Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

659. Annex 3 to printed Document 320, revised April 18¹

April 18, 1963

Annex 3

CURRENT SITUATION

A. INTERNAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

During 1963 the Cuban economy is continuing on the declining trend that began in 1960–61. Production of sugar from the current harvest as of March 30, 1963, was an estimated 2.2 million metric tons, compared to 2.7 million tons in 1962 and 4.3 million tons in 1961 at the same date. The final crop is estimated at about 4 million tons, well under the low 4.8 millions in 1962, and only 60% of the 1961 production of 6.8 million tons. Production could be further reduced by new technical or political difficulties or by unseasonable rainfall. With unfavorable conditions, total production might drop to 3.6 million tons.

In 1962 Cuba’s gross national production (GNP) was an estimated 25% below the 1958 level. Cuban GNP in 1962 was less than $2,000 million (in 1958 prices), as compared to more than $2,500 million in 1958. Cuba has been able to compensate for lagging output by imports from the bloc on credit, but probably had 20% less goods available in 1962 than in 1958. Che Guevara recently asserted that Cuba has reached “the lowest rung in the production of sugar” this year, and that errors in “sugar policy” have been rectified. However, the sugar economy and the economy in general seem to be far from recovering the efficiency and momentum lost in the Revolution.

The shortfall in available consumer goods is particularly serious because Cuban consumers have more money to spend. Despite rationing, extended from basic foodstuffs to clothing and shoes, the consumption of goods by the poorer classes has declined, and blackmarketing is widespread. In an attempt to stem inflation, the regime announced price controls on a wide range of goods and services in early April 1963, greatly extending the previous system also by controlling prices at producer, wholesale and retail levels. Distribution of foodstuffs has apparently improved somewhat. However, there is a widespread refusal to work manifested in a shortage of workers to harvest crops, inattention by labor to quality control, and work slowdowns and absenteeism. Many Cubans find poor performance a way of expressing anti-regime feeling, and others understand the Revolution to mean freedom from work.

Meanwhile, Cuba is almost entirely dependent on the communist bloc economies. Cuban trade with the free world has declined to around 10% of imports and 20% of exports. Cuba will do well to deliver as much tonnage to the Free World in 1963 as in 1962, although export values could be greater because of higher world sugar prices. The bloc is continuing to supply essential goods to maintain the economy and is providing consumer goods on credit to compensate for the shortfall in Cuban exports. However, bloc aid for economic development is still largely in the planning stage. It has yet to have an effect in helping to restore the economic momentum lost in the Revolution.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Four years after his ouster of Batista, Fidel Castro remains the unchallenged leader of Cuba. He is no longer the widely popular figure he once was, but his assets are more than sufficient to assure his control. Castro is still a compelling inspiration to the youth of the country and there are many Cubans—such as those in the bureaucracy—whose lives are now too closely identified with Castro to permit them to pull out. The security network established since 1959 is vast, well-ordered, and effective. While there is grumbling among the part-time militia, the regular military is overwhelmingly loyal to Castro, there having been few defections. Political life in the country has been for some time highly organized and the new state party (PURS), involving some 50 to 60,000 people, is about ready to take over from its able predecessor, the ORI.

The mass of the Cuban people seem resigned to their situation and unwilling to accept the risks of open opposition to Castro. Internal resistance is still small-scale, and poorly coordinated and equipped. In recent months there has been some increase of resistance in the eastern provinces, but this is in part seasonal and related to opportunities presented to opponents of the regime by the lagging sugar harvest.

The missile crisis had little if any ill effect on Castro’s situation within Cuba, even though it soured Cuban-Soviet relations for a time. On the contrary, the way in which Castro stood up to the Soviets and the US and got away with it probably bolstered his position at home. Moreover, developments with regard to the missile crisis seem to have made the old line, Moscow-oriented Communists more willing than before to accept Castro’s leadership.

C. SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

The original estimate of Soviet personnel in Cuba at the height of the crisis—22–23,000—was arrived at by estimating the personnel requirements of the various Soviet activities in Cuba we could identify. The 22–23,000 figure represented a fairly firm minimum, but it was always recognized that the total could be higher by several thousand. The Time-Life reporter in Moscow, Stevens, for example, who spent several weeks in Cuba, reported Cuban estimates of 35,000 Soviets as a maximum figure.

Whatever the actual total, we are fairly confident that about 5,000 missile technicians left in November, and that an additional minimum of 4,600 Soviet personnel left between mid-February and mid-April. Most of these we believe to have been military personnel.

Only a few new arrivals have been observed, about 300, although we have unsubstantiated refugee and agent reports of many thousands. Most of these reports can be discounted on internal evidence alone on dates of arrival, ship names, and the like. Taking only the most reliable evidence, we would estimate arrivals of new troops and technicians at between 300 and 1,000 since January 1.

There have been some changes in the physical layout of the Soviet armored camps but nothing that would point conclusively to Soviet withdrawal from these or any other facilities in Cuba. There have been no significant equipment withdrawals in 1963, and there is no observable and significant Cuban participation in the activities we estimate to be primarily Soviet controlled—most notably air defense and SAM facilities. There are indications that the Cubans are being trained in MIG 21’s, SAMs, and other operations. But it is clear that the turnover has not yet taken place and that, when it does, it will be gradual.

Our information on the Bloc civilian presence in Cuba is very spotty. Stevens estimated that 5,000 civilian technicians might be there. This is a reasonable estimate but one we cannot prove. The majority of civilian technicians are undoubtedly Soviet.

The Soviets have announced their intention to build a Cuban fishing industry and to this end have embarked on a port development project and fish processing facilities. Several hundred Bloc agricultural specialists (most of them Soviet but including about 200 Chinese Communists) have been sent to Cuba in the last year. Soviet, East German and other Bloc industrial technicians are engaged in a variety of factory building projects including power plants, a petroleum refinery, a textile combine, and several light industrial plants. It is likely that several hundred technicians are also engaged in the maintenance of Soviet military equipment in Cuba particularly in the electronics and communications field. Other things being equal, the number of civilian technicians from the Bloc is not likely to go down and may very well increase.

For the future, we would expect Soviet military withdrawals to continue slowly. If the Soviet armored units were put into Cuba to protect the missiles—and we believe they were—their continuing presence is militarily unnecessary. They might be useful in certain circumstances—for example to prevent or support a palace coup directed against Castro—but they would not be powerful enough to put down a major Cuban insurrection if the Cuban army were ranged against them, nor could they hope to stem a determined military invasion of Cuba. These troops have some utility as a trip-wire and deterrent to such an invasion, but only if the Soviets are willing to react to such an invasion by nuclear war. Since they cannot (in case of hostilities) be readily protected, resupplied or reinforced and since they are not apparently needed to protect Soviet material in Cuba or to maintain order, their eventual withdrawal appears likely.

The remaining Soviet military personnel i.e. SAM, air defense, communications, naval and air personnel constitute a somewhat different case. Some of them are undoubtedly training Cubans and, as training is completed, may withdraw. We would expect the SAM’s to be turned over to Cuba eventually, but at the same time we would assume that the Soviets and the Cubans would want to maintain the air defense system at near peak efficiency. Withdrawal of these personnel therefore will probably be very slow since the training cycle alone is likely to take six months to a year.

Given the complexity of the military equipment now in Cuba and the current indications that much of it will stay rather than be returned to the USSR, it is likely that a large number of Soviet military technicians will remain in Cuba indefinitely. This number might run into a few thousand initially, even though few of them had direct responsibility for operating the equipment. Reductions in this number would depend on variable factors of the political climate, the introduction of newer equipment, and the proficiency of Cuban trainees.

1. Current Situation: Internal Economic Situation; Internal Political Situation; Soviet Forces in Cuba. Secret Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).