Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, July 18, 1961, 9 p.m.

92. Survey of Laos internal scene since Zurich leads to conclusion that despite some apparent agreement there, real current trend is towards greater polarization of forces.

PL and Souvanna are insisting on Souvanna as Prime Minister and bulk of portfolios in coalition government for at best Souvanna supporters and at worst PL. PL are steadily building up supplies, training forces, propagandizing population and otherwise consolidating their position in areas under their control in manner which clearly indicates their determination that they are here to stay. On other hand, Phoumi has returned from Washington vastly encouraged and with feeling that the U.S. is now prepared to back him militarily. He is reorganizing his forces and has definite military plans. (See CH MAAG Laos ML 3010 July 10.)¹ Consequently he intends take stiff position in negotiations with two Princes, negotiations for which in any event he has little enthusiasm and into which he has more than once stated he was “forced” by U.S.

Phoumi’s determination not to make unnecessary concessions is all to the good. But there are increasing indications that while Phoumi will take genuine effort to gain acceptance by Laotian King and other side of his formula of government presided over by King (either as Prime Minister or as presiding officer), he is at same time opposed to acceptance Souvanna as Prime Minister in any event, or at least on any terms PL would accept, even should King’s gambit fail.

Phoumi feels that Souvanna is irretrievably lost to Communists and that men upon whom Souvanna relies as neutralists are in fact either too weak to exert moderating influence or already under Communist control. Hence he does not think that government under Souvanna could offer reasonable prospect for an independent, united and neutral Laos. Equally important, he believes that even if coalition government more predominantly neutral than he considers possible were formed, it could not long survive under present imbalance of psychological antimilitary forces in Laos. He sees no real hope that Geneva Conference or ICC will be able to establish an effective deterrent to Communist power by control measures. Since U.S. has told him categorically that we will not accept government which is likely to lead to Communist control of Laos, he concludes that he can count on U.S. support in the military action which will in his view almost certainly be required.

Phoumi is obviously fighting idea of Souvanna as PM and preparing for eventuality of breakdown of negotiations if King’s gambit fails. For example: Phoumi said three times in Washington that he believes Souvanna cannot be salvaged. He has consistently refused even to consider in discussion with any Westerner who might be PM if King refused task. He told a UPI correspondent that Souvanna could no longer be considered a neutralist. Anti-Souvanna propaganda has appeared on Vientiane news. Phoumi is laying military plans for withdrawal to south. He is trying to get us to support him in King’s gambit. He has indicated to Morris his pessimism as to possibility satisfactory outcome three Prince negotiations, into which he says he has been “forced” by the U.S. (Embtel 82)² (Believe his more optimistic presentation to Addis (Embtel 68)³ should be heavily discounted.) He told Tobler a coalition government would not work and that he intended do his best to stall negotiations until November (see forthcoming septel).

Accordingly while Phoumi prepared at our insistence continue negotiations with other side, contingencies for which he now preparing include all of following:

A. Negotiations will break down and military action become necessary.

B. Enemy behavior at Geneva or in Laos will finally convince U.S. that political negotiations can only be successful if existing imbalance of military forces corrected, which at minimum will require strong public expression U.S. willingness intervene militarily.

C. Enemy will resume offensive, thus threatening rapid capture most if not all Laos unless there immediate U.S. and/or Thai and South Vietnamese military intervention.

D. Under strain protracted negotiations, enemy behavior will at some point provide RLG with good pretext for breaking off negotiations and partitioning country, in which case U.S. will find it most difficult refuse military protection to government in south.

E. Period of negotiations which will give RLG time to prepare for renewal of struggle, on increased but still minor scale when rainy season over in October or on major scale when negotiations break down.

