274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

924. In long conversation with Redel, formerly attached USOM Kathmandu and with Department representative, Nara Pratap Thapa, who briefly in Washington re purchase Nepalese Embassy, made almost impassioned plea for increased American aid.2 Thapa stated his sole objectives were: (1) build up position and power of King who alone could hold Nepal together and maintain that country’s sovereignty [1 line of source text not declassified]. Under first objective Thapa urged (a) budgetary support, alleging Indian rupees would be quite satisfactory (b) “discreet” help in training police and possibly even military in US service schools and (c) provision of helicopters for [Page 582] northern frontier patrol purposes and contacts with district administrators. (During King’s recent visit to Soviet Union Thapa alleges Khrushchev personally offered King 35 helicopters, i.e. one for each district, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thapa sought: (a) aid for Royal Nepalese Airlines (b) ropeway extending north from British-built Gurkha camp (c) million plus dollars in foreign exchange to enable GOI complete Trisuli hydro-electric project and (d) east-west road in Terai.

Thapa said he understood perfectly US desire not undertake any projects which might embarrass US-India relations. Nepal itself could and should undertake “clear” with GOI Nepalese approach to US for specific project assistance. Indeed Thapa had already done this personally with Nehru. Latter, after explaining GOI in no position help RNA, even encouraged Thapa turn to USG for help. Thapa concluded by stating both he and Foreign Minister Shah were under instruction discuss Nepal’s critical position with highest available US authorities. Shah carries letter to this effect from Chairman Council of Ministers.

In view above, Rountree and others on US delegation to Colombo Plan meeting in Seattle3 will use opportunity discuss situation more thoroughly with both Shah and Thapa and would prefer deferring substantive reply Deptel 8234 until after Seattle talks. Meanwhile and prior to talks Department would appreciate Embassy’s assessment Shah’s and Thapa’s position vis-à-vis King and anticipated GOI’s reaction to expanded US aid along lines set forth Deptel 823 and by Thapa.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790C.5–MSP/10–1758. Confidential. Drafted by Bartlett and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Kathmandu for the U.S. Operations Mission.
  2. Nara Pratap Thapa was Secretary of Foreign Affairs. A memorandum of Thapa’s conversation with Bartlett, which took place in Washington on October 15, is ibid., 790C.00/10–1558.
  3. The annual ministerial meeting of the Colombo Plan was scheduled to be held in Seattle, November 10–13.
  4. Telegram 823 to New Delhi, October 7, reads in part as follows: “Growing impression among foreign observers Kathmandu that fact of Soviet aid to GON must be accepted as logical outgrowth of King’s June visit to Moscow. However, belief also exists that GON undecided as yet on nature of projects, type of aid it wants or acceptance of Soviet technicians. Indian Embassy Kathmandu in particular, feels GON can still be influenced on these points.” (Department of State, Central Files, 861.0090C/10–758)