Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

514. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Managua, March 7, 1972

Participants:

• Dr. Fernando Aguero Rocha, President of the Conservative Party (PCT)
• James R. Cheek, Chief of Political Section, AmEmbassy, Managua

(Note: During the past few weeks, Dr. Aguero has maintained an extremely low profile, generally avoiding public notice and spending most of his time at his farms. This was our first meeting since the hectic days following the February 6 elections when Aguero was physically exhausted from the campaign and depressed and disturbed by the overwhelming defeat of the PCT. I was therefore impressed by his cool, calm and collected manner and his healthful, rested appearance on this occasion.)

Aguero says he has analyzed and reflected at length on the February elections and has tried to take a pragmatic view. He now states that he was not upset by actually losing because he expected to lose all along as the elections were conducted under the old, corrupt system. What did disturb him, however, was the mounting evidence from early returns that Somoza might be reneging on his promises to him and abandoning the Pact. He now feels that what occurred was a “revolt” of Liberal leaders opposed to the Pact and they demonstrated their feelings by producing some 300 thousand phony votes to crush the Conservatives. Aguero says that, when he realized that Somoza was still firmly committed to the Pact, he calmed down and changed his attitude considerably.

From this new perspective, Aguero feels that there was heavy opposition abstention on February 6 because they, quite rightly, considered that little was at stake and there was nothing to be gained from a fraudulent election. He maintains that he shared this view and consistently stated that honest elections in 1974 were the real objective of the PCT. He therefore does not plan to protest formally what he refers to as the “massive fraud” which occurred because this would serve no useful purpose. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal would not alter the results no matter how much evidence he presented. It is far better to have the TSE get on with electoral reforms than to occupy itself with the past.

Aguero remains convinced that, if electoral reforms are effected and honest elections can be held in 1974, a vast opposition vote will rally to his standard. He deprecates current talk of forming a so called “third force”, saying that the only possible third force in the country is the far left dominated by the Communists. If there are fair elections such a force would have little popular support because Nicaraguans will prefer to stick with the two traditional parties. He also belittles the idea of the PCT forming a coalition with other opposition elements. He sees no worthwhile benefit to the PCT from such an alliance because “the mini parties and dissidents bring nothing to the bargain but their desire for a share of the spoils.” There are some good persons affiliated with these groups and the PCT door is always open to them, but as political organizations they have nothing to offer. Moreover, Aguero asserts that he has the capacity to command all the opposition votes on his own. He therefore is currently not disposed to make any deals, though he concedes that he might have to change his mind if this assessment proves wrong.

Aguero stressed that implementation of the national identity system and honest elections are a sine qua non for continued political peace and stability in Nicaragua. He gravely states that without these, there will be no alternative but revolution for the opposition and his own party. He hopes that President Somoza will continue to appreciate this fact and act accordingly. While he found President Somoza’s special address to the nation of March 4 reassuring in this regard, he still wants to see action. He is particularly concerned that the requested OAS technical assistance for electoral reform be promptly forthcoming and that first class, competent advisors be chosen for the task.

Aguero says that the PCT unity is intact and there is no internal “revolt” against his leadership. Various department leaders have quietly visited him in recent weeks and pledged their continued support. He has no intention of resigning and has told the party that it will have a chance to replace him if it wishes when his term expires in 1973. However, he bluntly asks: Who else have they got to lead them but me? The projected PCT newspaper is proceeding apace and should be installed by the end of this year. The party plans a seminar-type national meeting in May to plan its strategy and program for the interim government.

Aguero still plans to serve as the Conservative member of the three-man National Governing junta which will rule the country from May 72 until November 74. He says that the PCT, and he personally, paid dearly for this position and they intend to get the maximum out of it. One of his ideas is to travel abroad in his chief of state role to enhance his status and image.

COMMENT: Aguero has apparently regained his self assurance and equipped himself with a comfortable rationalization of the recent election debacle. While he may also be practicing a certain self-deception, one must remember that he is an old political pro who is no stranger to defeat. Despite his present fragile position, he is not without assets. He retains control of the PCT machinery and monopolizes its leadership. He also remains as the only nationally known opposition personality with a claim to leadership status, and his service on the junta should provide opportunities to improve his popular standing. While he has a long way to go to shake his “loser” and “collaborator” image and rebuild his party, he seems determined to keep up the fight.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Limited Official Use; Exempt. Drafted by Cheek. Transmitted to the Department in Airgram A–23 from Managua, March 10. Repeated to Guatemala City, San José, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD.
2. Cheek discussed the outcome of the February 6 elections with Conservative Party President Fernando Agüero, who claimed he expected to lose the elections because they had been conducted under the “old, corrupt system.” Agüero explained that honest elections were a sine qua non for continued political peace and stability in Nicaragua and that, should these fail in 1974, revolution would be the only alternative.