You have asked for our views on the situation in Communist China, Sino-Soviet
relations, and Communist Chinese foreign policies—and on the resulting
possibilities for change in our own policies. Tab A, attached, is a
thoughtful and sound discussion of these matters, looking predominantly to
the longer term.
For immediate purposes, I believe we can take only very limited steps, since
our firm posture in Asia generally remains crucial and any significant
“concessions” to Communist China would be seriously misunderstood in key
quarters, not to mention the Congress. Specifically:
Attachment
SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA AND UNITED STATES POLICY
ALTERNATIVES
Situation in Communist China
After a year and a half of turmoil, Peking’s major emphasis is on
channeling the Cultural Revolution into non-disruptive channels,
restoring order, and seeking to restore its controls over the country as
a whole and to re-establish a system of administration. This emphasis is
articulated largely by the military—which has assumed an increasing
role—and by the remnants of the governmental administrative
apparatus.
The Cultural Revolution appears, at the present stage, to have had two
major objectives—to enhance Mao
Tse-tung’s own power through the removal of his prime
political opponents, and to carry through Mao’s revolutionary and Utopian ideas of destroying the
old society, remolding the individual, and establishing an idealized
Communist society.
The results have been the crushing of organized opposition to Mao, but at immense cost: first, to
leadership cohesion and Party and government institutions; secondly, a
near-total failure of Mao’s aims
of social and political changes; thirdly, mounting national
disillusionment and cynicism, and loss of confidence in Mao and Maoism; and fourthly,
incalculable economic and social dislocation.
[Page 647]
Today, rather than pressing on with the Cultural Revolution, the
leadership is seeking to control the forces they themselves unleashed
and to recreate institutional controls and a basic structure of power to
replace the one they themselves have weakened.
Outlook
The Peking regime faces staggering problems as it seeks to hold China
together and restore order. Mao
and his more dedicated followers have not given up their dream of
creating a new social order, and will seek opportunities to restore the
momentum of the Cultural Revolution. Factionalism at all levels remains
high, and steps taken to recreate the administrative structure
inevitably feed the factionalism by restoring to power many of those
only recently under attack. The People’s Liberation Army has been given
the task of policing the country in addition to national defense. Yet it
is both inhibited by the Maoists from exerting the force necessary to
restore order and reluctant to do so for fear of exacerbating the severe
tensions the PLA is already under.
Looking somewhat further into the future, whatever success the present
uneasy power equilibrium achieves in controlling disorders, re-knitting
the social and economic fabric and rebuilding the administrative
structure of the country is apt to be set back by the death of Mao. Mao’s health is not good, and it is unlikely he will
survive for long. His death (or total incapacitation) would remove an
important, if now somewhat tarnished, symbol of national unity, and
would immediately sharpen the struggle for power.
In summary, China appears to face a period of some years of instability
and internal preoccupation. The Cultural Revolution has set loose forces
that will make most difficult the task of restoring order and momentum
to China’s society and economy by any new leadership that may
emerge.
Opportunities for U.S.Initiatives
While this situation contains obvious elements of uncertainty and danger
for the stability of East Asia, it also contains elements of opportunity
for the United States. These elements revolve around the possibility
that the disillusionment over Maoism and the increasingly pressing
nature of China’s internal problems will bring with them, on the part of
a new leadership, a re-examination of the premises and priorities of
China’s foreign policy.
Likely Developments in Peking’s Foreign Policies
The close relations existing between Peking and Moscow from 1949–58
represent an exceptional interlude in the much longer historical pattern
of mutual suspicion and hostility between China and Russia. This
history, the long common border populated by ethnic minorities
[Page 648]
which have been politically
restive under both Chinese and Russian rule, and conflicting ideological
and national objectives make it unlikely that a long-term relationship
of friendship and cooperation between the two can be re-established.
The death of Mao would remove
certain personal obstacles to improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, but
unless accompanied by a break-down of order in China, this would not
fundamentally change the strategic relationship between China, the
Soviets, and ourselves. Moscow will be alert for opportunities to
improve its relations with Peking without sacrificing basic Soviet
interests, but any such improvement would in all likelihood be based on
a relationship of full independence, with each clearly conscious of the
dividing line between areas of common and competitive interest.
One evident common interest is their mutual desire to weaken the
international position of the U.S. This could provide a basis for
tactical collaboration on some specific issues which would be damaging
to U.S. interests.
We do not rule out the possibility that either in conjunction with or
independent of a lessening of overt Sino-Soviet tensions, the Chinese
could move to lessen tensions with the U.S. We should certainly seek,
within the context of our other Asian interests, to make this
alternative as attractive as possible to Peking.
