Office of the Historian

52. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

Washington, October 16, 1970, 4:47–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Cambodia

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State—Under Secretary John Irwin
  • Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. James Wilson
  • Defense—Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. G. Warren Nutter
  • Rear Adm. William R. Flanagan
  • CIA—Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman
  • Mr. Thomas Karamessines
  • Mr. William Wells
  • JCS—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • B/Gen. Robert P. Lukeman
  • Gen. Melvin Zais
  • OMB—Mr. James Schlesinger
  • NSC Staff—Mr. John H. Holdridge
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
The WSAG reviewed [less than 1 line not declassified] plans for employment of Thai Special Guerrilla Units in northern and southern Laos and Khmer Krom units in Cambodia.2 The consensus was that these activities should continue to be justified to Congress on the basis that they constituted a continuation of programs already under way and that they served to protect US troops in Vietnam by attacking enemy supply lines and sanctuaries. The WSAG endorsed a State Department proposal to instruct Ambassador Swank to inform Lon Nol that the Khmer Krom units were to be used against enemy sanctuaries and lines of communications. This would serve to place on the record the US intent in supporting the Khmer Krom operations.
2.
The WSAG agreed in principle to the proposal to replace Thai regular units in Long Tieng with SGUs. However, CIA and Defense are to provide an analysis of why the substitution of SGUs will not degrade [Page 133] friendly military capabilities in Northern Laos.3 Differences in armament and equipment between the regular Thai units and the SGUs will be specified. In addition, State will request Ambassador Godley’s judgment on the desirability and timing of phasing the SGUs into Long Tieng.
3.
Defense will coordinate preparation of an inter-agency paper setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of providing an M–16 factory to Indonesia in return for Indonesian assistance in supplying AK–47 weapons and ammunition to Cambodia. Arrangements made to pay Indonesia for ammunition supplied to Cambodia should provide generous compensation without, however, accepting unreasonable Indonesia prices.4
4.
The WSAG was reminded that in considering the question of Thai military involvement in Cambodia, the President’s deep interest in insuring that all feasible measures be taken to provide for the defense of Cambodia must be taken into account. In this connection, it is essential to obtain as soon as possible Thai agreement to contingency plans for employment of Thai ground and air forces in Cambodia as required; economic assistance trade-offs should be offered to the Thais to enlist their cooperation. The State Department will insure that Ambassador Unger is informed of the above considerations.5

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.↩
  2. In an October 16 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer on funding Cambodian operations under the Fulbright Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act, which was enacted on October 7 and prohibited funds slated for the GVN or Thailand to go to Cambodia, [text not declassified] and that the Defense Department fund Thai, Cambodian, and Lao SGUs in central and south Laos. (Ibid., Box H–76, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia, 10/16/70)↩
  3. Laird forwarded the study to Kissinger under a November 3 memorandum which recommended that the substitution proceed for political and budgetary reasons even though the SGUs would initially be less effective. Kissinger responded on November 27 that the recruitment and training of the SGUs should proceed and their effectiveness be reevaluated toward the end of March 1971. Both documents are attached to a memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, November 23. (Ibid., Box 548, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. VI)↩
  4. In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 27, Packard indicated that the plans for the M–16 factory would not be economically practical. Kissinger responded with a memorandum to Packard, November 2, asking for a fuller study of the factory option. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–76, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia, 10/16/70)↩
  5. Unger was informed in telegram 172147 to Bangkok, October 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 LAOS) Kissinger also sent a letter to Unger on the issue, October 27; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 95.↩