202. Minutes of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control1 2
The CCINC Working Group took up the items on its agenda (attachment #1) though modifying the order of the items due to the late arrival of certain members.
Ambassador Vance, the Chairman, began by reporting on his visits to countries in the Near East, South and East Asia and to Mexico. He described his meeting with the leaders of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand and the new Attorney General of Mexico. Promise of substantial progress was seen in all but Pakistan. Moreover, a commitment was obtained from the Prime Minister of Iran to consider financing control programs in neighboring countries, through the UNFDAC. A person is currently being recruited, who will be seconded to the UN to put together projects for reduced narcotics production and on enforcement in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to look into Iranian financing of such projects.
Joseph Dittert, the retiring Secretary of the International Control Board addressed the Working Group. (Dittert was accompanied by another INCB official, Mr. Abdelaziz Bahi of Tunisia.) Dittert made a plea for US ratification of the Psychotropic Convention, noting that it was essential for more manufacturing countries to become parties to the agreement. He reported a greater awareness of the narcotics problem, and a greater readiness to act on the part of governments. Many of the Board’s activities are not publicized as private diplomacy leads to better results. Activities are publicized when public opinion support is needed.
Turning to specifics, Dittert reported that for Europe the principal problem is Southeast Asia. The Netherlands is the main center attracting increased availability. Dittert thought that more Southeast Asian heroin will spill into the US. Poor controls and increased production in Pakistan and Afghanistan is leading to more leakage into illicit market in Europe. There is also a new trafficking route developing between Pakistan and the Arab states. Europe, particularly the Netherlands, is becoming increasingly concerned over cocaine, even though cocaine is less visible than heroin. Cocaine in the Netherlands comes through the Surinam connection.
[Page 2]In the area of international cooperation, Mr. Dittert believes: (1) more regional and inter-regional work must be carried out; (2) greater use of scientific research in all fields (mechanism of addiction, treatment, education and eradication possibilities) is needed; and (3) in dealing with the illicit traffic there must be greater exchange of information aimed at bigger fish.
Mr. Dittert was aware that the U.S. might allow production of bracteatum. He expressed great dismay at the prospect particularly since it has been constant U.S. policy not to produce raw materials. This complete change in policy creates great concern in the INCB. In the first place it will lead to overproduction of opiates, thus risking relaxed controls in Turkey and India as their income is reduced. The U.S. could hardly be effective in pressing them to renewed diligence if it were itself producing. Also, if the U.S. does allow bracteatum production, it will lose influence with countries such as Thailand, Laos, Pakistan and Afghanistan, who will then all wish to produce legal opium, a desire they have already expressed but have been dissuaded from, thus far. American objection to such a move would be thought by these countries as merely protective of the new U.S. competitive position. The INCB needs support in controlling the world’s production and the U.S. has always been the leader in providing such support. Dittert wondered if the loss of moral strength by the U.S. was worth the 10 tons of thebaine we might produce.
Mr. Bensinger questioned Mr. Dittert on the effect of the strict new law in the Netherlands regarding stiffer sentences. Dittert considers it too soon to judge. Mr. Bensinger also asked if there is any evidence that other countries, especially the western Europeans, are resuming payments to the UN Fund. Dittert noted that we would not know until the CND meeting in February as that was when contributions would be announced.
Mr. Johnson (OMB) expressed concern over the lack of progress on getting contributions, particularly from the oil-rich states and western Europe. He inquired whether western European contributions were being cut back. Mr. Dittert conceded that the economic crisis has had an effect on contributions.
Returning to the subject of bracteatum, Mr. Bensinger wondered if other governments would see it as less of a problem if the U.S. grew poppy straw. Mr. Dittert reiterated his views that it was essential for the U.S. to maintain its moral leadership and not get into raw material production irrespective of its type. Most people do not distinguish between kinds of poppies. Mr. Johnson asked if the moral strength argument was valid for Australia and France, which [Page 3] are producing and exporting. Dittert insisted that the U.S. was a special case, as it has the major role to play. It has always been in the forefront.
Mr. Cusack (DEA) questioned Dittert’s allegation that the U.S. was committed not to grow the raw material. The U.S. decision not to produce raw materials in the past was purely economic. Again Mr. Dittert insisted that the U.S. will lose its ability to tell other countries not to produce opiates. In answer to a question from DEA General Counsel Miller, Dittert said that bracteatum is not covered by the Single Convention. Miller indicated this meant DEA was not prohibited from authorizing its use while Dittert pointed out that the U.S. would be setting a bad example by utilizing a plant not controlled by the conventions which produces a dangerous substance.
Mr. Bensinger announced that an open hearing on the bracteatum issue will be held January 27–28 and offered to invite the INCB to participate.
