416. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Visit to Geneva and Far East
I thought I would give you some very brief notes on my trip to Geneva and the Far East.
Geneva.
The most important general indicator for the future that I got out of the Geneva negotiations was a rather clear impression that while the Soviets were happy with the agreement on Laos, they have little or no interest in being helpful in South Vietnam. From the ring of Pushkin’s propaganda blast at lunch with Averell and myself, my guess would be that they do not believe that the time is ripe for serious negotiations, and they will continue to support North Vietnamese intervention so long as there seems to be a chance for success. They may be attaching some importance to the possibility of a political crisis in Saigon. This I derived from the emphasis Pushkin placed on the Paris-led National Front movement, which the Communists have been supporting as a means of attacking Diem in terms compatible with Western thinking. Consequently, I would think that our job was to get on with the pacification of South Vietnam and be a little more vigorous with the Diem Government in insisting on political improvements.
Bangkok.
Things are not rosy in Thailand. Even discounting a certain amount of emotionalism which is shared both by their Foreign Minister Thanat and by our Ambassador, the Thais seem to be entering a new phase of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] uncertainty. Their preoccupation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is rising and making it more difficult than ever to direct their attention to the things that really need to be done to stiffen their country, especially in the north. My prescription for the situation would be to maintain a consistent pressure on them for specific improvement in their internal security situation while maintaining a polite boredom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] [Page 883] about Cambodia and Laos. We should continue to bombard them with practical schemes and help for strengthening the up-country areas, both in the military and economic fields. In this connection I hope to find out what has happened to McNamara’s logistic support program.
Vientiane.
This miserable capital village was in better shape than I have expected. Only in Laos can one find men who two weeks previously were on opposite sides of the civil war sharing the same offices without attempting to do each other in, physically at least.
Vientiane was in a state of suspension pending the return of Souvanna Phouma. Both sides have been sniping at each other, both along the cease fire line and in political maneuvering; but no major hassles were erupting.
The principal danger in the situation is that too much is being expected of Souvanna, who has a remarkable ability of retreating in the face of difficult situations. As a result I think our own policy should be designed to avoid rushing in on him when he returns with too many propositions which demand immediate yes and no answers. Our best course would be to concentrate on improving Souvanna’s basis of power, since the more secure he feels, the greater play his essentially pro-Western, pipe-smoking attitude will have.
Incidentally, my impression is that Phoumi remains refreshingly un-reconstructed. After making a very good speech about the glories of national union, he lowers his voice to discuss ways and means of intriguing against the other two factions. Len Unger, who is our white hope in this situation, proposes to move cautiously with Phoumi at the outset. I agree with this approach, but we will have to restrain Averell from time to time.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda: M.V. Forrestal, 6/62–10/62. Secret; Personal.↩