508. Airgram A–112 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1 2

[Page 1]

SUBJECT:

  • Kupia Kumi Report Number One

Summary

With the dissolution of Congress August 31, Nicaraguan politics enters a new, and possibly exciting, phase. The Somoza-Aguero Pact (“Kupia Kumi”) is now the law of the land, having been incorporated almost verbatim into an act entitled the “Total Reform of the Political Constitution and other Constitutional Laws” which Congress passed on its final day. The Conservative Party President, Dr. Fernando Aguero Rocha, is now trying actively to rebuild and rekindle his party and is campaigning vigorously for the February 6, 1972 Constituent Assembly elections, with a steady eye on September 1974 when he is to get his promised chance to compete for the Presidency. The Liberal Party is keeping its extensive and well-financed machine in regular motion with scores of meetings and “homenajes” (political banquets). The “mini parties” are in disarray, having a negative common cause (hatred of Somoza and the Pact, and disappointment with Aguero) but little in the way of positive factors, such as a leader, an organization or financing. Among them, the “Sacasistas” still sit on the fence with their leader Ramiro Sacasa, unable to decide whether or which way to jump. The Social Christians, who at least have [Page 2] a skeleton organization and an ideology working for them, show some signs of life and will participate in the February elections if they can collect over thirty thousand signatures on their petition and meet other requirements. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and his band continue to turn the fire of the powerful La Prensa newspaper on almost everyone but themselves. Although this force is not hitched to any “movement” or party, and is consequently not likely to alter the balance of the political equation in the country, it does inform and stimulate national awareness. In this ambient, the United States is tugged or tossed at from all sides and asked to support a multitude of causes. Such a situation requires us to constantly stand aloof, making it difficult for anyone to embrace or reject us too strongly. This, then, is the general picture as the Kupia Kumi enters its implementation phase. A more detailed description follows.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the Airgram.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Cheek, approved by White, and signed by Shelton. Copies were sent to Guatemala City, San Jose, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:30 a.m. on September 25, at the Bureau of Inter-American affairs on October 1, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.
  2. The Embassy reported on the Somoza-Agüero national unity pact, suggesting that Somoza’s Liberal Party sought U.S. association with the pact to lend it “an air of respectability and international acceptability,” while Agüero’s Conservative Party hoped that the United States would “be the guardian of the agreement and the potential enforcer should Somoza fail to comply with it. The Embassy recommended staying aloof and avoiding “the embraces of local politics.”