378. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of State (Pickering) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, November 29, 1973.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 8, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: NSSM 171 Follow-On — Analysis of U.S.
We have reviewed the Defense Department’s study of United States deployments in Thailand which was transmitted to members of the Defense Program Review Committee with Deputy Secretary Clements’ memorandum of October 13. We concur in general in the analysis presented in that memorandum and agree that the options set forth for both short and long-term deployments are conceptually valid.
Additional comment is called for on political considerations relevant to decisions on this subject. The DOD study stresses political factors indicating the general acceptability in Thailand of a substantial United States militancy presence. The implication is that, if non-political considerations dictate drawdown of United States forces, purely Thai political considerations suggest only that the drawdown should be gradual.
We believe attention should be given to political circumstances in Thailand that argue in favor of continuing reductions and that should affect the timetable. Recent reporting from Bangkok is reassuring. The new government has not expressed a desire to accelerate United States withdrawals and in general appears to accept the position of the previous government which, in essence, would permit us, as the DOD study states, “to withdraw our forces on our own timetable.” On the other hand, it is a political fact that the Thai have all along expected and desired that withdrawals continue.
[Page 2]In addition, we should keep in mind that the new government must be responsive to public pressures, especially from the students, to a greater degree than the previous government. While the United States presence was not a major issue in the recent overthrow of the Thanom regime, it is one that we know is on the minds of many student and public opinion leaders. As a result we would anticipate that, before long, we will see this issue brought again to prominence. We would expect the government to react by pressing for United States withdrawals to relieve these public pressures. The heat is off for the moment, but it will not necessarily remain off unless pre-emptive action is taken.
We believe, therefore, that from a purely political standpoint, we should not delay discussing with the RTG a timetable for further withdrawals down to a politically defensible target level. That level we judge to be the pre-1972 figure of 32,200 personnel, including TDY B-52’s that were part of the 1972 augmentation. We should not wait for overt public pressures to develop or appear to be influencing the new government to resist the popular will on this matter. If we do, we may be forced into more precipitate action than we wish, and our image in Thailand could be damaged.
The main issue raised in the DOD study is one of timing for withdrawals down to 32,200. In effect the DOD study asks us to decide whether to reach this level by January 1, 1974 or by July 1, 1974. We note that DOD does not have a united position on this question. The Secretary of Defense favors the slower schedule; both JCS and ISA favor the faster.
We do not believe that purely Thai political considerations as we know them point strongly toward either option. More important, perhaps, is our assessment of security conditions in Indochina and the symbolic [Page 3] effect upon Hanoi. Indochina circumstances of today do not, however, weigh the scales decisively in favor of either of the short-term deployment options set forth in the DOD study. The uncertainty of developments during the coming dry season suggests only that we approach our deployments in Thailand with caution and flexibility.
Because the main issue is one of timing, because relevant political and regional security circumstances are murky, and because both of the short-term deployment options permit considerable flexibility in execution, we believe no firm decision is necessary at this time. What is important is that we begin talking with the RTG about our plans and put it in a position to assure the Thai public that the subject is, in fact, being addressed in a manner consistent with RTG sovereign rights and Thai interests. It is also important that these discussions lead within a reasonably short period of time to actual movements of some additional United States forces out of Thailand. It is also desirable from the RTG point of view that we explicitly accept, as an interim goal, reduction to the pre-1971 level of 32,200, including the 8 TDY B-52’s. As for the timing, however, we believe that question should be left open for discussion with the RTG. RTG desires, based upon its interpretations of domestic political forces and Thai security concerns, should be reflected in the schedule we finally decide upon, whether that schedule be one of the options suggested by DOD, or perhaps something in between.
We agree with Deputy Secretary Clements that a decision on longer-term deployments can be deferred until the Southeast Asia military situation stabilizes. Our primary objective for the moment should be to keep our options open. The new RTG leadership has indicated that it expects eventually to have all United States forces withdrawn, but under optimum condition this might be pushed into the future beyond the longer-term timeframe of FY 1975-79 mentioned in the DOD study. The [Page 4] manner in which we carry out our short-term redeployments will have an important bearing on whether we will have any choice for the longer-term.
[signed for]
Thomas Pickering
Executive Secretary
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Central Files, Top Secret Files, Box 4, DEF 1–1 US, 1970–1973. Secret. Barnes signed the memorandum for Pickering. Drafted by Dexter. Concurred in by Rush, Sneider, PM, and EA/RA. The DOD analysis of U.S. Deployments in Thailand, transmitted under Clements memorandum of October 13, is attached but not published. Kissinger requested this DOD study in a memorandum, attached but not published, from August 28. For NSSM 171, see Document 2. ↩
- Pickering transmitted the Department of State’s view on U.S. deployments in Thailand.↩