Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

431. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Turkish Affairs (Cash) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, June 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Letʼs Not Throw the Turkish Baby Out With the Narcotics Bathwater

Last December Moynihan told Bill Handley and me that we should bomb the Blue Mosque in retaliation for the way the Turks are “aggressing” against us with opium.² (The same day, incidentally, the President told Bill in low key, “do your best.”) We thought at the time Moynihan was joking. Now, Iʼm not so sure.

I am becoming increasingly concerned that various people in the Government (including Rossides,³ who has demonstrated his disregard for US-Turkish relations, and Kleindienst)⁴ without responsibility for US foreign relations, but understandably anxious and frustrated over our horrendous narcotics problem, may be fully prepared to see irreparable damage done to all our other interests in Turkey in the attempt to solve this problem. And—worst of all—without any real prospect that our narcotics problem will thus be solved.

At least with the “Johnson letter”⁵ there was a real chance that a Greek-Turkish war would be prevented. This was accomplished and, therefore, the risk—and the high price paid in damage to US-Turkish relations—was, in my view, justified.

But if Turkey produced not one more poppy, our problem would not be solved. Opium is produced in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, India, etc. etc. As long as there is a demand, there will be a supply. Furthermore, even if the USG can agree internally that opium should be eliminated worldwide, which is very doubtful, and could achieve this, which is even more doubtful, the experts say addicts would find a substitute—any substitute (LSD for example)—because their need is so compelling.

In other words, this is a problem that must be solved primarily at the heart, i.e. the user in this country, and secondarily by attempting to control what comes in over the borders of this country, not what goes out over the borders of any number of other countries throughout the world.

The argument is made that if an abrupt cessation of Turkish production could be obtained (which it canʼt), narcotics dealers would be flushed out in their attempts to rearrange their supply lines to other sources. It seems incredible that as adroit as these criminals are, and with all the publicity our efforts with Turkey have been given—over our and the Turksʼ objections—that other arrangements have not been made. Surely contingency planning is not a government monopoly.

All of this is not to say that we should not urge the Turks to do everything possible that will be of real assistance to us; we should and are. And we should be willing to pay the price the achievable results are worth.

The questions are: what will be of real assistance to us; what is achievable; and what should we pay?

Since 1966 we have been putting heavy pressure on Demirel (to the point of irritating him considerably), and he has: been progressively reducing the provinces in which poppies may be grown (with a resultant loss of votes); cooperating with us in improving control, including permitting US agents to roam Turkey (a considerable risk for both him and us); and promised to end production in ‘71. He, incidentally, is the only one who has been willing to commit himself to eradication. All other Turks have emphasized increased controls only. If we lose Demirel—a real possibility even if we donʼt add to his present serious difficulties—we lose the Turkish commitment to eradication.

Bill Handley says—and I think his telegrams show—that he has used every arrow in his quiver with the Turks on opium. Although they have been stupid in not sending someone from Ankara to the CCMS, we are convinced that they are doing as much as they can to help us.

I am certain from the various noises that have been made that we will quite soon be under very heavy pressure to use AID, PL 480, MAP, and anything else available as blunt instruments to bludgeon the Turks into doing our bidding. Anyone who knows the Turks knows this simply wonʼt work. They are just not amenable to that kind of persuasion. Worse yet, if there are even indications of this kind of direct pressure, such as a holdup of the program loan or a delay in PL 480, this will get the Turksʼ backs up and may well cause a slackening in the cooperation we are presently getting on narcotics. If such pressure were to become public knowledge—as would almost certainly be the case—our other exceedingly important interests in Turkey would suffer.

Our relations with Turkey canʼt stand another “Johnson letter” with so little prospect of accomplishing what we wish.

1. Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 29, Soc 11–5. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and sent through Davies (NEA). A copy was sent to Saunders.
2. No record of this conversation was found. Sisco drew an arrow from this line and annotated: “I agree. Pls be sure Iʼm on clearance for everything. Stay alert. Iʼm willing to confront Moynihan. JJS.”
3. Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
4. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.
5. Reference is to President Johnsonʼs June 5, 1964, letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning against mililtary intervention in Cyprus. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.