193. National Security Decision Memorandum 262, Washington, July 29, 1974.1 2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 29, 1974
National Security Decision Memorandum 262
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of
State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT: Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression Against South Korea
The President has reviewed the memorandum of the Deputy Secretary of State of April 27, 1974 which proposed a modification in the guidance contained in NSDM 251 concerning extension of the 1961 Kishi Minute on the Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression Against South Korea.
The President has approved the recommendation in Option 3 of the memorandum, i.e., with the purpose of retaining at least the effect of the Korean Minute without seeking an explicit, formal extension of the Minute, we should:
— Not raise the question of the Korean Minute itself directly with the Japanese Government.
— Rather, during discussion with the Japanese Government on the future of the U.N. Command, take the position that we are confident termination of the U.N. Command will not adversely affect our ability to deter a North Korean attack, even though the U.N. cover and the U.N. SOFA for Japan are terminated, and that no further formal U.S.-Japanese actions are required.
Accordingly, the guidance contained in NSDM 251 is amended in this respect.
Henry A. Kissinger [signed]
cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, #145–264, 1972-1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rush’s memorandum, April 27, offered three options: “1. Negotiate a new agreement as provided in NSDM 251. 2. Let the Korean Minute formally lapse and depend on the Nixon-Sato Communique. 3. Not raise the Korean Minute issue directly with the Japanese Government and seek to leave the issue in essence unresolved.” Rush recommended option three. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia & Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 3, Japan 1974 [3])↩
- Kissinger modified NSDM 251, relating to the use of U.S. bases in Japan in the event of aggression against South Korea.↩