86. Diary Entry by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1
1200
Met with Dr. Kissinger in the Situation Room at the White House. Also present were LTG Vogt, RADM Robinson and BG Haig. HAK opened the discussions by stating that the President had given further consideration to the Kompong Cham relief operation since HAK’s talk with me last night.2 The President now is inclined to go ahead with the operation, provided we can insure minimum US involvement. The President envisions that US airlift might handle logistics supplies while RVNAF carries the bulk of the troops. HAK thought this would be a good approach, and would minimize Congressional opposition which could jeopardize bigger operations in the future. He added that we should take bold and unexpected actions against the NVN in order to keep them off-balance. HAK said that he had already talked to SecDef about the airlift matter, and that SecDef wanted some answers to questions he had sent out to Abrams last night before committing himself. I stated that I presumed the questions to which he referred were those that I sent to Abrams. HAK continued with his assessment of the White House position, adding that the President would not be unduly concerned if some ARVN troops were on board the US aircraft; however, [Page 214] the cover must emphasize that we simply are participating in a movement of cargo. The President wants to be able to say that he authorized the lift of supplies—and if some troops accompanied—that would be a secondary matter. In response to HAK’s question, I stated that the relief operation was of military value, and outlined briefly the objectives which we would seek.
HAK then asked if we are conducting a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia, implying such to be the desire. I replied that we are giving the Cambodians what they ask for, and this in turn was a function of how many validated targets could be found. HAK stated that the President would not accept that as an answer—that the President last night had specifically directed a major air effort in Cambodia. LTG Vogt pointed out that all legitimate requests are filled, and I added that when the ARVN move into Kompong Cham we will get better targets. HAK asked if we had directed Abrams to lay on a maximum air effort in response to the President’s personal directive. I told him that we had not done so, but that I had just received a memorandum from SecDef which asked a number of questions pertaining to the feasibility of such an effort. HAK responded sharply to this approach, offering to provide “the tape” of the President’s order if there is any doubt as to what was intended. He added that he had to be in a position to tell the President that we had carried out his directive, and requested a written report that we have done so by tomorrow morning. I stated that we would send a message to Abrams without delay.
I then asked HAK for clarification on the use of US airlift in normal resupply operations. I informed him that CINCPAC and the Ambassador had worked out an arrangement whereby US airlift would be used for logistics support whenever the RVNAF system becomes saturated. HAK emphatically supported such a plan, but requested that we not ask him to confirm existing authorities or procedures. He would have enough problems in handling the relief operation alone, without reopening the routine matter of normal logistics support which was proceeding satisfactorily, and without criticism.
I concluded with my assurance that we would send two messages—one pertaining to the use of maximum air, and one requesting an assessment of reconfiguring the Kompong Cham operation using US airlift for the bulk of supplies and RVNAF for the bulk of troops.3 HAK stated that he would then attempt to get a consensus among the senior people that we should go ahead with the operation. Looking further into the future, he thought that the bigger operations, such as that into the Chup Plantation, should kick off as fast as possible.
- Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret.↩
- Presumably the discussion described in Document 84.↩
- Neither further identified.↩