Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

80. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 19, 1966.

SUBJECT

• South Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Christopher Everett, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Mr. George C. Moore, Acting Director, NEA/ARP

1. British Departure Plans. Mr. Everett referred to the Secretary’s conversation with U.K. Foreign Secretary Brown on October 15 in which the Secretary expressed concern that British withdrawal from South Arabia might be too rapid. He asked for an elaboration of the extent of this “concern.” Mr. Davies said that various foreign governments had raised with us the possibility of the British conditioning their withdrawal from Aden on UAR withdrawal from Yemen. We, among ourselves, recognized the political problems—both domestic and foreign—which this would pose for the U.K. and thus had not suggested this item in our briefing paper for the Secretary’s conversation. At the same time, some of us would like to see all pressure possible put on Nasser to withdraw from Yemen. The Secretary was doubtless concerned with the chaotic situation which he could see developing in South Arabia and the general impact which this would have on affairs in the Horn of Africa.

Mr. Everett emphasized that HMG had firmly stressed its withdrawal decision in Parliament and the U.N. and that it would be extremely difficult for it to shift its position even if it had decided to do so. He continued that Mr. Brown, personally, had for many years held the firm belief that the only way for ultimate solution in South Arabia was via early British withdrawal. This belief had been stressed to the South Arabians. He noted that many in the U.K. had in any event never expected Nasser to get out of Yemen so that the latter’s statement that he would stay, made following announcement of British intent to withdraw, came as no surprise to them.

2. U.N. Involvement. Mr. Everett said the process of establishing a U.N. Commission for Aden had been slowed by the departure from New York of Pachachi² who had been most helpful, and by the continued intransigeance of Committee of 24 Chairman Collyer.³ However, the UNSYG is continuing to press for setting up the Committee. He has a 50% chance of being successful in getting the Commission to Aden after the end of Ramadan (mid-January) and with terms of reference which will keep it involved on a continuing basis in the birth of the new state. With SAL and Federation leaders now getting together and the expectation of U.N. involvement, HMG now feels that prospects for establishment of an independent South Arabia are somewhat more encouraging. It is hoped that the U.S., in addition to its moral support, will join the U.K. in some tangible aid to the new state for political and psychological reasons. Mr. Davies said that the Secretary’s remarks could be interpreted as an indication of our concern. He also expressed the hope that other powers in the Peninsula—especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—would be willing to aid South Arabia.

3. U.K. Military Withdrawal. Responding to a query, Mr. Everett said that the British military timetable called for beginning of ground force withdrawals in June 1967, with some units being shifted to the Gulf. The intent was to lower the number of troops to a minimum level consistent with maintaining security so as to be in a position to pull out completely at any time on or after January 1, 1968. The troop numbers would be held at that minimum level until the political decision on the timing of final withdrawal had been made.

4. Nasser’s Intentions. In response to a question, Mr. Davies said he thought we could not take at face value Nasser’s statement of intent to stay in Yemen; that he would withdraw if he found a convenient way out. If he stays indefinitely in Yemen he will find increasing problems with terrorism directed at the Egyptian presence there.

5. Soviet Intentions. Mr. Everett asked for our assessment. Mr. Davies noted that the USSR has established an expanded position in Yemen which it will be able to maintain irrespective of UAR withdrawal and of whether a republican or Imamate regime takes over. The Soviets have a better chance of staying in Yemen than do the Egyptians. We feel that Aden, while not of major world strategic significance, is of importance, particularly in the event of hostilities when access to the facilities there might be required. While we would anticipate a South Arabian receptiveness to Soviet aid offers, we would hope that a significant Western presence could also be maintained.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on October 21 and initialed by Davies. The memorandum is Part I of II.
2. Former Iraqi Representative to the United Nations and current Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan M. Pachachi.
3. Sierre Leone’s Representative to the United Nations Gershon B.O. Collyer.