169. Memorandum for the Record0
Washington,
August 30,
1961.
SUBJECT
- Meeting in the State Department on 28 August Called for the Purpose of Reviewing a Plan for Southeast Asia
PRESENT
- Mr. McNamara
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- General Lemnitzer
- General Taylor
- 1.
- This memorandum records business conducted at a meeting in the State Department called for 1700 hours on 28 August for the purpose [Page 384] of reviewing a plan for Southeast Asia. The meeting was chaired by Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson.
- 2.
- The first portion of the meeting was devoted to detailed criticism of the organization and concept of the proposed plan. The language of the concept was adjusted to indicate the United States may have to make direct contact with Souvanna Phouma in order to determine his acceptability as Prime Minister of a coalition Lao government.
- 3.
- It was decided that preliminary bilateral contacts with the SEATO Allies, to gauge the feasibility of the concept, would be made at the same time as a demarche to the Soviets alerting them to our vital interests and purposes in Laos.
- 4.
- It was decided that the number of advisers required for encadrement of the FAL to company level would be 1,000. The intent would be to use a maximum number of Thais, filling in the remainder with U.S. personnel.
- 5.
- There was a discussion as to a need for Thai participation in aerial reconnaissance of northern Laos.
- 6.
- General Taylor pointed out that the concept as written did not establish adequately the U.S. desire that indigenous forces be used to a maximum in Laos, in support of the FAL, in order to keep U.S. participation at a minimum.
- 7.
- There was a discussion as to the SEATO response to a clear Communist violation of the cease-fire. It was decided that rather than executing SEATO Plan 5 as proposed in the concept, phased implementation of an expanded variant of SEATO plan was preferable. It was envisioned that the expanded plan would permit initial commitment of indigenous forces with subsequent build-up of additional strength, including non-indigenous units, as the situation required.
- 8.
- There was discussion of the Felt-Luce reference to the May 3rd cease-fire line. A general restriction, conforming with the British idea that operations would be limited to re-establishing the May 3rd line would, in fact, leave numerous pockets of resistance throughout the RLG-controlled areas without authority to mop up. There was a consensus of opinion that this point should be clarified to permit operations as necessary to achieve wider control.
- 9.
- The question of positioning fast carrier task groups in the Gulf of Tonkin or the South China Sea was discussed and, on the advice of General Lemnitzer, decision was delayed as a matter appropriate for subsequent detailed planning.
- 10.
- There was intensive discussion as to the extent the United States would commit itself by virtue of preliminary bilateral negotiations regardless of the outcome of such negotiations. Mr. Johnson suggested the commitment would approximate 99–1/2%. It was brought out by General [Page 385] Taylor that a strong commitment already existed by membership in SEATO and approval of SEATO Plan 5. It was agreed that this was a fuzzy area, but that the United States probably had more maneuvering room than that indicated by Mr. Johnson. For presentation to the President it was decided to recast the plan’s approach so that it was clear an additional commitment was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. There was a need to emphasize the fact that preliminary negotiations were essentially exploratory to determine the feasibility of moving ahead with detailed planning.
- 11.
- Secretary McNamara developed the point that a premature commitment in Laos, with possible evolution into a Korean-type situation, would be unwise at this time when we had to be ready to meet the crisis in Berlin.
M.D.T.1