Peking’s policy objectives with respect to its other Asian neighbors,
particularly in Southeast Asia, will probably continue to focus on
drawing these states into Peking’s orbit of political and economic
influence and detaching them from close relationships with the U.S.
After a very harsh period last spring and summer, in which major threats
were laid out against several countries in the area, Peking has now
moderated its tactics, although it may be launching a significant
subversive effort against Burma. In general, if the situation in
Southeast Asia were to soften through adverse developments in Viet-Nam,
we might expect to see some increase in pressure and subversion from
Peking, notably in Thailand, but the degree to which this was pressed
would depend heavily on conditions in the area. Moreover, we can reckon
that Peking’s internal problems will somewhat reduce the degree of
pressure from what would have been foreseen prior to the Cultural
Revolution, and specifically in the 1965 period when the U.S. made its
major decision on Viet-Nam.
More broadly, and looking into the future, our best forecast would be
that the over-all goal of major influence, and when possible control, in
key parts of Southeast Asia will probably be shared by Mao’s successors whoever they may be.
Specific tactical approaches used toward this end will vary, as they
have since 1949. Should Mao’s
successors, however, become less rigidly committed to the concept of a
Maoist revolutionary development in the world—as we strongly suggest
they eventually
[Page 649]
will—the
insurrectionary-subversionary element in Peking’s foreign policy may be
gradually de-emphasized.
In dealing with the rest of the world, Peking will continue to be
handicapped by its limited resources and will probably gradually begin
to accept the limitations on its abilities to influence or control the
actions of other states. The problems of an internal leadership
transition will also hamper the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy. The general outlines of Peking’s policies, however, will
probably continue: emphasis on developing relations with Afro-Asian
states, willingness to deal on a practical basis on economic and trade
matters with even certain states it does not recognize, and avoidance of
war, if at all possible, with major powers.
Peking’s Attitude Toward the U.S.
The likelihood of a change in Peking’s policies toward the United States
is minimal in the next few years, and probably nil while Mao is alive. Nevertheless, Peking has
been willing, at some political cost, to keep open the
Ambassadorial-level contact in Warsaw and clearly sees an advantage in
having a communication point with the United States.
Especially given the current fluid state of Peking’s politics, we believe
it is in the interest of the U.S. to present to a potential or emerging
Chinese leadership a variety of options and alternatives to their
present policies.
Alternatives to U.S. Policies
We have, in the past few years, made initial moves in this direction by
offering increasing contact through travel and limited types of trade
and by attempting to institute a dialogue with Peking on disarmament.
Further moves in respect to travel and trade can probably be taken
without damage to U.S. security interests. We should also act to
minimize potential points of irritation and direct conflict with Peking,
and this applies particularly to self-restraint in U.S. military air and
naval operations close to Chinese borders.
There is nothing that can presently be done directly to resolve the
problem of Taiwan. We are committed to its defense but for all practical
purposes deal with Peking and Taipei as if they were separate states.
This is a direction toward which our policies have been taking us for 15
years and it is probably in our interest to work gradually toward at
least a tacit acknowledgement of this reality by both.
So long as Peking’s policies remain militant and hostile, there is no net
U.S. advantage to be gained from Chinese Communist participation in the
UN’s political organizations. If
Peking were to moderate its policies even to a limited degree, we would
almost certainly be confronted by growing pressure from UN members to bring Communist China into the
[Page 650]
UN, even if this resulted in withdrawal
from the UN by the GRC. There are, even at present,
significant advantages which might be derived from Peking’s membership
in a number of the UN’s technical
organizations (WMO, ITU, WHO,
UPU). It is politically difficult to
accomplish this, however, without bringing Peking into the General
Assembly or the Security Council.
In general, we anticipate in the middle-long run that China’s attitude
toward the United States will be subject not only to changes in Peking’s
leadership, which could result in some moderation of Peking’s hostility
towards us permitting progress towards placing our relations on a more
pragmatic basis, but also to the future U.S. posture in East Asia and in
particular to the pattern of activities by the United States affecting
Chinese security interests. We do find it possible to envisage the
gradual development of practical cultural and economic relationships in
somewhat the same way as our relations have developed with the USSR, even while our political
relationship remains a hostile one
At some point, it may be desirable to consider the advantage of
attempting to draw Peking more into Asian regional ventures such as the
Asian Development Bank, ECAFE, or the
Mekong Valley Project. We suspect Peking’s initial reactions would be
negative but the attempt might usefully serve to underline that the U.S.
does not oppose Peking’s taking part in peaceful economic development
programs with its Asian neighbors.
