the Neo-Destour to give up. Whether the Nationalists will allow him to mark time is another question; I think it likely that they will stir up so much fuss that he will be driven to some action to get rid of the Cabinet.

It appears that the Bey’s message of May 15 (mytel 117¹) was the last straw which decided Perillier to take his stand. (An English translation of the message from French is enclosed, together with a single copy of the original Arabic.²) As reported by telegram, this message was drawn up without consultation with the Resident General, who did not even know the Bey intended to issue a statement. However, this was only the latest of a series of grievances, all of which were mentioned in Perillier’s bill of complaints delivered to the Bey on May 19.³ They included the general strike of March 10, the boycott by the Tunisian Ministers of the Grand Council sessions and the generally uncooperative attitude of the Cabinet’s leading triumvirate: Prime Minister Chenik, Ben Youssef and Minister of Social Affairs Badra.

On the other side of the picture, the Neo-Destour, and all other nationalist groups as well, continue to accuse the French of dragging their feet. While some of the Ministers, even Ben Youssef himself, might be willing to go slowly, they seem to be driven ahead by the pressure of their followers. Accordingly, they have adopted “democratic representation” as the new keynote and are hammering it for all it is worth. (See my despatches No. 430 of May 15 and No. 441 of May 22.⁴) This is a line having great popular appeal and one which would also give them an excellent propaganda basis for appeals to other countries and the United Nations if matters come to that.

In addition to the question of a cabinet change, a showdown may arise out of the new budget. After being approved in general by the two sections of the Grand Council (though with reservations by the Tunisian Section) it was supposed to be considered by the “Mixed Delegation” to reconcile various minor differences between the versions approved by the two sections. This is a standard procedure corresponding to the system of conference committees in our own Congress. However, the Tunisian members took the position that they would not participate in the work of the Delegation unless they were assured of satisfaction regarding the two conditions their section had attached to the budget. (See my despatch No. 429 of May 15.⁵) Communications to and from the Residency failed to produce such assurances. The French members of the Delegation therefore met alone and gave their blessing to the document, whereupon it was referred to the Higher Budget Committee established by the reform decrees of February 8. This Committee met May 19 (without its Tunisian members) and is understood to have approved a budget based on that presented but with minor changes.

The next step is to get the approval of the French Ministry of Finance in Paris, after which the budget is supposed to be presented to the Bey, by the Prime Minister, for his seal.

What will happen when it comes back from Paris is the big question. The Nationalists say publicly that the Prime Minister will refuse to present it for the Bey’s seal and that His Highness will refuse his approval in any case. If this occurs, drastic French action of some sort seems possible. The Resident General has told me that he cannot and will not permit the country to be without a budget; the administration must be carried on. One of his chief subordinates, Director General of Political and Administrative Service Jacquet, admitted to me that, theoretically, there is no way to promulgate a budget without the Bey’s approval, but he added: “In practice, there is the French Army.”⁶

This whole budgetary dispute is public knowledge, and the Resident General’s demand for a new cabinet is rapidly becoming so. At least two newspapers have already reported it as more than a rumor. Furthermore, Perillier publicly reiterated his opposition to new reforms at present in a speech before a conference of Reserve Officers at Tunis on May 20, when he said:

“Progress can be made only with order and balance; those who want to skip the (intermediate) stages and who always try to go beyond the agreements reached render very poor service to the country.”

He added that French policy was to build democracy from the bottom up, beginning with municipal governments and using them as training schools for eventual democratic representation on the national scale.

This has, of course, been taken as a reply to the Bey’s message of May 15.

It is obvious that the Bey and the Neo-Destour cannot back down at this stage without great loss of prestige and popular following. It is also obvious that the Resident General cannot back down if he is to stay in Tunisia.

I think it probable that matters will drag along, with mutual recriminations but without a real showdown, until after the French elections of June 17 and the formation of a new French Government. What happens then will depend on the amount of support the new government is willing to give Perillier. (He may even find himself out of a job.) If the French stand firm, my guess is that the Bey will find a way to save face, after a suitable lapse of time, and that a new cabinet will be formed and the budget approved, perhaps with some slight French concessions with respect to form. There is, however, the other possibility that the Nationalists will get the Arab and South Asian states to make a world issue of the whole dispute. I need not point out to the Department the difficulties this would cause the United States.

John D. Jernegan

1. Not printed. It reported that the Bey had issued a message to the people of Tunisia supporting the Tunisian Cabinet of Prime Minister Chenik and calling for a further reform of the Tunisian executive. (772.00/5–1751)
2. The enclosures are not printed here.
3. Telegram 119, May 19, from Tunis, reported that French Resident General Perillier intended to inform the Bey that he was free to retain the present Cabinet but that the French would conduct no further negotiations with it. Perillier presumably asked that Chenik, Ben Youssef, and Badra be eliminated from the Cabinet. (772.00/5–1951)
4. Neither printed.
5. Not printed.
6. The Bey approved the Tunisian budget on June 1. Despatch 463, June 12, from Tunis, observed that with the advent of the religious holiday of Ramadan and the approval of the budget “a relative calm seems to have descended on the Tunisian scene.” The despatch also observed that the approval of the budget removed one of the most serious immediate difficulties in Franco-Tunisian relations and apparently greatly relieved French officials who “will not now be faced with the ungrateful task of using force to impose a budget.” (772.00/6–1251)