Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Hanoi’s Short Term Intentions

The CIA has produced a memorandum on Hanoi’s intentions over the next six months or so (Tab A).² The major points follow.

Hanoi’s fundamental view of the struggle has not changed. The Communists still believe that they have more staying power than their opponents, and they are gearing their efforts to a long, drawn-out contest. It seems clear that they are determined to make the sacrifices required by the wider war in Indochina; there is some evidence that Hanoi has stepped up its recruitment efforts, and the southward flow of troops from North Vietnam began earlier than usual this year.

Before the U.S. elections. The Communists could take several different courses of action in an attempt to influence the U.S. Congressional elections.

• —They could step up military pressure in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, attempt to inflict a severe defeat on the Cambodian task force northeast of Phnom Penh, or maneuver diplomatically to arouse peace sentiments in the U.S.
• —We have no evidence as to what they are planning.

The next six months. The range of practical alternatives open to Hanoi is not very broad.

• —With the loss of Sihanoukville and the disruptions caused by the allied operations in Cambodia, much of the Communist effort will be devoted to expanding and reinforcing their logistics system in southern Laos, and attempting to re-establish a credible military threat in or near southern South Vietnam.
• —It is unlikely that the Communists will attempt an all-out offensive anywhere in Indochina during the next six months. Some short and sharp offensive action cannot be ruled out, but the Communists primarily will play for time by conducting a low cost, low level struggle.
• —The Communists will continue to hammer away at the Government of South Vietnam by insisting that the Thieu-Ky leadership stands in the way of a settlement.
• —They will probably engage in some wary exploration of the allied position in Paris. But they do not expect much change in the allied position, and they are not willing to pay a price that would seriously jeopardize their chances for success in South Vietnam.

Comment. The CIA clearly interprets the evidence, including recent infiltration activity, as part of a long term Communist effort. It largely discounts any significant increase in military action during the next six months, either before or after the U.S. Congressional elections. We agree that much of Hanoi’s efforts during this period will necessarily be directed toward rebuilding diminished capabilities, but it is also quite possible that Hanoi may try some spectaculars during this period, such as rocket attacks on U.S. bases.

Hanoi’s growing manpower commitments bear watching. The Communists have injected about 20,000 troops into the Laotian Panhandle since June. The destinations of all these troops is not yet clear; some could be bound for South Vietnam or Cambodia, though most of them will probably be used to expand and reinforce the trail network in southern Laos. In addition, about 3,800 troops have begun to move toward southern South Vietnam (COSVN) so far this month. The numerical sequence of the groups in which they are moving suggest that many more are scheduled to follow. Last year, infiltration into the Laotian panhandle itself was negligible, while groups destined for southern South Vietnam did not start to move until early November.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 149, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, 1 Oct 70. Secret; SPOKE. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads, “The President has seen.”
2. Attached but not printed.