21. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Kissinger1

Fulbright Letter—Pell Resolution

Your office asked me today to give you background on the correspondence related to Senator Pell’s resolution, which calls upon the United States Government to take the initiative for a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war (Tab B) and a letter for your signature to Senator Pell (Tab A).

The Under Secretaries Committee, in response to a request from the President dated March 2, 1971, requested a study of the possible implications of weather modification on our international relations (Tab C). This study, which also examined the military implications of weather modification, was forwarded to the President on February 12, 1972. In early 1972 Senator Pell introduced a resolution similar to the one introduced this year, and I testified on behalf of the Department at hearings conducted on the resolution in July 1972. Senator Fulbright on March 21, 1973 wrote to Secretary Rogers requesting coordinated Executive Branch comments on the revised resolution (Tab D). Mr. Rush wrote to Senator Pell on July 30 and August 28 about this matter and discussed it with him at a luncheon on July 19. However, Mr. Rush’s letter and comments have not gone beyond stating that we have this matter under review. There has been no substantive reply to Senator Fulbright’s letter of March 21, since the Department believes [Page 47] it cannot be responsive to the letter in the absence of a reexamination of the whole question of military uses of weather modification.

The Under Secretaries Committee memorandum of February 12, 1972, which forwarded to the President the study mentioned above, said, after noting that it did not have access to all classified information on military applications of weather modification:

“As regards our long-term policy, the members of this Committee are agreed that if there is convincing evidence—not available to this Committee—that military use of weather modification against an enemy is essential to our national security, then the U.S. would necessarily have to hold military options open, even at the expense of progress and cooperation in civilian programs.

However, if no such evidence is brought to bear on this matter or if the employment of weather modification against an enemy is regarded as possibly useful under limited circumstances but not essential, most members of this Committee would support early consideration of an initiative to propose a ban on hostile uses of weather modification. The Department of Defense does not share this view.”

NSDM 165 of May 2, 1972 (Tab E), which was issued in response to the USC study, said in part, “The President has decided to defer decision on the matter of policy governing military aspects of weather modification.”

In July 1972, as the main government witness at the hearings on the earlier version of the resolution, I presented the case against adoption of the resolution at that time on the grounds that there was considerable uncertainty regarding the technical status of weather modification activities. I also cited the uncertainty about verifying compliance with a treaty dealing with the military aspects of environment modification.

I doubt, as do Mr. Rush, ACDA, the Department of Commerce, and my colleagues in the Department, whether this position is any longer credible. It is not responsive to the argument made by Senator Pell that geophysical warfare should be proscribed before techniques are developed that would lead to further escalation. It is not consistent with our own conclusions that the military value of weather modification tactics is severely limited by fundamental physical constraints. The official position also fails to take adequately into account growing concern about this matter in Congress (Congressmen Gude and Fraser have introduced a resolution in the House similar to Senator Pell’s) and in scientific and academic circles. Considering these factors, Mr. Rush on June 28 asked the President for a review by the USC of the utility of weather modification as a military weapon. He also asked that classified data be provided to authorized members and staff of the USC (Tab G). We have not received a response from the White House.

I am attaching an extract from your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 10 in which you acknowl [Page 48] edged unfamiliarity with Senator Pell’s resolution, but said that since the resolution had been adopted overwhelmingly by the Senate and the North Atlantic Assembly, it had to be taken “extremely seriously” (Tab F).

We see no way to respond constructively to Senator Fulbright’s letter and Senator Pell’s resolution without reexamining the question of military uses of weather modification within a suitable review committee. Moreover, we believe there can be no useful analysis of the problem unless we have access to all the classified information related to the subject.

The attached letter to Senator Pell is intended to assure him that we are taking his resolution as seriously as you said the Department would in your reply to him in the Senate hearings of September 10.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Senator Pell at Tab A.

  1. Summary: Pollack provided Kissinger with background on correspondence related to Senator Pell’s resolution calling for a treaty prohibiting the use of environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war. He requested that Kissinger sign an attached letter to Pell.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Lot 81D309. Secret. Sent through Rush. The date on the memorandum is stamped. An attached note from Rush to Kissinger reads: “I would like to emphasize the main point in this memorandum, namely that we examine our policy on weather modification—by a restricted group if necessary—on the basis of classified as well as unclassified information.” Kissinger added the following notation to Scowcroft at the bottom of Rush’s note: “To Brent—Get NSSM on weather modification.” Grove sent copies of Pollack’s memorandum and Rush’s note to Davis under a November 6 memorandum, indicating that Rush had asked him to send the documents to her. (Ibid.) Tab A is Document 22. Tab B, a copy of Senate Resolution 71, is attached but not published. Tabs C–F are not attached and not found; Tab G is Document 9.