147. Editorial Note
General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, sent President Kennedy a memorandum on July 26, entitled “Southeast Asian Military Planning,” which combined recommendations and advice on Laos and South Vietnam. Taylor suggested that the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces down the Laos panhandle was the most immediate threat to South Vietnam and noted that SEATO planning was not designed to deal with it. Nor, Taylor continued, was the Royal Lao Army, with or without the Meos, adequate to cope with the infiltration notwithstanding U.S. ongoing efforts to improve its performance. Taylor stated that without suggesting a reduction in the effort in north Laos, he felt a “prime military requirement” was the establishment of a secure base in south Laos capable of covering the flank of South Vietnam and providing a point of support for operations against North Vietnam. To accomplish this end, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam, assisted [Page 321] and encouraged by the United States, must cooperate. Taylor reinforced Walt Rostow’s view that a tightly knit Southeast Asian task force was required to create a strategic plan and program for Southeast Asia. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 7/25/61–7/28/61) Taylor’s memorandum is printed in volume I, pages 243–244.
On July 26, President Kennedy met with Admiral Arleigh Burke who was retiring and receiving a Distinguished Service Medal for his service as Chief of Naval Operations. The President and Burke discussed a number of matters including Laos. Burke stated that, “The President talked about Laos being a bad place to fight. I said yes, it always would be because the communists would choose a bad place to fight. I said we may have to yet fight in Laos.” (Memorandum for the record by Burke, Op-00 Memo 0364–61, July 26; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, “Bumpy Road Materials”)
On July 27, Taylor and Rostow jointly sent President Kennedy a memorandum suggesting issues for decision on Southeast Asia. They recommended an integrated strategy to met the precarious situation there and suggested three choices: graceful disengagement; a U.S. military attack on North Vietnam; or a buildup of indigenous military, political, and economic strength to contain the thrust from Hanoi while preparing for U.S. intervention if the situation got worse or the Chinese intervened. Specifically on Laos, Taylor and Rostow suggested that the United States would have to decide what was the U.S. “sticking point” in Geneva and what kind of Laos government was minimally acceptable; what to do in the event of a breakdown of the conference, and would the United States accept a split Laos. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General 7/25/61–7/28/61; printed in volume I, pages 248–249)
On June 28, John Steeves, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Chairman of the Southeast Asian Task Force, sent the President an interim report which included consensus conclusions of the Task Force: Southeast Asia must be protected from Communist subversion; the United States must decide how to resist Communist encroachment, by military means if necessary; the U.S. approach must be coordinated for all countries of the area and include political, economic, psychological, and military measures; and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was the immediate focal point of the threat. A strategy and concept to accomplish these purposes in Laos included at Geneva the decision that the U.S. “sticking point” was an effective and well-equipped ICC with adequate terms of reference. This should be the minimum price for U.S. disengagement from Laos. Furthermore, the United State must encourage the Royal Lao Government not to accept a coalition which would merely be a prelude to a Communist take-over; [Page 322] continue to train and support the Lao Armed Forces so it could resist a breach of the cease-fire or a Pathet Lao offensive; be prepared to support a divided Laos with one part under a non-Communist government rather than a unified Laos under a Communist-oriented government with inadequate controls resulting from failure at Geneva; and, finally, prepare new military contingency planning, with or without SEATO concurrence, aimed at reducing the threat to Laos and South Vietnam by concentrating military action on North Vietnam should all other efforts fail. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia; General: 7/25/61–7/28/61; printed in volume I, pages 250–251)