268. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- General Haig’s Talk with President Thieu
As I have told you, General Haig’s almost two hour long conversation with President Thieu was completely successful.2 It served to reassure him of continued US support, to secure his approval of our new negotiating initiative designed to make that support possible, and to elicit his assurance that he would take major steps of reconciliation and anti-corruption after the October 3 election.
In light of the importance of this exchange you may wish to read the full transcript at Tab A.3 Following are the highlights.
Our Negotiating Initiative
President Thieu not only accepted the rationale for, and substance of, our new political proposal; he insisted that he himself would not be a candidate in the new Presidential election that would take place after a negotiated settlement.
General Haig explained both your determination to carry on US support in this terminal phase of our involvement and the corollary need for an impressive negotiating record to hold domestic opposition and restrictive legislation in check, especially in view of the recent political developments in South Vietnam. He outlined our ideas for our new initiative which would include:
- —the elements already essentially agreed upon with the other side in Paris (fixed withdrawals, POW release, ceasefire, neutrality toward the political process, respect for the Geneva Accords, international supervision and guarantees);
- —a political proposal that would feature a new Presidential election five months after a settlement run by a mixed commission (including the communists), and supervised by an international body. [Page 977] President Thieu would step down a month before the election, for which he could be a candidate, and the President of the Senate would run the interim government.
General Haig outlined the advantages of this proposal, including the strengthening of Thieu’s and our position of reasonableness both in South Vietnam and the U.S. so that Vietnamization could be successfully carried out. He said the other side was likely to reject it, but it offered a face-saving formula for them if they were at all interested in a negotiated settlement. In addition, the negotiating process would allow you to make a two-month withdrawal projection in November that would keep off-balance both Hanoi and our domestic opposition.
President Thieu endorsed the initiative and went further to say that he would not be a candidate for reelection, just as he had already promised his people he would step down if peace could be made. General Haig said that we did not think Hanoi should have a veto over candidates, and Thieu replied that we could use his pledge of non-candidacy secretly with the other side to enhance the negotiability of the package. He was confident that in a fair election any sound nationalist would defeat the communists, and the government would be left in good hands.
GVN Measures After October 3
General Haig stressed the importance of President Thieu’s moving right after the current election to strengthen his base in our two countries before the negotiating process bears fruit or is made public. He specifically pointed to the need for reconciliation with Thieu’s non-communist opponents, such as permitting some of them to enter the new government. President Thieu suggested that some responsible Buddhist elements could be included and confirmed at the end of the meeting that he would take reconciliation steps.
General Haig also underlined the need for dramatic measures against corruption, both in new procedures and removal of personnel. Here too Thieu agreed to consider such steps, to be undertaken promptly after October 3.
U.S. Assistance and Cambodia
In response to General Haig’s inquiry, President Thieu said he would again take preemptive steps in Eastern Cambodia to deflect new pressures against MR III. Early action there would permit reinforcement of MR I which he thought would be the critical area during the next dry season. He plans to assemble a new division and additional units for MR I, but pointed to manpower problems and the lagging behind of certain U.S. equipment deliveries. General Haig noted that we had been speeding up these deliveries and promised to check into this matter further.
[Page 978]President Thieu asked General Haig to urge Lon Nol to solve the problem caused by Cambodian revocation of automatic license to the ARVN for shallow cross-border operations which Thieu considers essential. General Haig said that he had been assured that this issue was being resolved at the Military Commanders’ level and promised to raise it with Lon Nol the next day.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 872, For the President’s Files, Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Encore, September 1971–75 February 1972, President’s Speech January 25, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Nixon wrote at the top of the memorandum, “K—This man has great character and subtlety.”↩
- Haig met with Thieu on September 23. See also Document 261.↩
- Attached but not printed is a memorandum of conversation, September 23.↩