A political “deal” to admit all the applicants.
Since 1946 we have opposed such a deal on the ground that
the Soviet satellites do not meet the qualifications of
Charter Article 4. However, the increasing difficulty of
maintaining support for our position may make it
desirable to review this situation. Until now one of the
strongest arguments against the Soviet package has been
Japan’s omission. In the pending negotiations with the
USSR Japan may obtain Soviet support for its admission,
but if the USSR agrees only to add Japan to its package,
our position will become more difficult since the
package would then include all applicants except
Cambodia, Laos, Viet-Nam and the ROK (against whose immediate admission some
plausible arguments may be presented.) Moreover, the
widely held view that the membership problem should be
dealt with in Charter review, enables us to consider the
matter in a new context.
Conceivably the US could publicly indicate willingness to
see all the countries in the Soviet package except the
“Mongolian People’s
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Republic” admitted (i.e., Albania,
Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania), if
Japan, the ROK, Laos,
Cambodia and Viet-Nam were simultaneously admitted.
Alternatively, we could indicate our readiness to
accept, in addition to the above, Spain and Germany,
even though they have not yet applied. In making any
such proposals, it would be essential to make clear our
continued opposition to the seating of Communist China
in the UN. Even if, as is
likely, the USSR opposes such proposals, we would then
be in a stronger tactical position to urge alternative
courses, such as non-member participation.
A limited agreement to admit several non-committed
states (e.g., Austria, Libya, Jordan).
The Secretary General suggested this idea last fall but
dropped it when it became clear the USSR was opposed.
The fact that such a proposal omits states with equal if
not better claims to prompt admission (e.g., Italy,
Japan) and increases neutralist strength in the UN, makes it undesirable for
us to take any such initiative, though it might be
advisable to keep an open mind on the matter in order to
be able to go along with an acceptable grouping, should
one be suggested.
Further negotiations on non-member participation.
If we estimate that no progress on membership can now be
made, our most fruitful course of action might be to
reactivate study of non-member participation,
recognizing at the outset that a request for an advisory
opinion from the ICJ
with respect to the legality of the plan is probably all
we can get through the Assembly at this stage. We could
proceed through diplomatic channels and conceivably also
use the Interim Committee, thus paving the way for the
Tenth GA. On the other
hand, in view of its current negotiations with the USSR,
Japan, the most important applicant favorably inclined,
may not maintain its support for this plan. Also to be
considered is the implication that, by promoting
non-member participation, we are relaxing our pressure
for the admission of qualified states.
