679. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 241
SUBJECT
- Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and Non-Resumption of PANAM Flights to Havana
In about a week or so the Cuban Coordinating Committee will probably recommend that we lift our NOTAM over Cuban airspace but not permit PANAM to resume its flights to Havana. Attached is a draft memorandum which gives the reasons in arriving at these decisions. Here are a few additional points.
[Typeset Page 1740]1. State is holding up on its recommendations to allow time for a possible Cuban reaction to our institution of the NOTAM against Cuban non-scheduled airplanes.
2. CIA tells me that while the non-resumption of PANAM flights will not help their intelligence-gathering capability, it won’t hurt the capability very much either. CIA’s other intelligence capabilities (e.g. communications from their own people in Cuba) have been growing and they rely less and less on refugee information, which at best is not very reliable. In the unlikely event that the need for refugee information becomes urgent, we can probably get a boat-load on an ad hoc basis.
3. We will have to handle carefully the press and public on this one; for example, we don’t want the lifting of the NOTAM (attached) to be misinterpreted as a softening of our Cuban policy. Here are some of the tentative press guidelines.
(a) The action will be played in low-key.
(b) If we are questioned on the lifting of the NOTAM, our reply can include the following points. First, our experience over the past few months leads us to believe that it is no longer dangerous for PANAM and Braniff Airlines to fly over Cuba. KLM and other foreign airlines have been flying over Cuba without incident. (PANAM and Braniff would probably also be overflying Cuba if it were not for the objections of the Airline Pilots Association.) Second, American business is suffering unnecessarily. Third, it should be noted that PANAM will not resume services to Havana and that the integrity of our isolation and anti-subversion [Facsimile Page 2] policies will be maintained.
(c) We may want to point out to appropriate non-scheduled American pilots (1) that we require non-scheduled Cuban planes flying over the U.S. to land for technical inspection and (2) that they should be aware of the probability that Castro will do the same thing to American non-scheduled planes which begin to fly over Cuba as a result of the lifted NOTAM.
4. At this point, the adverse consequences of lifting the NOTAM appear to be relatively mild and manageable. First, KLM may regard the move as an invitation to resume its pressure for a renewal of its services to Havana. However, we intend to make it clear to the Dutch that this is not so. We have a convincing case in view of the fact that PANAM will not resume its flights to Cuba. Second, Castro may get mad when PANAM doesn’t resume its flights to Havana. However, he cannot legitimately do anything to hinder PANAM’s overflight rights without compromising Cuba’s status in ICAO (which provides him with many services). At the worst, he can compel American scheduled airlines to use inconvenient routes across Cuba.
- Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and non-resumption of PanAm flights to Havana. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Lifting of NOTAM re Cuba, 5/63–6/63.↩