105. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 4. For Acting Secretary from Secretary.
Just before departure saw material giving Sihanouk’s further thinking about Laos,1 as well as messages suggesting growing cleavage between Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao. Please have colleagues access following idea and give reactions promptly to Paris and Vienna.
Communist bloc now banking heavily on Communist Laos arising from their doctrine of “three forces” in that country. Sihanouk and other neutrals and some Allies inclined to accept or consider it inevitable. It [Page 223] would be minor miracle if we succeed blocking coalition government shared by “thirds” in view of military situation on ground. Even SEATO intervention could do little more than save precarious toehold unless there follows major escalation.
Would it make sense to accept “thirds” idea but adjust it as follows. Since both sides are caught with notion that Souvanna himself is neutral (despite some US misgivings) let Souvanna put together a central government without Pathet Lao or strongly committed anti-Communist elements such as Phoumi. He could do so with civil servant types or others recommended by King as reliable neutralists. Then apply “thirds” to provincial arrangements with clear understanding with King and Souvanna as to local autonomy such matters as police and security. Let Pathet Lao keep northern provinces including Xieng Khouang, let Phoumi and Boun Oum return to southern Laotian panhandle and let Souvanna control Vientiane-Luang Prabang axis. This would put friends in panhandle, a neutralist buffer between Pathet Lao and Thailand in northwest and leave Pathet Lao their God-forsaken northeast.
Some such arrangement plus international apparatus being discussed Geneva might have many advantages compared with alternatives. We do not want strong central government composed of “thirds.” We want Vietnam and Thailand insulated. We have no real US ambitions Laos itself. My suggestion could be presented as not being partition but recognition that neutral government ought to be neutral and not a battleground for contending interests. Instead of quarreling over distribution of portfolios parties might agree on territorial precedence of influence and authority. Further, if Souvanna offered this role by French and France promises to take seriously Geneva Accord arrangements for French presence Seno plus Vientiane, we might save something worth saving. We have been saying the RLG should give us more to support. Would this idea give both Western and neutral countries something to support? Under such arrangements we could do a great deal in panhandle. If Commies want to make something out of northeast, let them try.
This is not a policy directive but a question.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–261. Secret. Rusk was in Paris accompanying the President on his State visit.↩
- In telegram 2140 from Vientiane, Brown reported that Sihanouk had told Royal Lao Government representative Leum in Geneva that Laos was in danger of going Communist and suggested that a coalition government in Laos should be formed and Laos should join the neutral bloc. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2461)↩