Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

350. Memorandum From the President’s Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 11, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Pending Middle Eastern Decisions

I see three issues which are ripe for consideration. They are:

I. The arms registration proposal;

II. Selected military aid approvals;

III. Limited extension of PL 480 Title II aid (voluntary agencies) to some of the radical Arab countries—especially Algeria and the UAR.

In this memorandum I attempt to summarize the issues. More detailed papers are at Tabs I (arms registration); Tab II (military aid shipments); and Tab III (Title II).²

I. Arms registration

The gut issue here is that while everybody prefers the notion of arms restraint in principle, nearly everyone opposes public lists that might inhibit his own sales or procurement. Because people need our weapons, we can override these objections if we wish, but only at some costs in terms of political sniping from the Israelis, moderate Arabs, and sellers like the British. Most of the State and Defense people advise against an early unilateral disclosure, and I reluctantly conclude that they are right. The alternative which they propose is essentially as follows (although I have sharpened it up a little):

1. We should press the case for general arms registration on every diplomatic line and at the UN. While we should begin by consultation with our friends, we should not let this consultation delay us and we should aim at creating a diplomatic situation in which Goldberg can make a formal proposal at the UN within the next month.

2. Even before such a proposal is made, we should begin to call attention in quite specific terms to the large-scale Soviet resupply operation. We should not overstate the military meaning of these shipments, because we do not want to paint the Soviets as ten-foot high protectors of the Arabs. It should not be hard to find language which tells the facts without fanfare, and which points the finger of responsibility politely but firmly at those who are in danger of starting up the arms race all over again.

3. At the same time, or a little later, we should let it come out that we ourselves are continuing very much more modest and carefully chosen assistance programs, mainly agreed before June 5—first to moderate Arabs and second to the Israelis. The language of any such backgrounding should be carefully drafted to emphasize the fundamentally restraining purpose of these very limited shipments. We should note that in total they represent only a small fraction of what others have done. (There are some who think we should not minimize our contributions, because that will simply lead to further requests, but I think on balance they are wrong. Especially in the United States and on Capitol Hill we need to have a picture of great restraint and selectivity in our arms shipment policy.)

4. Beginning now it should be our understanding, on all new arms agreements, that the recipient will support the principle of arms registration in the UN. We can get this agreement if we ask for it, even though we must accept the fact that most of those who agree will do so in serene confidence that they will never have to honor their promise because of the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to play ball.

Some combination of principles like these seems to me to give us the best middle road between the conservatives who find the whole notion of arms registration impractical and even dangerous, and the idealists who would like to see us practice what we preach on a one-way basis. In effect what is proposed is a diplomatic campaign in favor of arms registration and a policy of unilateral interim disclosure which would fall short of giving away specific military “secrets.”³

Go ahead on this basis

Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group

Call a Special Committee meeting

II. Certain limited additional arms shipments

There are two interlocking forces here which lead to a need for a reasonably prompt decision. The first is Israeli pressure for additional shipments under the agreement you approved on May 23, together with an intense Israeli desire to buy about $300,000 worth of tank ammunition and an $18,000 radar coupler-items which they claim to need urgently in the wake of the June fight. Bob McNamara and I reviewed these items last week and he and I agreed that we should be responsive on the May 23 agreement so as to prove that your decisions stick, and that the tank ammunition and the radar coupler are such small items that it would be a mistake to hold them up for long. We have some very major issues to settle with the Israelis when they come in for new major military agreements, and I have already warned Abba Eban that you are not the sort of man who will wish to separate fundamental questions of Israeli defense from major political issues in which we have a legitimate interest—like Jerusalem and the refugees. But these bargains are of a different scale altogether from tank ammunition, and we believe we can negotiate them more effectively if we can point to a record of meticulous and timely fulfillment on the May 23 agreement. So there is an Israeli package that is ready to move.

On the other hand, we do not want Israeli military supplies to hit the papers ahead of limited actions for the moderate Arabs if we can help it. We already have three such limited actions which you approved at the end of June for fiscal year reasons—a $14 million Moroccan program; a $15 million sale of four C–130s to Saudi Arabia, and a $9.9 million weapons repair and maintenance program also for the Saudis. Now we would like to thicken this package with some further limited actions for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Libya. The items involved are well summarized at Table II. None of them involves heavy combat equipment. The only large items are sales (to the oil-rich Saudis), and there is no USG financing which was not already in prospect before the war. I would emphasize especially the Jordanian item—which would resume shipments of about $2 to $4 million over the next six months under previously approved grant and sales programs. The Jordanians need this small action in order to quiet their military, and we have already received grudging acknowledgment from the Israelis (Eban) that we are a better supplier than the Soviets. This Jordanian list includes nothing that would scare the Israelis in the current balance of power.

I think it is really very clear that on policy grounds both the Israeli package and the moderate Arab packages are highly desirable. The only difficulty is in possible Hill resistance. Bill Macomber has checked leaders of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee in both Houses and says that there is reluctant acceptance of the argument, although without enthusiasm. McNamara thinks we can expect a similar result in the Armed Services Committees. I have checked myself with Russell, who says go ahead, with Symington, who says OK if I say so (but reluctantly on Jordan), and with Fulbright, who says we should do nothing and try for an agreement with the Soviets (I answered that we were trying and would keep trying, but could not let places like Jordan sink or swim while we waited). I conclude that we should go ahead, but that Luke Battle should have one more session with the Symington Mid-East Subcommittee before the actions are final.

Go ahead on this basis

Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group

Call a Special Committee meeting

III. PL 480, Title II for Arabs who broke relations

As you know, we allowed Title II aid to continue to all Middle Eastern countries as long as the voluntary organizations could oversee offloading and distribution. Now we face a decision on similar action for FY–68, and at Tab III there is a good summary memorandum drafted for me by Howard Wriggins of Walt’s staff. In essence what it amounts to is an authorization for Catholic Relief and CARE for $4.5 million for the first quarter, almost $4 million to go to Algeria and nearly all the rest to UAR. We owe nothing to Boumediene or Nasser but on balance I think the value of the humanitarian shipments outweighs the marginal economic usefulness to demagogues.

Go ahead on this basis

Hold for discussion in Tuesday lunch group

Call a Special Committee meeting

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Arms Limits. Secret. Sent through Walt Rostow. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President. Bundy sent a copy to McNamara with a July 11 covering memorandum noting that it might be relevant at the Wednesday luncheon meeting of the President’s Tuesday luncheon group scheduled for July 12. Bundy’s memorandum to McNamara states that he had tried to make the three recommendations to the President consistent with the discussions Bundy and McNamara had had earlier. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East 092)
2. The attachments, which include a July 11 memorandum from the Control Group to the Special Committee on Arms Control for the Middle East and an undated memorandum from the Control Group to the Special Committee on Exceptions to Interim Arms Policy for the Middle East, are not printed.
3. None of the options in this memorandum is checked, and there is no indication of the President’s reaction.