47. Telegram 1262 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, March 2, 1974, 0255Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
CANBERRA 1262

R 020255Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2685

DEPTO 44

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (RUSH)

SUBJ: MEETING WITH WHITLAM

1.
I HAD EXTENDED LUNCH SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER WHITLAM ON MARCH 1, AT AMBASSADOR GREEN’S RESIDENCE. AFTER EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES AND SMALL TALK INTERSPERSED WITH WHITLAM’S LAUDATORY COMMENTS ON AMERICAN, WHITLAM TOOK INITIATIVE TO RAISE SUBJECT OF HIS RECENT STATEMENT ON VIETNAM BOMBING. OBVIOUSLY HE WAS THOROUGHLY AWARE OF MY PRIOR BARBED CRITICISM TO FOREIGN MINISTER WILLESEE AND AMBASSADOR SHAW. HE HAD FOR OUR SESSION THOROUGHLY PREPARED AND PERHAPS EVEN REHEARSED BRIEF, AND THROUGHOUT HIS DISCOURSE CAREFULLY, WITH CLEAR PAUSES, CHOSE HIS WORDS.
2.
PURPORT OF WHITLAM BRIEF WAS CLOSEST TO AN APOLOGY THIS PROUD MAN COULD DELIVER. RECOGNIZING OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT HIS BOMBING STATEMENT HE POINTED OUT POSITION OPPOSING BOMBING HELD BY HIM SINCE 1967—HANDLING ME CLIPPINGS FROM 1967, PERSONALLY MARKED, ATTACKING BOMBING POLICY OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WHOM HE OTHERWISE GREATLY ADMIRED. BANGKOK STATEMENT WAS ACTUALLY MADE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AND IN PART HARKENED BACK TO ’67 BOMBING. WHITLAM FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGED HIS LANGUAGE INTEMPERATE. HE CONCLUDED WITH MOST FULSOME PRAISE FOR THE “HISTORIC,” SEMINAL “POLICIES OF THE PRESIDENT AND YOURSELF IN DEVELOPING DETENTE WITH SOVIET UNION AND CHINA.
3.
I DID NOT LET WHITLAM OFF THE HOOK EASILY. I REVIEWED FOR HIM REASONS FOR BOMBING OF HANOI IN DECEMBER [Page 2] 1972 AS AGONIZING BUT ESSENTIAL MEASURE TO SECURE PARIS AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS. I REHEARSED OUR OBJECTIONS TO HIS STATEMENT, STRESSING PARTICULARLY, THAT HIS CRITICAL STATEMENTS WERE EXPLOITED AND PLAYED UP BY PRESS AND FOES OF PRESIDENT TO DEBILITATE HIM, LEAVING WHITLAM’S IMAGE AS ENEMY OF PRESIDENT DESPITE HIS OTHER STATEMENTS PRAISING OUR POLICY.
4.
WHITLAM REACTED SPONTANEOUSLY, REMARKING THAT “NO WONDER HE HIT THE ROOF. HE THINKS I STABBED HIM IN THE BACK.” WHITLAM SHEEPISHLY DENIED THAT WAS HIS INTENTION. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE HAD DIFFERENCE WITH OUR POLICIES IN INDOCHINA AND PARTICULARLY CAMBODIA, HE REITERATED HIS PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT’S EFFORTS AND AGREED WHEN I MENTIONED PRESIDENT’S OVERRIDING GOAL TO ESTABLISH “GENERATION OF PEACE.”
5.
IN OTHER RESPECTS, WHITLAM WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO SIGNAL HIS DESIRE FOR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH US AND ACCEPTANCE OF US POLICIES. HE REJECTED KIRK’S NUCLEAR FREE ZONE AS UNREALISTIC SHORT TERM OBJECTIVE; HE AGREED WITH MY EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF DETENTE AND NEED TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY; HE REITERATED HIS INTENTION TO OBTAIN DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND AVOID ANY STATEMENT DAMAGING TO THEIR SECURITY; AND HE REAFFIRMED BARNARD’ S PLEDGE TO WORK OUT NEW VISITS WHILE OUTLINING LEGAL DIFFICULTIES WITH STATES ON THIS ISSUE.
6.
FINAL ACT WAS EXTRAORDINARY AND LENGTHY PRESENTATION BY WHITLAM WITH FRIENDLY BUT POINTED REFERENCE TO PRESS REPORTS THAT AMBASSADOR GREEN HAD BEEN APPOINTED DELIBERATELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF “LEANING ON” WHITLAM GOVERNMENT, AND BY IMPLICATION THIS WAS FORM OF INTERFERENCE IN HIS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE DID, HOWEVER, EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR KNOWLEDGEABLE CAREER AMBASSADORS, LIKE GREEN.
7.
COMMENT: ALL IN ALL THIS WAS EXTRAORDINARY PERFORMANCE BY WHITLAM. HE HAS FULLY COMPREHENDED OUR SIGNALS AND HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY THEM. HE HAS OFFERED A FULL-SCALE TRUCE AND IS PREPARED TO FALL IN LINE IF WE DO LIKEWISE. HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION OF HIS CRITICISM IN US WHICH HE READILY RECOGNIZED SEEMED TO REINFORCE HIS DETERMINATION TO CALL A TRUCE. THERE HAVE [Page 3] BEEN OTHER RECENT INDICATIONS OF WHITLAM’S FRIENDLY LINE, NOT ONLY AT ANZUS BUT FROM BARNARD AND WILLESEE AND FROM SUDDEN EASING IN PAST FEW WEEKS OF EMBASSY CONTACT WITH WHITLAM INNER CAMP OF ADVISORS. WITH WHITLAM, ONE CAN NEVER AFFORD TO BREATH EASILY; HE HAD A SELF-ACKNOWLEDGED TEMPTATION TO MAKE THE ILL-CONSIDERED QUIP AND HE HAS LONG-FELT DISAGREEMENTS WITH US ON INDOCHINA POLICY. BUT, HE SEEMS TO BE GOING TO GREAT LENGTHS, FOR HIM, TO MAKE “HIS PEACE” WITH US. I WOULD ADVISE WE GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS INTENTIONS.

RUSH

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105, Australia, March–August, 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.
  2. Rush described his meeting with Whitlam.