Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

683. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 28¹

May 28, 1963

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Towards Exile Unity

1. The Cuban Coordinator’s paper on U.S. policy towards exile unity is moving along quickly. We should have the approved version in the next couple days.

2. Our present public position towards exile unity is mixed; we are saying and doing things to both encourage and discourage exile unity. Factors which we control and which seem to be encouraging the exiles to unify are the AG’s public statement of April 21 (Tab 1); to a lesser extent, the President’s statement of April 24 (Tab 2); and the AG’s past conversations with Ruiz Williams. Preliminary readings indicate that Ed Martin’s statement of May 22 (Tab 3), which qualified our support of unity, has tended to discourage some exiles who were previously in favor of a movement towards unity. Attached as Tab 4 is a recent cable from Miami regarding recent exile unity movements.

3. As I see it now, I don’t think our present position is too far from where we want to be. Two steps seem to be in order. First, everyone should tie on to Ed Martin’s relatively non-committal statement. Second, the AG should refrain, on a person-to-person basis, from encouraging the exiles to have elections or to unify (this sort of encouragement is likely to lead to expectations of future U.S. support). As you know, there are indications that the AG may now be willing to do this.

Assuming that exile unity does not serve U.S. interests, we may want to consider the desirability of going a bit further than the Ed Martin statement—e.g. make no value judgment on whether unity is good or bad, but simply say that the unity issue is strictly internal exile business. Such a position leads to the following questions: Is it necessary to go further than the Martin-type statement to accomplish our purposes? Will such a position be palatable in terms of domestic politics? Does such a position have to be consistent with what we have said before on the subject?

Gordon Chase

Tab 3

Statement by Edwin M. Martin Before Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees May 22, 1963

As time has passed since the first impact of the March 30 measures and their immediate aftermath, the bitterness and tension in the exile community have diminished as sobering and more responsible second thoughts have taken effect. At the present time, there is considerable ferment within exile groups which has been created by a still somewhat vague and confused desire for devices or organizations that might bring about, or at least symbolize unity. There are several persons and organizations engaged in efforts directed toward finding a broad formula for unity. The search for a single organization stems in part from a psychological need to fill the vacuum created by the decline of the Revolutionary Council following the resignation of Dr. Miro and others and our own decision not to continue to support the Council, even though that body did not represent more than a part of exile opinion. In part, the striving for unity is based on a desire to have a single exile voice which can address governments, international bodies and public opinion. This might raise, of course, the question of a government-in-exile, to which I will address myself later. Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

1. U.S.policy toward exile unity and enclosing a May 22 statement by Edwin Martin before a Senate Subcommittee on the same subject. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63–6/63.