His strategic concept seems clear—to concentrate bulk of his forces in south, where he hopes for significant military help from RTG and SVN to help him gain and maintain control over all territories south of Nam Ca Dinh. He appears now also hope that U.S. military forces would become involved on his side. He would endeavor hold Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Paksane but only with limited forces to serve as bases for counter-guerrilla and guerrilla operations in north. End result would be de facto partition of country. (For Embassy’s views on implications of attempted partition and unrealistic character Phoumi’s estimates FAL’s unaided capacity, see Embtels 2316, 72, 69, 19,⁴ and CHMAAG ML 3010.)

Meanwhile, however, Phoumi is pressing forward energetically with King’s gambit. At Zurich he did everything possible to put other side in position in which it would be most difficult for them to refuse recognize royal action. He has at present support of assembly and other non-Communist Lao leaders for this concept. He is beginning public political campaign to explain basic assets of King and constitution (Embtel 48).⁵ The great unknown is, of course, reaction of King. I think Phoumi really hopes that under persuasion of assembly and Phoumi, and perhaps after discovering how difficult it will be for three Princes to agree, King will, albeit reluctantly, conclude that he must take risks to avoid his throne being later toppled by Communists, and therefore accept full powers from national congress, appoint reasonable government and assume role of de facto head of government as de jure PM. I suspect that Phoumi also believes it possible that despite probable adverse effect on world opinion, other side may refuse to accept King’s action, claiming he under Phoumi and U.S. constraint, in which case they are likely to resume hostilities.

I am still doubtful that King will consent to act as PM. He will undoubtedly stall as long as possible to try to get agreement among three Princes which he can simply promulgate. He will be most reluctant to join in any proposal which either side states vigorously it will reject. My guess as to most probable result is that King will conclude that government under Souvanna, including Phoumi and PL is only solution which has any hope of bringing agreement and that Phoumi’s acceptance or rejection participation in such government will depend in large measure on whether U.S. agrees or is not prepared to use force rather than accept or acquiesce in it.

It is likely therefore that after a period of protracted negotiation we will be faced with decision whether to accept best compromise for which King is able to get agreement of other side, which will certainly include Souvanna as PM and may well be otherwise less than satisfactory to us, or to support Phoumi with force in country-wide resistance, or break away to south.

On other hand, King’s effort may entirely fail for reasons of intransigence, distrust, miscalculation on both sides, in which case King will probably throw in the towel, and opposing forces will remain confronted as at present without hope of agreement. In such event, even if other side does not resume large scale hostilities, it will certainly renew eroding pressures of all kinds which FAL will find it difficult effectively resist alone.

We would then have to decide whether to intervene to forestall capture of key points like Vientiane, Thakhek or Luang Prabang, or wait and react militarily to enemy attacks, or to protect only south or to write off all of Laos.

There is always the possibility that Phoumi may decide to force our hand by finding some pretext to break off negotiations and going south, in which case we will have to decide whether to support him.

Factors that might lead Phoumi to break off negotiations and go south include, a) enemy resumption of hostilities; b) encouragement by SVN and Thailand to divide country rather than yield all to communism, c) Phoumi reaction should he feel U.S. watering down its Washington assurances of support, or actively supporting Souvanna as PM, particularly in combination with idea of turning over Western military role in Laos to French.

If on other hand Phoumi did accept membership in a Souvanna-led government, he may well, either after acceptance, or as a condition of his acceptance, ask us for assurances of covert support for clandestine non-communist forces.

It is obviously impossible to predict with certainty what is likely to happen, but foregoing indicates some possibilities. In any event we should be prepared for:

A) Continuing impasse in three Princes’ negotiations and Ban Na Mone talks, which while it permits Phoumi to regroup, refit and train his forces, in preparation for limited eventuality such as defense of south and do a limited amount of propagandizing population, and work in villages in the restricted area he controls, also enables enemy to consolidate his position, something which he is doing vigorously in both military and psychological fields. In balance it probably benefits enemy more in view larger area under control, his good strategic position and his better organization in villages. (We will send separate telegram on this important subject shortly.)