During his presentation Mr. Dittert indicated that any problem of shortage of opium which might have existed no longer exists. In fact, we are moving into an oversupply situation. Mr. Johnson suggested that if there is an oversupply, perhaps the focus should be on the world production which is not controlled rather than on the U.S. bracteatum. Dittert pointed out that we are already doing all we can to reduce uncontrolled production and he fears a U.S. move to bracteatum would reduce the effectiveness of such efforts. Moreover, if there is overproduction, the price will fall and we may have less controls in countries now effectively controlling.
Dr. DuPont reported that the U.S. medical community was unanimous in feeling that opiates are “good drugs” for medical needs.
At this point Dr. Dittert and his party left the meeting.
Ambassador Vance outlined the State Department’s objections to bracteatum as it related to the foreign relations field, specifically the impact first on Turkey and India and then on the group of countries we are now pressing to eliminate production, like Mexico, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Thailand. The U.S. was already being criticized for failing to ratify the Psychotropic Convention, yet we in fact control such production domestically. Therefore the probability that we would [Page 4] effectively control bracteatum will not diminish foreign criticism of such a move.
In response to a question from Mr. Featherstone (Treasury), Messrs. Miller and Bensinger said that by 1981, bracteatum would supply 20% of the U.S. requirements. They could not specify how much acreage would be devoted to its cultivation since better plants are now being developed.
Mr. Hamm (Customs) asked why DEA was pushing bracteatum. Was it merely to advance the interest of the pharmaceutical firms: In Mr. Miller’s view, legally we can not limit production if the industry wants it. Furthermore it will make the product cheaper. Ambassador Vance asked if those were the only reasons. The DEA representatives revealed a fear of suit by the industry. The drug industry has told Mr. Bensinger that if DEA does not allow controlled production of bracteatum, the industry will do it anyway. In Mr. Miller’s opinion the companies can produce thebaine from any source either foreign or domestic (bracteatum) and DEA has no legal basis to prohibit it. Hamm said we should then change the law.
A discussion ensued on the urgency to proceed to a decision on bracteatum. Ambassador Vance questioned the wisdom of holding hearings only 7 days after a new Administration has taken office. The new Administration should be given adequate time to study the issue. The only urgency was that created by DEA. Vance also doubted that the companies would actually go to court. Mr. Bensinger said he would take Ambassador Vance’s opinion into account in his decision and noted that even if the hearings were held it did not mean that a decision needed to be mad immediately thereafter. Both Bensinger and Dr. DuPont believed that the debate on bracteatum should go on in public rather than in private.
In the opinion of Ed Johnson, the CCINC could only comment on the international considerations of the issue. The special opium task force was responsible for the overall ramifications. There was considerable objection to that point of view. Vance noted that the Opium Task Force did not make any recommendations.
Comments by Messrs. Bensinger and Johnson provoked a heated exchange with representatives of State (Gough), AID (Mann), and USIA on whether these agencies would carry out their responsibilities to represent U.S. positions abroad (should a decision to be taken to authorize bracteatum).
The discussion of bracteatum concluded and a note from the Canadian Embassy on this subject was distributed.
[Page 5]Turning to agenda item #3, Mr. Ernst reported that the Coordinating Subcommittee and the FISC had developed and sent out to 13 European posts country-specific intelligence requirements. Similar cables will go to other areas and by spring we expect to have a world-wide picture to use as an aid in reviewing priorities.
Regarding agenda item #4, Mr. Johnson, on behalf of Mr. Parsons, reported on the issuance of the Federal Strategy Paper (the Brown Paper). Ambassador Vance mentioned the questions which had arisen during the Guatemala ARA Narcotics Coordinators Conference over cocaine. He also called for another Working Group meeting to be held in January in preparation for the CND meeting in February.
A representative of DEA (Mr. Fink) reported that Senator Nunn’s committee will be holding hearings on gun trafficking. One subtopic will be the linkage of guns for narcotics. DEA has prepared a study on the subject for the Committee. He also informed the group that the Attorney General made a finding that there is a legal basis for the foreign intelligence organs of the USG to give DEA intelligence.
As the meeting ended Ed Johnson stated he thought the Carter Transition team had accepted his idea to combine the several narcotics Cabinet committees and leave the Working Group structure as it is.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, INM/P Files, Lot 84 D 147, Cabinet Committee–Working Group. Limited Official Use. Attached but not published is Attachment 1, a December 7 memorandum circulating the agenda to Working Group members. Vernon Hann’s name is misspelled as Hamm.↩
- The Working Group discussed drug control-related conditions in various countries, potential domestic production of paper bracteates, activities of the Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee, Congressional initiatives, and exchanged views with representatives of the International Narcotics Control Board.↩