Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

324. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, April, 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos Situation

The essential facts of the Laos situation, as they have developed over the past two weeks, are described in the paragraphs which follow.

Facts¹

Governor Harriman talked with the King, Phoumi, Boun Oum, and Sarit, during the period 22–25 March. Mr. Sullivan followed up, on Harriman’s departure, and has discussed the situation in detail with Phoumi, Souvanna, and Souphanouvong.

Phoumi refuses to cede Defense and Interior to Souvanna; he continues doubtful that Souvanna is independent enough of the PL to administer a neutral government. Phoumi’s position has hardened since Governor Harriman told him in clear terms the U.S. view that he must give up Defense and Interior and negotiate the other positions since there was no alternative solution. Phoumi feels now there is an element of “face” which prevents his compromising. The RLG Information Chief (Sisouk) suggested the U.S. invite Phoumi to Washington; he was told in Vientiane this was impossible unless as a means to facilitate Phoumi’s giving in gracefully. Sisouk also emphasized Phoumi’s view that there must be no “winner” if a coalition government was entered into; the PL/KL forces act as if they were victorious already. Phoumi appears convinced that U.S. withholding of aid is temporary and that it will flow again as soon as the U.S. realizes he alone is on their side.

Souvanna will leave Laos on 3 April for Paris, returning to Khang Khay “at the proper time.” This means when Phoumi agrees to Souvanna taking Defense and Interior and is ready to negotiate on a coalition government. Souvanna has declined an invitation to visit Washington en route to France. It is thought Souvanna will remain in France for his daughter’s wedding, returning in June. He has emphasized that he is retaining his mandate to form a government and wants Phoumi in it. He seems willing to consider ways to make Phoumi’s decision more palatable. There continue to be signs that he does not control Souphanouvong nor agree with him on some basic questions. Mr. Sullivan feels it may be beneficial that Souvanna is leaving PL pressures in Khang Khay which seem to be taking some effect on him. Souvanna has urged the U.S. to apply military sanctions against Phoumi as the only way to sway him. He has assured the U.S. that the PL/KL will not attack a weakened FAR.

Souphanouvong tries to let Souvanna speak for the Khang Khay group, but on some issues has been unable to avoid expressing his contrary views. He stresses the need for negotiations to hammer out the details of a new government if Phoumi will accede to the Defense/Interior proposal. He agrees that military sanctions must be applied to convince Phoumi, but is less convincing on the PL/KL willingness not to attack the FAR after sanctions are levied (says areas on his side of the cease-fire line will be cleared).

The King is maintaining his sympathy for Phoumi, but has confirmed that the mandate to Souvanna remains in force. He continues imprecise on any question of his taking part in a government.

The Soviets, and ICC Poles, suggest a 2–3 month period of military calm and political maneuver is commencing. In Laos and Geneva, the USSR representatives seem relaxed; the Ambassador in Laos is departing at the end of April to return in August. Sarit has become convinced of the U.S. resolve and appears sincerely to be seeking to encourage Phoumi to trust our lead. Other Asians, particularly the ChiNats, SVN, Burma, Korea and Japan, believe U.S. confidence in Souvanna is misplaced, but are maintaining a diplomatic silence. There is a widespread conviction that the U.S. and USSR have made a “deal” on Laos. The evolving ChiCom-USSR relations may reach a crisis point as a result of the current Party meetings in China, but what that will mean in Laos is not clear.

The British and French continue to support the U.S. lead. The U.K. is concerned Souvanna’s departure for France will create a vacuum in Laos and delay or obstruct a solution. Governor Harriman shares this concern. Neither the British nor French see any solution except in the direction our policies are now projected, but are disappointed that the U.S. is not applying greater pressures on Phoumi.

Prospects

The principals in the Laos situation—USSR, Britain and France, plus the PL/KL—are urging the U.S. to apply military sanctions. The U.S. is considering further steps to isolate Phoumi, short of sanctions:

a. [1 line of source text not declassified]

b. Withdraw Brig. General Boyle from Laos, keeping him nearby in case of need, and accepting a hiatus until his relief arrives. (Major General Tucker not now to relieve Brig. General Boyle; plan is to find a 1–star officer. State has insisted that this is no time to increase the rank of the CHMAAG billet.)

c. Recall Ambassador Brown for consultation.