B) The possibility of:

i) Request by Phoumi for U.S. support, including troops, in breaking off negotiation with two princes and embarking on military plan which he outlined to Admiral Felt (CINCPAC DTG 031845Z)⁶ and CHMAAG Laos (ML 3010 DTG 100345Z), or

ii) Such action by Phoumi on his own in effort to force our hand. (I doubt if i) or ii) are likely before October as Phoumi feels he needs time to regroup and refit his forces and apparently also feels that in this time is on his side. I did not intend give Amb Young’s impression I felt such change “imminent” (last para Bangkok’s 57 to Dept).⁷

iii) Request by Phoumi for covert support clandestine non-Communist forces should he enter Souvanna led coalition government, or as condition to his doing so.

iv) Resumption of pressures or active hostilities by other side when enemy feels his build up sufficient, or as part of his over all strategy in worlds confrontation with U.S.

Under foregoing circumstances our best course of action would appear to be:

1) To continue to press at Geneva for satisfactory arrangements on control mechanism, powers for ICC and terms of neutrality, without awaiting formation of a coalition government.

2) To urge RLG to maintain an attitude of willingness to negotiate at PPenh, Geneva and Ban Na Mone, while avoiding damaging concessions.

3) To work on Souvanna directly and through our Allies along lines already undertaken by Amb Harriman and British.

4) While quietly supporting Phoumi’s efforts to get King to act effectively on election government, keep our ultimate freedom of decision as recommended by Amb Harriman in his Confe 378 to Dept.

5) To expedite and enlarge training program for FAL, bringing special pressure on Phoumi to provide officers and NCO’s for training.

6) To keep alert in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon for any indication that Phoumi is planning to put his ideas on going south into practice.

7) To plan seriously as to our reaction in case of possibilities i), ii), iii), and iv) above, consulting at least British also, as well as planning for other possibilities raised by Amb Young in Bangkok’s 57 to Dept.

8) To emphasize and enlarge counter guerrilla operations by military, and if possible police, in order extend area of security.

9) To act in economic and psychological field as suggested by Embassy’s forthcoming response to Deptel 20⁸ (septel) to limit allowed by security considerations.

10) To maintain and make manifest our confidence in our strength and that of our Allies and our determination to sit out negotiations as long as there is chance of gaining what we consider to be just and reasonable objectives.

11) To prove our own and SEATO forces in readiness in the event of resumption of hostilities, or any other necessity and to let this fact be known.⁹

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:50 p.m. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC for Polad, Geneva for Fecon, and Canberra. Transmitted in three sections.
1. In this telegram, CHMAAG reported that Phoumi outlined a plan to be used if the present negotiations failed. The plan had two phases beginning in November. In the first, the FAL would fight alone; in the second it would be joined by SEATO-multilateral-U.S. forces. The plan would consist of flexible guerrilla action north of the Nam Ca Dinh River and 17th parallel coupled with a strong defensive bastion to the south of this line to force the Pathet Lao from the South. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Laos, 1961)
2. Dated July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1761)
3. In telegram 68, July 14, the Embassy reported that Phoumi told Addis that he was basically optimistic that a satisfactory result could come from the three Princes’ negotiations as long as conditions which the United States and Phoumi regarded as essential were safeguarded. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–1461)
4. Telegram 2316 is Document 118. Telegrams 72, 69, and 19 from Vientiane, July 15, 14, and 6, are in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1561, 751J.00/7–1461, and 751J.00/7–661, respectively.
5. Dated July 12. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1161)
6. In this telegram, July 3, CINCPAC reported that Phoumi had outlined to him the plan as summarized in footnote 1 above. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Laos 1961)
7. In telegram 57, July 14, Young suggested possible contingencies for Laos and suggested in the last paragraph that the military situation was grave with the Pathet Lao in control of much of the country and able to move to the Mekong at a number of strategic points at any time. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1461)
8. In telegram 20, July 5, the Department asked for the Country Team’s suggestions for nonmilitary ways to support the RLG and the King within Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–461)
9. At the end of this telegram the following note in an unknown hand reads as follows: “All of these recommendations would be encompassed in courses of action contained in our concept Telegram.”