Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 19, 1972, 9:30–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Courtesy Call by Minister Luetgendorf

PARTICIPANTS

• Austrian Side
  • Minister for National Defense—Karl Ferdinand Luetgendorf
  • Military & Air Attaché, Embassy of Austria—Brig. Ferdinand Folten
• U.S. Side
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense—Kenneth Rush
  • Principal Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Armistead I. Selden, Jr.
  • Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—John H. Morse
  • Military Asst to the DepSecDef—Colonel John G. Jones, USA
  • Austrian Desk Officer, EurReg/ISA—Charles T. Lloyd

I–25875/72

1. Preliminary Discussion

Secretary Rush welcomed Minister Luetgendorf and noted that Austria was the only place in Europe which the Russians had left voluntarily. Minister Luetgendorf responded that in Austria the Communist Party holds no seats in Parliament and secures only 2½% of the vote. The Secretary observed that this is unusual because one might expect the Russians to have thoroughly organized an effective party before leaving.

2. Soviet Policy

Secretary Rush referred to the change in Russian posture as demonstrated in Brandtʼs “Ostpolitik,” the Berlin Agreement² and the groundwork being laid for MBFR. He said that the Russians think their best interest is served at the present time by détente. However, this is not a change of Russian objectives but a change in means or tactics. Their objectives are to have the U.S. withdraw from Europe, to break up NATO and to spread their influence in Europe. Minister Luetgendorf said that the small countries in Europe particularly hope that the U.S. will keep its forces in Europe, because there will be great danger if troops are reduced. He agreed that Russiaʼs objectives remain the same and on the basis of his study he is not sure that its attitude of coexistence and appeasement will continue during the next 20 years.

3. SALT

Minister Luetgendorf expressed the view that it is necessary for the little countries to take part and that their military experts have the opportunity to discuss military potential in the area. He also expressed the hope that the so-called peace activists in the younger generation had not influenced the political representatives at the SALT conference.

4. Status of Russian Hierarchy

The Minister expressed the view that Brezhnev and Kosygin are now in a position similar to the one Khrushchev reached. He said the Army takes a position not in accord with that of the political leadership and this could lead to a change in government. The Secretary noted that we were aware of the difficulties faced by the political leadership in May after the North Vietnam attack when the President had taken firm action to mine North Vietnamese harbors and bomb military targets in the North. He noted that timely ratification of the Berlin agreement by the FRG³ had made it impossible for the Russians to cancel President Nixonʼs trip. He said that he believes that the present Russian leaders have now suppressed the opposition and remain in command of the situation.

5. MBFR and CSCE

The Secretary said he expects the Russians to push for the CSCE for a number of reasons; that for them it would, in effect, be a World War II peace treaty because it recognizes political changes within Europe, would provide a calming period in the West to enable the Soviets to face the Chinese in the East and finally would enable the Russian Government to satisfy some of the economic pressures that exist. The Soviet game plan is to get the U.S. to reduce its presence in Europe and to split up NATO. The Secretary said the U.S. game plan is the reverse, to maintain U.S. presence and strengthen NATO as we seek a guarded détente based on MBFR.

The Secretary said he was confident that President Nixon will be re-elected and will maintain U.S. strength in Europe. He said that the stronger Western Europe remains the safer Austria is. Over a period of time, the U.S. would hope to attract Warsaw Pact countries such as the GDR, Poland and Romania, even Russia itself, to free hundreds of millions from the yoke of Stalinism. He noted that Soviet hardliners see this as an effort to corrupt and weaken Stalinism.

6. Military Equipment for Austria

The Minister expressed his appreciation for the great U.S. help which enabled Austria to build up its Army. He said that it has been ten years since Austria had a credit of $46 million and that it runs out this year. He reported that much of the Armyʼs equipment is old and needs replacing and asked whether it would be possible to get a new credit to buy material from the U.S. Army, especially communications and signal equipment. He also mentioned the need for heavy weapons including M–60, M–109 howitzer, 106mm recoilless cannon, anti-tank cannon ammunition and helicopters. He suggested that if this material were available as surplus as was the case between 1956–60 this would be good for Austria. Secretary Rush said that the U.S. would be glad to consider any Austrian request that the Minister might propose. He said that we have very friendly feelings for Austria and while she must be neutral we consider her a good friend of ours.

7. Reorganization of Austrian Army

The Minister said that the strategy of Austrian defense is moving toward that of Yugoslavia in which the Army will not engage in major battles but will utilize Austriaʼs mountains and confine defense efforts to small groups fighting behind enemy lines. For this, he said, they need good communications, anti-tank and small anti-aircraft weapons. He said that the Army would maintain one interceptor aircraft group in order to defend Austrian air-space. It would also be important to have helicopters for communication and to shift troops. Mr. Morse noted that the Yugoslavs are interested in the same type of equipment for similar purposes. Secretary Rush agreed that communications and mobility are vital in such operations.

8. Yugoslav Political Situation; Yugoslavs in Austria

The Minister noted the potential political difficulties in Yugoslavia. The Secretary commented that the presence of different races and rivalries presented an opportunity for promoting a civil war from outside. Mr. Rush noted that only this week Yugoslavia was taking action to control its factions. He suggested that the Russians might want to let Yugoslavia break itself up rather than promote civil war or support an attack from without. However, he hopes that the present détente may be sufficiently interesting to the Russians to prevent them from pushing such a war. On the other hand, local power struggles could be stimulated.

The Minister said there are now 120,000 Yugoslav workers in Austria and he does not know what they would do if Tito dies. Last year when the Yugoslavs conducted maneuvers only 35% of its reserves called back from Austria and Germany actually returned. Secretary Rush agreed the Yugoslavia is a focal point of interest today and noted that the French are concerned and Minister of Defense Debré recently told him he has it uppermost in his mind. The Minister said that he is aware of one plan for Hungary to attack Yugoslavia through Austria and therefore Austria is now prepared to close the Hungarian border. He noted that the Russians would like a port on the Adriatic.

9. Left-Wing Youth

Secretary Rush asked the Minister whether the radical youth (JUSO) posed problems for him. Minister Luetgendorf stated that while he is independent of political matters he is helping the Socialist party control its own left-wing youth. Secretary Rush said that the situation is serious in Germany where Brandt may lose the December elections because of the youth vote. Minister Luetgendorf said that the situation in Austria is less troublesome because the students are less excited.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AUS. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Drafted by Lloyd and approved by Selden on July 31. The meeting took place in Rushʼs office at the Pentagon.
2. See footnote 5, Document 68.
3. Apparent reference to Bonnʼs ratification of its “Eastern treaties” with Poland and the Soviet Union on May 19, 1972. The text of the two treaties is printed in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1103–1105 and 1125–1127.