144. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- Laos
I attended an Interdepartmental Meeting on Laos this afternoon chaired by Mr. Steeves. Before we got down to the main business—consideration of a draft telegram to Geneva1—Mr. Steeves reported on one or two other developments. He stated that in a conversation he had just had with Geneva it had been indicated that the process of going through the protocol on Laotian neutrality was going more rapidly than had been assumed and that consequently the draft instruction which we were to consider had become even more important as guidance. There was some discussion as to whether the statement in the draft neutrality declaration that economic aid to a neutral Laos would not have political conditions attached raised any legal problems in the light of the requirements of mutual security legislation. There was general agreement that the requirements with respect to undertakings by recipient countries could be waived, but it was agreed that this matter should be further examined urgently.
Mr. Steeves also read the text of a telegram to Geneva relating to the Communist efforts to eliminate the Seato umbrella for Laos.2 The telegram [Page 313] directed the delegation to stand fast against any such efforts subject to possible further instruction from Washington after we had seen the whole text of the neutrality protocol and could assess the general lay of the land. We are prepared, as a fall-back position, to agree to a self-denying statement by the Laotians with respect to Seato protection.
The group then turned its attention to the draft telegram. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whether it was possible, through the meeting of the Princes, to get a non-Communist government in Laos. In this connection, he read a list of Souvanna’s candidates, most of whom, he indicated, were Communists. In response, State (Mr. Usher) said that State did not mean to say that the present meeting of the Princes would necessarily result in agreement to a non-Communist government. However, such an outcome was a possibility under some future circumstances—for example, in the event of a conference breakdown. State, in the course of this discussion, also referred to Phoumi’s intention to prolong the talk of the Princes over a period of several months. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it was imperative that the draft message be paralleled by a message to Phoumi not to give way in the discussion between the Princes. State agreed.
Mr. Steeves said that it was his understanding that the maximum to which we were prepared to go with respect to the composition of the Lao government was to permit Souvanna to have some “prominent” role up to and including that of Prime Minister and to allow one or two members of Souvanna’s group (or even Pathet Lao) into the Cabinet, provided they were not in key positions. He agreed that it was important to send a parallel instruction to Phoumi which would cover two points: (a) remind him of the guidelines to which we have previously agreed with respect to the composition of the government (as summarized just above); (b) ask him not to accept a government that will not in turn accept an ICC with powers of the kind that we wish to see. In connection with this last point, Mr. Chapman, the Lao Desk Officer, pointed out that the RLG did not agree with us on the composition of the ICC. It was prepared to accept three neutrals or three neutrals plus some others. Mr. Steeves responded by saying that we would have to tell the RLG that we were going to stick by our present position and say that we wanted them to create a government which would support this position.
The question was raised as to how seriously ill Souvanna might be. It was indicated that we were asking information on the subject from the French. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the French would never tell us the truth if he were seriously ill, because his death would destroy the whole basis for French policy.
The group then turned to pages 6 and 7 of the (attached) draft telegram. One of the numerous State people present raised the question of [Page 314] whether Par. 2 on P.6 dealing with “reduction of pockets of enemy forces in southern and western Laos and interdiction of use of the Ho Chi Minh trail” was something that we could do with existing forces and under existing authority. [1 line of source text not declassified] However, further discussion of the paragraph produced agreement that it did go beyond existing authorization. As a result of my suggestion that we needed to clarify whether this telegram was being used to seek additional authority in this area or simply to state what we were already doing, the introductory language of the paragraph was revised to read “continue to pursue military and psychological warfare to contain PL Vietnamese forces in areas they now hold and seek approval for expansion of this action in order gradually to neutralize.”.3 In addition, it was agreed to change “reduction of pockets” to “harassment of pockets”. I raised the question of whether it was clear that paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with contingency actions. As a result of the discussion which resulted, it was agreed that Par. 4 should be introduced with the phrase, “Within currently approved concepts”. It was also agreed that the paragraph should be generalized by omission of the final “which” clause and deletion of the word “any” before “resumption”.
The introduction of Par. 5 was revised to read “develop additional courses of action for approval in addition to steps already being taken which will bring pressure…”.
These changes seem to me to deal with the paragraphs we had difficulties with on pages 6 and 7. What State originally sought in Par. 2 on Page 6 was some stepping up of the limited guerilla actions which have already been approved for Laos. State’s concept was for an increase which would not raise the threshold of activity to the point where it was likely that we would be accused of a major breach of the cease-fire, but which would be equal to the level of activities of the Communists in Laos. As a result of the discussion, however, Mr. Steeves suggested that this question could best be dealt with in connection with the overall plan for Southeast Asia which he is presently preparing. I agree.
I raised the question of whether Par. 5 was necessary, suggesting that this prejudged the strategy that we might wish to pursue in the event of a failure of the conference. In response, it was pointed out that we might get to a stand-off position on the ICC issue, but might not yet be prepared to intervene ourselves in Laos. We might wish rather to continue with our preparations for such intervention or other action. In such a situation, there would be certain to be suggestions that the conference be adjourned. The guidance in Par. 5 is intended to cover the situation. It is to be noted that it begins by stating “we should seek to avoid [Page 315] having a failure of the conference to reach an agreed solution necessarily result in a resumption of military action in Laos.” Nonetheless, I argued that it did not seem to me necessary to cross this bridge at this particular time. Mr. Steeves, however, believed the guidance desirable and I dropped the argument. I do not believe that this is a crucial matter since in the event of a failure of the conference or the imminence of such failure, we shall obviously be reviewing our overall Laos policy (if we have not already determined upon it earlier) and can decide at that time what our strategy should be with respect to breaking up the conference.
With these changes, do you believe that the telegram will need to be cleared with the President? I would think not.