83. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]
[Kissinger]: In Cambodia the communists have started an attack and have beaten up in Cambodia. Perhaps we should have an airlift of the area. It’s best to start our offensive or we will be in a rescue operation.
P: In the paper there was something about Cambodians doing well.
K: I don’t know what it referred to. It was put out in Phnom Penh.
P: We know what our facts are. No question of going forward if we can get them to do it.
K: I have talked to Laird and Moorer.
P: That is it? They are with us? How about Abrams?
K: I think so. We are getting additional intelligence.
P: Where would it go?
K: The rubber plantation in the general area of the Fish Hook where we were last year.
P: Are there North Vietnamese there?
K: It’s the tip of their offensive. The good one is the one Haig will look into and they are making the plans on.
P: We have to do both. This is the tip of the communist offensive?
K: It’s the tip where they go from the jungles to the plains. If we could set them back a bit but it’s mostly a despoiling operation. Should be able to do some within the week.
P: In the meantime it’s ______ a psychological turn around.
K: I had a fascinating cable from Ladd2 about the press which confirms what you said. He thinks they are physiologically and psychologically sick. They don’t lie but select the facts in such a way that makes it sound that the leaders have a vested interest in defeat. He briefs them regularly and thinks it’s hopeless. He makes (or lacks) analysis. Show a strong operation and not putting much in there. On such limits we are ______. These are in response to the clippings last week.
[Page 208]P: Is Swank doing better then the other guy?
K: That talk you had with him in San Clemente was very helpful.3 And it’s helped turn the State Dept. around because Marshall Green won’t go against his own Ambassador. They had the vote on Guinea and we abstained.
P: I saw that.
K: That’s not major.
P: With regard to the Cambodian thing, any question about Moorer knowing about the urgency I put on this problem?
K: Absolutely not and I will call him again immediately.4
P: Any air needed, put it in there. On the infiltration, maybe you have to bang earlier.
K: If the airlift is undertaken we may be [asked?] to fly the planes for it.
P: No. That should be avoided. See what they can do on their own for a change. That will open a whole can of worms.
K: I favor the ground offensive over the airlift because we don’t want SVN unit trapped up there.
P: Make sure they are going at break neck speed. Hit them before they hit us.
K: Mel is aboard.
P: How about another strike at the choke points? It’s not fiddle-dee-dee as before.
K: We should wait on the choke points until after we have Laos completed because it’s most effective with that. The difficulty is that the grounds are wet so they must dry out a little before we can start the ground offensive so they can only trap a group here and there.
P: They could ______
K: 100 people. Lack of ability and leadership but they fight well. NVN casualties are substantial.
P: South Vietnamese too. How about having Ladd back over here and have a talk with him? Have him come back with Haig. He needs time off, he’s (been working very hard).
K: You never met him.
[Page 209]P: Never at all and I should talk with him. We are not going to lose this at this point. I don’t want Americans on the ground in the north (?) but we will do anything else. Bombing, whatever. They finally got under Bill’s skin yesterday.5 They crack him too hard, he hits back.
K: He is very tough. Much more than Mel. The dinner last night had a nice human touch.
P: Means more to him than a division. That we care about him.
K: The story you told at the end was very touching.
P: They should get that out sometime.
K: I did the taping for the “Today” show yesterday and said a lot of what you do. The questions were very sympathetic. They will run it several mornings two weeks from now. Questions on how you work, etc.
P: They like that. They are more interested in the man. On Cambodia thing, it was good that Bill slapped back and said we are not telling you the plans. It’s about time someone said it. We constantly get this on our credibility gap. What do you hear?
K: I don’t think it’s a problem. The people opposed to you are opposed because they understand your program but they are opposed. Who today can remember what exactly ______ the Hanoi led. Laird has a tendency to be clever but those are marginal problems. There is no credibility problem except among people opposed to us anyway.
P: Fulbright was a great laugh because he said he had reason to know that the Administration knew before the raid there were no prisoners there.
K: That’s plain sick.
P: Why risk 60 men.
K: We could have done more damage with 4 bombs than with the whole raid.
P: The other way he put it was that we knew that the enemy knew. If they had known, there would be 60 more dead Americans.
K: It’s absurd!
P: It’s typical of the credibility gap thing. So let’s keep the WH staff informed. They get badgered by the press more. We have to constantly do it. On Cambodia I get back to the fact for to win it. Do they both understand?
[Page 210]K: Yes. I talked with them after dinner last night. They are doing a first draft and I will talk to them.
P: South Vietnam will bomb in there. Tactical air and knock the hell out of them. Combined with major strike. ______ is a pretty big month. It can only mean that they need them.
K: They cannot replace the losses we consumed. If they keep up at this level they are pointing towards a major offensive. They are probably planning a wallop against Cambodia but not South Vietnam—They can’t do enough damage.
P: We are doing nothing?
K: That’s what we are sending Haig out there for. So Abrams will know that you want him to launch spoiling operations.
P: Get a message to Abrams from me on this point.6 Not from you or Laird or Moorer but from me.
K: This minute.
P: It’s of urgent importance and I have asked Haig to discuss it and it should be done now. I don’t need to see it. Good-by, Henry.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking. All omissions except those of unrelated material are in the original.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 32.↩
- Kissinger called Moorer at 3:30 p.m. and informed him: “The President is raising Cain with me. He wants you to know that he has no intention of losing Cambodia.” Kissinger expressed concern about putting any U.S. forces on the ground in Cambodia. Moorer replied that he had a plan that would not involve U.S. troops on the ground and the two agreed to meet later that afternoon. (Transcript of telephone conversation, December 9; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 8, Chronological File)↩
- Nixon is referring to Rogers’ testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the administration’s request for a supplement to the Foreign Aid bill. Laird testified as well. For a description of the hearing, see The New York Times, December 9, 1970, p. 18.↩
- Later that day, Nixon approved a message for transmission to Abrams in which the President noted that the situation in Cambodia during the dry season could deteriorate seriously, allowing the enemy to re-occupy areas near the South Vietnamese border through a “strategy designed to neutralize or topple Cambodian resistance.” He wrote that there were “sufficient assets to permit the adoption of bold and aggressive allied counteractions,” and ordered Abrams to work with the FANK and ARVN to begin planning “within the political limitations imposed on U.S. Forces.” Nixon added that he was sending Haig to the region to “amplify for you and other responsible U.S. officials my personal thinking” on the operations. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 3, Chronological File 12/70)↩