Office of the Historian

336. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Laos

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The President
    • The Secretary of State
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Ambassador Bruce
    • Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
    • Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
    • Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
    • Mr. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
    • Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA
  • British
    • Prime Minister Macmillan
    • Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
    • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
    • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
    • Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
    • Mr. M. A. M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
    • Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister

The President expressed the opinion that we got something at Vienna on Laos. The Russians have stuck by Khrushchev’s commitment, thus he thought there may be something in a bilateral meeting. The Secretary agreed adding that the Russians seemed to be bound on Laos to some extent by what Khrushchev had said. He reported that we had received a very slight note of optimism from the Thais, with respect to their good will mission to Laos.1 The Laotians were taking a more responsible view and more serious negotiations were now possible.2

The President mentioned that he had said to Ambassador Ormsby Gore last night that our policy on Laos had just about run out. By the time we convinced Phoumi, Souvanna’s power will have run out. But, we should continue along this road. We had decided to wait until May 7 to see if the Thais could do something. If nothing were done by May 7 we might give a public warning that we would not necessarily intervene. We were also considering withdrawing our forward military advisers. To cut our military aid would be too drastic and could cause the collapse of the government. He asked the Prime Minister if he was optimistic. The Prime Minister replied negatively, except for the fact that the Russians were not keen on working things up. They might not be the beneficiaries. He was sure our policy was right. The President said the only other alternative is partition.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that Malcolm MacDonald was going to see the King who was an old friend. He might be helpful. The President asked why the King hated Souvanna and if Souvanna was going to the U.K. The Prime Minister replied that Souvanna was not going to the U.K. Ambassador Ormsby Gore suggested that Souvanna was [Page 708] embarrassed by contacts with the West. The Secretary recalled that we had asked him to visit Washington but Souvanna was not interested. The Secretary added that we understood Kong Lee was going to visit Paris. We planned to establish contact with him and to work on him. He had been having trouble with the Pathet Lao.

The President noted that Governor Harriman had asked him to say how helpful the British Ambassador in Laos had been.

The President asked whether we should mention Laos in the communique.3 Mr. Bundy commented that this turns on the type of communique we wish. If we mention Laos there are other problems that should be included. There was some reluctance to say something on each problem in the world.

The Secretary expressed our appreciation for the job Mr. Thompson was doing in South Vietnam.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the White House on May 4.↩
  2. The reference is apparently in error and is to the Lao good will mission to Thailand. Brown reported that the RLG Acting Foreign Minister in Vientiane told him that the Lao mission had been well received in Bangkok. Sarit had advised Phoumi and Boun Oum to consider their relations with the United States very carefully and to take U.S. advice seriously. (Telegram 1462 from Vientiane, April 30; ibid., 751J.00/4–3062)↩
  3. In telegram 1461, also April 30, Brown reported that he had a “quiet and rational” conversation with Phoumi in which it was evident that Phoumi was concerned about the deterioration in his relations with the United States and hoping to improve them. Phoumi was planning to get in touch with Souvanna in Paris and for the first time, according to Brown, thinking in terms of how the problem of the Defense and Interior Ministries might be resolved to protect his legitimate interests without insisting that the RLG should be given the posts in the cabinet. (Ibid.)↩
  4. The communique, April 29, contains a statement that the President and Prime Minister discussed the situation in Southeast Asia, and “strongly reaffirmed their support for an independent and neutral Laos under a government committed to that objective.” Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 631–632.↩