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  4. Document 144

144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1

Washington, August 23, 1964, 2:10 p.m.

479. Geneva for Acheson. For Ambassadors. After a long telecon with Ray Hare early this morning2 and the dubious result of his subsequent final try with Inonu,3 I have reluctantly concluded that Geneva, as originally conceived, has run its course.

In order to salvage remaining possibilities, I ask your comments on the following new proposed course of action:

1.
In Athens Labouisse would say to the GOG that it has proved impossible to persuade the Turks to accept anything less than the Karpas Peninsula Base and even that is doubtful on a leasehold basis.
2.
However, we are not prepared to let conditions drift to the point where Cyprus becomes another Cuba, as will almost certainly be the case if the Makarios regime continues in control of an independent GOC.
3.
We are, therefore, considering saying to the GOG that they should go forward with their plans to bring about enosis and that we will undertake to see that, if they bring it off with reasonable promptness, neither the Turks nor any outside power will intervene with military force.
4.
The conditions of this offer are:
(a)
The GOG must undertake, once enosis is concluded, to negotiate promptly and in good faith with the GOT regarding the mutual recision of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.
(b)
In the course of this negotiation, the GOG must undertake as a minimum to offer the Turks, in exchange for the abrogation of those treaties, two major concessions.
(c)
The first is the assurance of minority rights to the Turk Cypriot population in the form developed by Dean Acheson.
(d)
The second is an undertaking by the GOG to grant to the GOT a 50-year lease for a suitable area to be mutually agreed on with the advice of SHAPE.
5.
While the GOG may be reluctant to agree now to negotiate these concessions in the absence of a simultaneous Turkish agreement, we can point out to them that without an understanding with the GOT a post-enosis Cyprus will face sticky problems. For example, it will be confronted with the presence of a Turkish garrison which the Turkish [Page 287] Government will no doubt insist on maintaining under the Treaty of Alliance unless the juridical situation can be sorted out by agreement. The garrison, the rights claimed under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, and the unresolved status of other Treaty provisions can make relations very difficult. This is true even though the UN General Assembly might pass a resolution calling upon the Turks to relinquish these rights and get out.4

In Ankara we would propose to take the following actions:

(1)
Hare would say to Inonu that he regrets that the GOT has not accepted our proposal and that Turkey will probably never be able to obtain as good a deal again.
(2)
The USG, however, is not prepared to let Cyprus become another Cuba.
(3)
We are advising the GOT, therefore, that we are encouraging the GOG to bring about enosis and propose to tell them that we will assure that this is achieved without outside intervention from any quarter.
(4)
At the same time we are insisting, as a condition of this assurance to the GOG, that the Greek Government must agree as outlined in paragraph 4 above.

The advantage of this course of action from the point of view of the GOT is that it does not require the Turkish Government to agree to anything. It would merely accept notice of our statement that we expect it to stand down on Cyprus and that we propose again to concentrate on the great issues that bind Turkey to the Western Alliance. We should get some sense of the risks involved in giving the Greeks an assurance of Turkish standdown through General Porter’s visit to Ankara in the next two or three days. I would like particularly to have Ray Hare’s comments on this.5

In order to share these risks and at the same time give a firmer underpinning to the proposal, we might consider trying to associate the UKG as well as Germany and Italy with our action.

If we get an affirmative reply from the Greeks and implicit acquiescence from the Turks, you might wish to stop off in Rome, Bonn and London on your return to the US to try to get them on board.

Meanwhile, both Dean Rusk and I feel that it would be helpful if you could stay on in Geneva for some days more until we fully explore the possibilities of trying to work out an arrangement along the above lines. This would minimize the possibilities of a sudden sense of alarm resulting [Page 288] from the conspicuous termination of the Geneva talks. Moreover, your departure at this point from Geneva might well encourage Makarios and the Greeks to take a more obstructionist stand. Your continued presence, on the other hand, could reinforce the general situation while both the Greeks and Turks are sorting out their final arrangements.6

In preparing the above suggestions we have obviously taken into account the Papandreou letter to Acheson (Athens 153 to Geneva)7 which gives some encouragement to the course of action proposed.

Geneva as 153), August 23. (Ibid.)

I would greatly appreciate a reaction from all addressee posts regarding this proposal.8

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London.↩
  2. Initiated at 4 a.m. on August 23. (Ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation)↩
  3. See Document 140.↩
  4. In telegram 387 from Athens, August 24, Labouisse endorsed Acheson’s proposal and stated that in order for Papandreou to carry out enosis successfully, he would have to be able to limit the commitments he had already made to Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)↩
  5. Hare’s comments are in telegram 370 from Ankara, August 24. (Ibid.) In telegram 379 from Ankara, August 24, Porter reported that he would make an effort to convince the Turkish General Staff that the Karpas Peninsula was militarily sound for a base. (Ibid.)↩
  6. In telegram 467 from Geneva, August 23, Acheson stated his readiness to stay as long as necessary to carry forward Ball’s proposals. (Ibid.)↩
  7. Papandreou’s letter was transmitted in telegram 381 from Athens (repeated to↩
  8. In telegram 911 from London, August 24, Bruce registered his “deep misgivings” about Ball’s proposals. (Ibid.)↩