The President has asked me to call this meeting for the purpose of having
a general discussion of U.S. policy in two large areas, Latin America
and Europe. It is not his purpose in this meeting to attempt detailed
analysis of immediate questions such as the program for the San Jose
meeting or the next steps in the post-Nassau negotiations. He desires
instead to have a broader exchange of views, in which it would be open
to any member to propose quite new levels or directions of policy as
deserving further study.
Members of the Council are familiar with the main lines of current policy
in these two areas, but the two papers which are attached may be of some
interest to those who have not seen them. One is a talking paper on Cuba
used by the Secretary of State in a recent talk to the Cabinet. The
other is an abridgment of an informal talking paper on European policy
presented to the President by Ambassador Bruce. The documents do not
have the authority of formal State papers, but each is a responsible
statement of the main lines of our present course; alternative views
might well respond to them. It should be added that the Secretary of
State’s paper, in that it centers on Cuba, covers a field less broad
than that of hemispheric policy as a whole. It is the broad field that
the President has in mind for the first item on this simple agenda:
Attachment
REVIEW OF THE CUBAN SITUATION AND
POLICY
(Talking Points)
I Policy Objectives
(a) We shall continue to safeguard the security of the United States
through whatever measures may be necessary. Our purpose is to
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achieve
security, not only for the United States but for the Hemisphere. In
this effort we shall work so far as possible through collective
action. Our interest is in practical results and not flamboyant
measures.
(b) We shall continue to fight against the spread of Castroism
through Latin America not only by intensifying existing efforts
directed specifically toward this task, but also by helping to
eliminate poverty and inequity which is the building ground for
infection. This we shall do through an expansion and development of
the Alliance for Progress.
(c) On the basis of the progress of the great strides already made
toward increased inter-American cooperation we shall continue to
tighten the noose around the Cuban economy and to increase the
isolation of the Castro regime from the political life of the
hemisphere until that regime becomes a complete pariah.
(d) We will not be satisfied until the Cuban people have been assured
the opportunity of freely choosing their own government.
II Success of our
Policy So Far
1. We have substantially isolated Cuba from access to the
industrialized nations of the free world:
(a) Trade with Cuba between the Atlantic Community and Latin America
during 1962 dropped to one-third of what it was during 1961.
(b) The year 1963 will undoubtedly be the worst year economically
that Cuba will have known in recent times.
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(c) As the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate Cuba will become an
even greater economic burden for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We estimate
that Cuba is currently costing the Bloc at least $1,000,000 a
day.
2. We have substantially reduced the availability of free world
shipping for Cuba (either direct or under charter to the Soviet
Bloc). The number of free world ships calling at Cuba ports has
dropped from 128 in January 1962 to 12 in January 1963. We are
continuing to reduce the number of free world ships in the Cuban
trade by achieving the cooperation of Free World nations and through
various shipping measures.
3. We have brought a major reduction in the political influence of
Castroism in the Hemisphere:
(a) During October 1962 complete hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban
issue was achieved for the first time by a unanimous vote in support
of our quarantine.
(b) In January 1962, at Punta del Este, the United States effectively
excluded the Castro Government from the Inter-American System.
(c) Fourteen Latin American countries have broken diplomatic
relations with Cuba and only five (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay
and Bolivia) continue to maintain such relations. The Federal
Republic of Germany was the latest country to break relations.
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(d) Significant gains for the democratic forces have been shown by
recent student and labor elections in the Hemisphere during the past
two years. They show a significant decline in Castro/Communist
influence.
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(e) As a result of economic chaos which has been produced in Cuba as
a result of Communist mismanagement and Cuban isolation from the
rest of the Free World, Latin America has been given a visual
demonstration that Communism has little to offer it. This
demonstration has been reinforced by growing evidence of the
subservience of the Castro Regime.
4. We have made great progress in countering Cuban subversion and
propaganda efforts:
(a) The cooperation of the Organization of American States (OAS) has been successfully enlisted in
countering subversive activities. The OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security has just
submitted its report. It has made recommendations to Member States
regarding measures to counteract these activities.
(b) We are actively working with Latin American countries in
developing programs to counter subversion. This includes our whole
police and counter-insurgency program.
(c) We have substantially strengthened the United States Information
Program beamed to Cuba and the Hemisphere. The Voice of America has
stepped up its broadcasting in Spanish from one hour a day in 1960
to nine hours a day at the present time. We have delivered 8 million
copies of anti-Castro books as well as films and TV programs
describing the nature of Castroism in Cuba.
5. We have insured the protection of our national security by the
legitimizing of our aerial surveillance of Cuba. This has been
achieved on the basis of OAS
action.
