255. Editorial Note
On September 14, 1971, a 2-day series of heated exchanges began between the White House and the Pentagon over apparent leaks to the press about withdrawals of U.S. troops from Vietnam made by General Creighton Abrams, the United States Commander in Vietnam. According to the transcript of a telephone conversation that took place at 6:55 p.m. between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, they had the following exchange:
“K: Mel, I was just talking to the President. We have been reading the Star story. We don’t know what to do about the Pentagon.
“L: That’s just a cheap story.
[Page 906]“K: Pentagon sources.
“L: Did you read my press conference about a week ago?
“K: No. Couldn’t everybody just shut up!
“L: You can’t get reporters to shut up.
“K: I don’t mean the reporters. Who the hell is Abrams to say there will be no residual forces!?
“L: McGovern came out of the meeting with Abrams and said Vietnamization program eventually would provide for the total withdrawal . . .
“K: Now that we are in the end phase of it . . .
“L: I understand that completely, Henry. But no one is talking in the Pentagon. If you are going to take McGovern’s . . .
“K: I don’t give a damn about McGovern!
“L: They are absolutely cheap stories. What they are doing is quoting military sources but I guarantee there is no military—there might be some Army officers—some are getting to the point where they think Vietnam has hurt the Army.
“K: There will be no awards for getting out 2 months earlier if we get out in a way that the Communists are in power in Saigon. All this agony will have been in vain.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 11, Chronological File)
At 8:22 p.m., Kissinger spoke with Moorer to convey similar concern about Abrams’ apparent leak. According to a transcript of their conversation, Moorer began, “I talked to Abrams. It was just exactly like I thought—he didn’t talk about the withdrawals, the times, or anything like that. He simply told McGovern that his philosophical approach in working with the South Vietnamese is to go toward balanced structure that would eventually be for the good of their country.” Kissinger stated that he would call President Richard Nixon and reassure him and added, “Tom, you are not our problem. I don’t know where we would be without you.” (Ibid.)
Kissinger placed a call to the President at 8:25, and they had the following exchange:
“K: I raised hell with Moorer and Laird. They are going to send out additional order to Abrams to keep his mouth shut.
“P: Do you think Abrams put out ‘getting out by spring?’
“K: No, I think that was by McGovern but I think Abrams was protecting himself by saying there would not be a residual force.
“P: That’s not his business! I think we have to consider withdrawing the son-of-a-bitch.
[Page 907]“K: I think so, Mr. President. He is a meritorious person but he is no longer on top of this. I think we might think of a younger man who wants a reputation. But it will look like the last days of the Johnson Administration if we withdraw him.
“P: Get someone second in command that will keep him from drinking too much and talking too much.
“K: We can’t get anyone that will keep him from drinking too much, but we can get someone to keep him from talking too much.
“P: They go together! Do you have Laird silenced?
“K: I called Laird. He said he would hold a meeting tomorrow and get pretty tough.” (Ibid.)
After Laird held a meeting on September 15, he spoke with Kissinger at 8:40 a.m. and had the following conversation:
“L: We’ve just been having a little meeting on this matter of Abrams’ interview and God dammit Henry, last night you got in touch with Tom Moorer and didn’t wait till the McGovern thing was in. If you’re going to get screwed up about what McGovern says goes on then I’m going to see the President. God dammit, I resent it.
“K: It wasn’t just the Abrams thing . . .
“L: Well, then I think I better talk to the President today.
“K: That’s up to you. What we said to Moorer was that no one should talk about troop withdrawals.
“L: No one does, but to jump Abrams on this thing . . .
“K: No one was jumping Abrams; we just said that there should be no statements by anyone.
“L: I’ll handle that. There will be no statements; we’ve shut them off over here. I just don’t want Abrams jumped on something McGovern says. I want to know when these things are going on.
“K: I assume that Moorer is in touch with you.
“L: Well he is. But I’ll defend Abrams any day in the week.
“K: It’s just that every time a troop withdrawal announcement is imminent, there are stories close enough to the truth to indicate that someone is leaking.
“L: Well, Abe has had to put up with more than any field commander ever has.
“K: That is true.” (Ibid.)