751G.00/7–2754: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
366. FYI. Intelligence reports from Vietnam indicate good many nationalists are waiting see what policy United States will be toward government Vietnam and whether we will allow French attempt reestablish their former degree of control over retained Vietnam. There have been other intelligence reports to effect French are undermining Diem, perhaps with view to establishing regime headed by former Prime Minister Tam or possibly former Prime Minister Huu and made up mainly of southerners previously identified as Cochin-China separatists, morally corrupt and politically subservient to France. These French maneuvers reportedly began before cease-fire agreements were concluded and were probably intended offer insurance against a refusal by Diem to accept terms to be agreed on at Geneva. Since Diem has gone as far toward accepting cease-fire as we believe he could have done without losing all nationalist support we believe interests United States and France will best be served under present circumstances by supporting Diem government. End FYI.
Please find appropriate occasion talk to Mendes-France along following lines:
“There has been considerable recent speculation about US share in aid program for retained Vietnam and question has been voiced as to whether US assistance should be given directly to Vietnamese or in part channelled through French. We are prepared to contribute positively toward solving problem of Vietnam but feel we should know first what prospects are for Diem Govt and how Mendes-France himself sees situation.
“From information at our disposal, Prime Minister Diem, while inexperienced, seems to have demonstrated independence and personal qualities which appeal to his compatriots. Before establishing our position we feel we must know whether his govt is likely to last, and whether it enjoys support of French Govt, or whether French are thinking in terms of replacing Diem (as La Chambre hinted to you, [Page 1889] Paris tel 366).2 If latter is true, we should have to take into account character and prospects of any successor govt. Our objective is that US aid should contribute to strengthening of a Vietnamese Govt whose strength derives from wide popular support and whose appeal extends beyond line of demarcation into North. We would not wish to give aid to govt which did not enjoy support and confidence of Vietnamese people. Prospects of keeping part, if not all, of Vietnam in free world, and indeed of setting up effective SEA security arrangements are intimately associated, in our minds, with manner in which retained Vietnam is helped to attain sense of independence and of responsibility for its own future.”3
- Drafted by Sturm of PSA and Tyler of WE. Repeated to Saigon for information as telegram 348.↩
- Dated July 27. p. 1879.↩
- In telegram 409 from Paris, July 29, Ambassador Dillon stated that in his opinion it would be neither appropriate nor effective to raise this matter with Premier Mendès-France who was fully preoccupied with other matters. The Ambassador therefore intended to approach Minister La Chambre instead. (751G.00/7–2954)↩