439. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY
Background
There is a fundamental dichotomy in Turkeyʼs political life between the elitists of the urban, educated minority and the mass-based politicians. The elitists feel that only they are capable of giving Turkey the enlightened, progressive leadership it needs, while their political opponents are better characterized as populists. Among the elitists are the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the principal opposition party. It is flanked on its left in the political spectrum by the small, Marxist, Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and by a congeries of splintered, radical-left student groups.
The 1965 election victory of the Justice Party (JP) marked the return to power, after a five-year lapse, of representatives of the same segments of Turkish society which had been removed from power in the 1960 military revolution. This military intervention was largely supported by the elitists and was brought about by economic mismanagement and political repression.
The Democrat Party (DP), which was deposed by the 1960 military revolution, and the JP, its successor, were brought to power with the support of the conservative peasantry and of the commercial class. The JP has been led throughout its five years in office by Suleyman Demirel, who has exhibited during his tenure unusual skill in economic policy and an unanticipated ability to maintain an effective working relationship with Turkeyʼs military leaders.
Current Situation
In the past year, charges of corruption on the part of Demirelʼs brothers gave a convenient issue to some within his party and to the opposition to use in trying to remove him. However, Prime Minister Demirel, himself, precipitated the latent intra-Justice Party (JP) crisis by excluding from his post-1969 election cabinet representatives of his partyʼs more conservative right wing. This faction, in turn, deprived the JP Government of its large majority in the National Assembly by making an open break with Demirel. They did this by voting against [Page 1080] the budget in February 1970, and then adding their weight to the intractability of the opposition. Turkeyʼs National Assembly has managed to accomplish little since this event.
The November 1 reconvening of the Grand National Assembly produced an immediate crisis when agreement could not be reached on presiding officers for either house. Party discipline failed because of the secret balloting, allowing JP dissidents still within the Party to frustrate with impunity the election of the legislatureʼs leaders. The first month of the new session was thus wasted, as no other matters could be taken up until the leadership issue was finally resolved. This was succeeded as a pre-empting issue by various attacks on, or charges against, Demirel, including the corruption issue. He overcame the corruption charge, perhaps temporarily, in a Grand National Assembly vote supporting a committee report that the corruption issue was not valid.
The violence perpetrated in recent years by radical-left students stimulated the growth of countervailing violence by radical-right elements, and Turkeyʼs universities have suffered greatly in the attendant atmosphere of coercion and chaos. A number of deaths, many injuries, and considerable property damage have been the physical result of this chain of circumstances. Turkeyʼs urban populace, at first benevolently neutral in the main toward the radical-left actions—including a number of anti-American incidents in which the United States was basically a surrogate target for the JP Government—seems to have had enough of student violence. In addition, there apparently is widespread dismay at the irresponsibility and ineffectuality of the Grand National Assembly in the face of Turkeyʼs many problems, not the least of which is continued student violence.
Demirelʼs compatibility with the Turkish military establishment was never universal, and over the years since 1965 there have been intermittent CAS reports of coup-plotting. This usually has been at the colonel level and sometimes associated with members of the coup group of 1960, who appointed themselves life Senators before returning government control to civilian hands in 1961. Widespread frustration with the unhappy state of Turkish politics and the JP Governmentʼs inability to tackle many of Turkeyʼs problems, especially student violence, has recently given rise to widespread rumors and further CAS reports of an increasing willingness of the Turkish military to intercede in the political process. These reports have begun to involve many of the top leadership, suggesting that Demirelʼs modus vivendi with them has been attenuated by the scale and intractability of the problems he has been unable to solve. Most recently, there have been reports of specific suggestions to President Sunay by the Air Force Commander, General Batur. In his capacity as a member of Turkeyʼs NSC, he advocated changes in Turkeyʼs governing institutions to permit more effective leadership of the nation.
[Page 1081]Prognosis
The attempt to unseat Demirel doubtless will continue and is likely to be more vigorously pursued by the elitists and by the JP right-wing spin-off group, which formed the Democratic Party on December 19. The majority of the JP will be extremely reluctant to withdraw support from Demirel, since they realize that—as Foreign Minister Caglayangil has analyzed the situation—the withdrawal of Demirel as Prime Minister will only encourage redoubled attacks on any JP successor, and the JP would have sacrificed Demirel in vain. If the JP Government is unable to reassert its control, perhaps because of further defections from the partyʼs right flank, the calling of new elections is a probability. These could be held as early as May 1971.
The military remains a somewhat unpredictable factor. Intervention of some kind is a distinct possibility if the JP Government fails to come to grips with the critical issues, such as student violence, and if the Grand National Assembly continues to act irresponsibly. A limited intrusion by senior officers to bring about changes designed to induce greater stability and responsibility in government, such as an altered elections law, seems most likely. This might well be through the assumption by President Sunay, with the National Security Council, of much of the executive function. However, the field grade ranks were the locus of plotting for the 1960 military revolution, and the emergence of another such group cannot be excluded.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret. The paper was sent to Kissinger on December 23 by Eliot who indicated it was “prompted by recent developments.”↩