45. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles1
Dear Foster: I have now had time to consider your proposal that we and the French should make strong appeals to a number of Governments with the aim of obtaining their support for a move to reject the credentials of the Hungarian representatives to the General Assembly. Mr. Whitney will already have reported my preliminary reactions; but, for the sake of completeness, I repeat below much of what I said to him on November 24.2
It seems to me that there are two quite separate problems: first, whether we can secure the rejection of the Credentials by an adequate majority and second whether, if we think we can, it is desirable to do so.
As regards practicability, I think we both start from the position that a favourable vote of less than two-thirds would not be acceptable. The United Kingdom Mission at New York have made several careful assessments of the probable vote on a motion for rejection. On each occasion they concluded that a two-thirds majority was unobtainable. As recently as October 23 our two Missions at New York, together with the French and the Australians, made a joint assessment. The unanimous conclusion was that, even on the most favourable assumptions (including strong representations in Capitals), a two-thirds majority could not be achieved; the best vote that could be expected was 40 in favour, 22 against, and 19 abstentions. Dixon has within the last [Page 79] day or two confirmed that this is still his view. I find it hard to believe that even the strongest representations could at this stage produce a substantial change.
I know that your own estimate is somewhat more favourable, but I imagine that you would agree that there is at least some uncertainty whether we could achieve complete success. To embark on it at all would, to my mind, involve two serious risks.
(a) Once the lobbying operation became known, the prestige of the three Governments concerned would be engaged, and it would not be possible to withdraw without giving the Soviet Union a major propaganda victory.
(b) We would have to press on to a vote, therefore; whatever the outcome appeared likely to be. We might well get (and I think would most likely get) a simple but not a two-thirds majority, would we then be compelled to argue that a matter of this sort can be decided by a simple majority? In view of your preoccupations about Chinese representation, I should not have thought that this would be what you want.
I am moreover doubtful whether it would be wise to embark at this time on an intensive lobbying campaign on the issue of Hungarian Credentials. Very many delegations at the United Nations in all geographical groups are at present very anxious to avoid anything likely to increase East/West tension, and indeed wherever possible to go a long way to achieve East/West agreements. I am sure that members of the Afro-Asian group, some Latin American Governments, the Governments of the Scandinavian countries and indeed some Commonwealth Governments would dislike the idea of rejection as likely to increase tension.
These arguments alone seem to me overriding. But I also think that the desirability of rejecting the Hungarian Credentials is seriously open to question. I agree entirely with you that action of this sort by the United Nations would give satisfaction and encouragement to the Hungarian people. It might conceivably, though I doubt it, bring about a diminution of repression in Hungary. But I think we must consider possible consequences in the longer term very carefully before we take such a step, merely because there is no other practical sanction the United Nations can apply. Here I see difficulties and risks besides those to which Mr. Whitney drew attention.
For me, at least, there is a legal and intellectual difficulty. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly lay down that Credentials should be issued by the Head of the State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian Government have issued such Credentials. If we did not recognize the Hungarian Government, we could argue that the Credentials were not in good form; but we do recognize that Government and we intend, if we can, to maintain bilateral relations with them. If, therefore, we reject Hungarian Credentials, it will be [Page 80] either because we do not approve of the Hungarian Government’s actions; or because that Government was established by the Soviet armed forces and has, therefore, no legal basis. That leads to further difficulties.
Rejection on the first ground could very easily form a most unwelcome precedent. Surely the remedy should be expulsion in accordance with Article 6.3 Moreover, even if a two-thirds majority for rejection were obtained, it is by no means impossible, for instance, that the Russians could, during the present session, get a similar majority for the rejection of the South African Credentials.
Rejection on the second ground is not much more satisfactory. The same argument could be applied to some other Governments (though less obviously); it is also difficult (though not impossible, I agree) to reconcile with the maintenance of Missions in Budapest. No improvement of conditions in Hungary would remove that ground for rejection, short of the establishment of a new Government by methods which we could regard as valid. Re-admission without a change of political system would be incompatible with the original argument for exclusion, and we should have to face an annual battle of uncertain outcome.
There is one other minor point. Your note4 mentioned the possibility that the Hungarian Government might break off diplomatic relations with the West. It is not, of course, certain that they would do this. But if they did, is not Mindszenty an embarrassment? It is not only his fate personally which worries me, but the danger that a major quarrel over him might upset the present delicate balance in Poland by forcing Gomulka5 and the Polish Catholics to take sides.
I am entirely in favour of strongly condemning, during the debate on Hungary, both the Soviet Union and the present authorities in Hungary. I am also strongly in favour of continuing our previous policy of leaving Hungarian Credentials in suspense. But I do not think it would be either timely or wise to attempt to secure their rejection. I hope you can agree.
Yours ever,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 26 note from Hood forwarding the letter to Dulles. The notation “Sec saw” is written on Hood’s transmittal letter.↩
- See footnote 3, supra.↩
- For text of Article 6 of the Charter, see footnote 5, Document 16.↩
- Not found.↩
- Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