Governor Harriman believes time is working against the U.S. in Laos. Beyond isolating Phoumi, the possibilities, singly or in combination, are:

a. Establish a “Troika” for Defense and Interior ministries during the period plans for integration of the armed forces and local administration are being developed. A council of Souvanna, Phoumi, and Souphanouvong would handle Defense and Interior matters assisted by three Secretaries of State. Voting on action would be on a unanimous basis. After this period (about 2 or 3 months), Souvanna would take over both ministries. This concept is agreed in principle by all concerned except Souphanouvong, who says it should be discussed at a 3 Princes meeting, and Phoumi who has not yet commented (though some of his colleagues have indicated interest).

b. Convene a tripartite meeting, at the Deputy level, to talk over the “Troika” idea and other matters and, when necessary ground work is laid, the 3 Princes would meet.

c. Apply military sanctions. This could involve pay, supplies, aircraft, and U.S. advisors. Ambassador Brown has suggested a limited approach which would have an impact, but be reversible—the total suspension of military equipment/supplies deliveries into Laos. Because of stockpiles, the FAR would not be affected for 2–3 weeks at current rates of operations. The withholding of Feb-Apr funds has left the RLG with little money to fill the gap from other sources. Holding supplies in Thailand would make it easy for the U.S. to introduce them if desired. At the same time, if Phoumi remained adamant (or continued to think the U.S. would change its mind), the measures would eventually decrease FAR readiness drastically. Any PL/KL demonstration of strength would make the U.S. position more difficult. If the sanction continued indefinitely, the safety of U.S. personnel in the field would be a consideration. On balance, the Ambassador sees risk, but no sanction will have clear-cut advantages.

d. Maintain status quo on the belief Phoumi will reflect on Governor Harriman’s words and give in. Harriman considers this a conceivable result within the next two weeks.

e. Buy off Phoumi to gain his agreement to the U.S. position.

U.S. Actions

State is studying the various possibilities. Governor Harriman apparently has discussed the situation with the President, but there has been little consultation with DOD/JCS.

The action thus far is to continue to press Phoumi. There seems to be minimum consideration of ways and means to give Phoumi greater assurances of our fidelity after a Souvanna government is constituted. The “Troika” concept might lead us into more detailed thinking on this aspect. The inter-departmental planning on U.S. policies to strengthen and assist a Souvanna government was commenced 6 months ago; it has yet to be pursued actively. More attention to this element of our policy might offer new ideas that would help sway Phoumi.

WHB

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret.

1. On April 2, at the White House daily staff meeting, Forrestal gave a report on Laos as follows:

   “Mr. Forrestal gave a very brief run-down on the Laos situation. He reported that all our heavy artillery appeared to have failed in moving Phoumi. However, some of the messages over the week end indicated some perceptible signs of effect. Mr. Harriman feels that Phoumi will begin to move somewhat in our direction in the next 10 to 15 days. (Forrestal very carefully failed to associate himself with this estimate.) Souvanna will be in Paris until June, it is thought. He further mentioned that Gromyko had told Rusk something that indicated that the Reds may not press in Laos for an indefinite period. Governor Harriman sees the need for preparing the Congress and the public for heavier pressures, such as withdrawal of some military supply support and some of the White Star training teams. Schlesinger commented on the lack of criticism of our policy in Laos as contrasted to the right wing support of the Katanga position in the Congo. Forrestal said that the Laotians are evidently trying to find some Senator who will take up cudgels in their behalf. Forrestal was careful to emphasize that this whole operation was sort of Alice-in-Wonderlandish, and that nothing was actually the way it appeared to be.” (Memorandum for the Record by Ewell, April 2; ibid., White House Daily Staff Meetings, Jan.–April, 1962, T–124–69)